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1The concept of federalism deals generally with the division of powers between
national and regional (state) governments.  Under federalism, both levels of government
operate simultaneously and exercise power directly over the people representing
somewhat of a compromise between the two extreme forms of government (with unitary
and confederate structures at the two extremes) in terms of power centralization.  In the
context of HMI, the federalist view considers the equitable distribution between states of
the federal income tax benefit derived from the HMI deduction.
Ortiz, Dennis S. The home mortgage interest deduction for federal income tax: A
federalist perspective. Doctor of Philosophy (Accounting). August, 2000. 209 pp., 31
tables, 2 figures, references, 142 titles.
 The debate over federal income tax treatment of home mortgage interest (HMI)
has largely overlooked an important, and possibly unintended political and economic
consequence of our federal income tax system.  The distribution of the for home
mortgage interest deduction tax benefit across states is a possible missing consideration. 
Specifically, this study offers a federalist1 perspective on the federal income tax benefit
from the deduction for HMI - one of the largest personal federal tax expenditures on the
books.  This dissertation analyzes current national political rhetoric from a federalist
perspective.  Discussion also includes background, current status, and proposed changes
to the tax code for of the HMI deduction.
First, a Tobit regression is used to analyze the distribution of the HMI tax benefit
across states and to test for disproportionate distribution across states in benefit derived
from the federal income tax deduction for home mortgage interest beyond that which is
explained by income.  This initial part of the study is also the precursor to a hierarchical
analysis seeking to identify significant factors affecting the distribution of the benefit of
the HMI deduction across states. The Ernst and Young/University of Michigan Individual
Model File of 1992 tax returns is the primary data source for this initial part of the
investigation.
The second part of the analysis examines the effect of sets of factors in a causal
hierarchy on the HMI deduction benefit.  By first controlling for the effects of personal
and identifiable state characteristics on HMI deduction benefit, the possible existence of a
residual socio-political force is tested. The primary data sources for this part of the study
are the 1990 Census of Population and Housing 5% Public Use Microsample as well as
tax data extracted from the Statistics of Income, Individual Public Use Tax File, Level III
Sample, as well as others.   Ridge regression is used for hypothesis testing.
Results indicate the existence of a significant difference in the benefit from home
mortgage interest deduction across states holding income constant.  This study also finds
that a set of personal as well as a set of state market, legal and tax characteristics
significantly influence the taxpayer’s HMI deduction benefit, and that a residual
difference in benefit across states after controlling for personal and identified state
attributes.  Future study should examine the source of residual across state differences
(attributed to socio-political differences between states).  Federal housing goals may be
frustrated as the effective subsidy actually helps support higher home prices in areas
where high housing costs may already be a barrier to potential new homeownership.  The
concepts and techniques applied in this study could easily be applied to other provisions
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This dissertation contributes to the federal income tax debate by bringing to light
the consequences of the tax laws and regulations under which our economic system
operates.  Specifically, this study offers a federalist  perspective on one of the largest
personal federal tax expenditures - the deduction for home mortgage interest (HMI). 
Discussion also includes background, current status, and proposed changes to the tax
code for of the (HMI) deduction.
This dissertation analyzes current national political rhetoric from a federalist
perspective (i.e., with consideration given to the right of states to equal treatment).  The
distribution of the HMI deduction tax benefit between states is introduced here as a
possible missing consideration in the national level political debate that dominates current
discussion of the HMI deduction.
There are two main parts to the empirical analysis.  First, a Tobit regression is
used to analyze the distribution of the home mortgage interest (HMI) tax benefit across
states and to test for disproportionate distribution across states.  The focus of this first
part of the study is on answering the question of whether there is a difference between
states in terms of the benefit derived from the federal income tax deduction for home
mortgage interest beyond that which is explained by income.  This initial part of the study
is the precursor to a hierarchical analysis seeking to identify significant factors affecting
the distribution of the benefit of the HMI deduction across states. The primary data source
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is the Ernst and Young/University of Michigan Individual Model File of 1992 tax returns.
The second part of the analysis examines the effect of sets of factors in a causal
hierarchy on the HMI deduction benefit.  By first controlling for the effects of personal
and identifiable state characteristics on HMI deduction benefit, the possible existence of a
residual socio-political force is tested. The primary data sources are the 1990 Census of
Population and Housing (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993) 5% Public Use
Microsample (PUMS) as well as 1989 tax data extracted from the Statistics of Income,
Individual Public Use Tax File, Level III Sample.  Other sources include the Federal
Housing Finance Board (FHFB), Mortgage Bankers of America (MBA), U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstracts. 
Hypothesis testing is conducted with the use of a Ridge regression analysis.
The primary purpose of this research is to identify the possible existence of a
wealth transfer between states.  Once identified, public finance theory should be applied
to the normative issue of desirability of such redistribution (as future research).  At a
simplistic level, the equity argument against wealth transfers is understandable.  From the
standpoint of national housing policy, however, the issue is further complicated by the
likelihood that if a transfer exists, resources are probably flowing from low cost of
housing states to those where housing costs are high.  In this case, the transfer, as a
subsidy of higher priced homes, compounds problems related to cost of home ownership. 
Thus, federal housing goals may actually be frustrated as the effective subsidy actually
helps 
support even higher home prices in areas where high housing costs may already be a
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barrier to potential new home ownership.
Despite some controversy over what should or should not be termed a   tax
expenditure,   most of the items on the official tax expenditure lists--from mortgage
interest deductions to capital gains breaks--are generally agreed to be deviations from fair
tax policy that are functionally equivalent to spending programs. 
In the current study, owner-occupied housing is accepted as a public good (as
suggested by White and Schollaert 1993).  Research has shown conclusively that owner
occupied housing is at least associated with socially desirable behavior.  An example is
that children of home owners demonstrate a higher likelihood of finishing high school
and a lower likelihood of having children or of being arrested while they are teenagers
(Capozza et al. 1996).
A primary objective of this study is to answer the question: Is there a difference in
the benefit from home mortgage interest deduction across states holding income
constant?  This study also investigates factors that may contribute to such differences
considering the effect of a set of personal as well as a set of state characteristics on the
taxpayer s HMI deduction benefit.  A potentially important consequence of a difference
in HMI deduction benefit across states after controlling for personal attributes of the
taxpayer is that the deduction, in effect, could result in an unintended wealth transfer
between states.  Such a transfer would be contrary to the notion of fiscal federalism, that
has seen renewed public interest, primarily among conservatives (such as Newt Gingrich,
whose political ideology of this time was influenced by the   decentralization   theme of
 
1Evidence of the objection to a strong central/national government by U.S.
conservatives is abundant in the popular press as exemplified by Watkins (1995).
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Toffler 1980) led by Ronald Reagan (Williamson 1990).1
Even though such interstate transfers have become almost commonplace,
Federalists maintain that the national government has no business effecting resource
transfers across states without good cause (such as, to protect the national interest). 
Based on the political unpopularity of regressive wealth transfers generally, it is further
unlikely that it would be considered politically desirable, much less an important part of
some national strategy, to require lower home price states (that may tend to be poorer
overall) to subsidize their higher priced counterparts.
The concepts and techniques applied in this study could easily be applied to other
provisions of federal tax, or to any other tax system in a federation for that matter.
 
1An important debate to consider in understanding the original intent of the HMI




2.1  The HMI Deduction for Federal Income Tax
2.1.1 History of the HMI deduction, Current Provisions, and Policy Recommendations
2.1.1.1 History of the HMI Deduction
The HMI deduction has been available to taxpayers as part of a personal interest
deduction since 1913 when the 16th amendment to the U.S. Constitution first allowed for
an income tax.  Limits on the HMI deduction were first introduced on October 13, 1987
(P.L. 100-647).  Prior to 1987 the amount of the deduction was unlimited.1
One of the (if not the) most serious challenges to the HMI deduction came in the
early 1980s when, in fulfilling his mandate to study fundamental tax reform, President
Reagan put the longstanding deduction on the table (McLure 1986).  Subsequently, in a
speech to the  National Association of Realtors on May 10, 1984, President Reagan
recanted the potential policy change, promising that his 1985 tax reform proposals   will
not affect home owner tax preferences, including the deduction for mortgage interest 
(Tax Analysts 1984).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA  86), although not directly impacting the HMI
deduction, by instituting a phase-out of the itemized deduction for consumer interest, had
 
2Tax Analysts (1985) reported that during a 1985 European trip, President Reagan
caught Treasury Department and White House officials who had reviewed the president s
speech, as well as aides traveling with Reagan off guard when he commented that the new
tax reform and simplification proposal he would submit to Congress would   not only cut
rates but make them less progressive.    The president  s statement marked a major change
in tax policy or a misuse of the word   progressive.   (Tax Analysts 1985 citing Anne
Swardson, 5-8-85, p. 1; 5-9-85, p. B1.)  Meanwhile, others in the press (e.g., The Wall
Street Journal) reported deteriorating congressional support for tax reform as President
Reagan and the Treasury Department opted for  several major tax breaks in the revised
tax reform package.
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an important effect on the use of mortgage interest (although not reflected in the present
study due to   blurring   in the data set used of information for higher income taxpayers). 
Having survived  (TRA  86), the next and still today the most serious challenge to the
HMI deduction comes in the form of flat tax proposals.  Early versions of the flat tax
were advocated by President Reagan.2  As the next subsection of this dissertation on the
current provision demonstrates, the HMI deduction remains largely intact.  The
subsection after next on proposed changes in the law, however, reflects the fact that, as
far as many are concerned, the HMI deduction is still   on the table. 
2.1.1.2 Current Provision as of 1997
The only personal interest that is deductible today is that on debt secured by a
taxpayer s primary or secondary residence.  Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Paragraph
163(h)(3) sets forth the limits for the amount of such deduction:  (1) interest paid or
accrued on a maximum of $1,000,000 of acquisition indebtedness, or debt otherwise
grandfathered in, plus (2) interest on a maximum of $100,000 of home equity debt (3) 
subject to a cap equal to the market value of the property.  Interest on a home equity loan
not used to buy, build or improve your home (or second home) is an AMT adjustment.
 
3Since Internal Revenue Code Section 68 which provides for the phase out of
itemized deductions for higher income taxpayers was first introduced for tax years
beginning after December 31, 1990 (RIA, 2000), the effect of this provision is partially
lost (primarily for married taxpayers filing jointly) for the 1992 tax year effecting the
Individual Model File based portion of this study.  Since the phase out was not in effect
prior to 1991, this provision has no impact on the Census based analysis where incomes
reported are for 1989 (even though Census data are also censored at higher income levels
to some degree).
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An individual whose AGI (Adjusted Gross Income) exceeds $100,000 for tax
years beginning after December 31, 1990 (indexed for inflation, $105,250 for 1992,
$114,700 for 1995) is required to reduce the amount of allowable itemized deductions by
3% of the excess of AGI over $100,000 (for 1991, the first year in which IRC Section 68
took effect).3  The reduction cannot exceed 80% of otherwise allowable deductions
(excluding deductible medical expenses, investment interest, casualty, theft, and wagering
losses).  No reduction is required in the case of medical, investment interest, casualty,
theft, and wagering losses.
2.1.1.3 Policy Recommendations
Although the purpose of this study is not to analyze the possible effects of policy
proposals in this area of the income tax, this subsection discusses proposals to cure the
distributional problems with the HMI deduction.  Special emphasis is given to the idea of
indexing to account for interstate disparities.
2.1.1.3.1 Proposed Changes Regarding Home Mortgage Interest
Recent attention paid to federal tax expenditures including the HMI deduction is
understandable given the problem of the size of the national debt.  Proposed changes to
the current IRC provisions regarding the HMI deduction include: (1) eliminating the
 
4In commenting on the Clinton economic proposal, members of Congress voiced
concern over possible changes in the HMI deduction (Tax Analysts 1993).
5Johnston (1996) reports that in response to (then Republican Senator from
Oregon and chairman of the Senate Finance Committee) Robert Packwood s early 1996
proposal to limit the mortgage interest deduction to interest on the first $300,000 of
mortgage debt, the home builders   association expressed concern that the cut   would fall
hardest on California, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia and
Florida because they have three-fourths of all homes valued at $250,000 or more.   
America s Community Bankers et al. (1995) similarly reply to the same proposed
$300,000 cap on eligible debt, that such a policy   would be unequally distributed across
the nation, with high-cost housing locations such as Hawaii and California and parts of
the Northeast experiencing major home price declines.  Moreover, if the proposal is
adopted without an indexation provision, the share of homes affected will increase over
time as home prices rise. 
During his failed campaign for the 1996 Republican presidential nomination,
Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania suggested not allowing a deduction on mortgage
balances above $100,000. 
6CBO proposal recommends capping the  mortgage interest  deduction at $12,000
per single return, $ 20,000 per joint return, and $ 10,000 per return for married couples
who file separately.
Also, the final report of the Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax
Reform, chaired by J. Robert Kerrey included a recommendation to phase in HMI
deduction limits between 1995 and 2000 (Tax Analysts 1995a).
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deduction altogether (Hall 1987; Representative Armey s Freedom and Fairness
Restoration Act of 1994; Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Tax Analysts 1994), (2)
reducing the cap on the amount of deduction allowed to interest on the first $500,0004, or
$300,000 of debt (Tax Analysts 1995a, see CBO analysis in Tax Analysts 1994, 1995c
and e5), or the first $100,000 of mortgage debt (as proposed by Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa,
see Tax Analysts 1995d), or similarly, the first $12,000 of interest paid (Hall 1987; Tax
Analysts 1995c6), (3) replacing the present deduction with a credit (Sunley 1977; Hall
1987; Luttman 1988 and Luttman and Spindle 1994 suggesting replacement of all
itemized deductions with a single credit), (4) providing some form of rental deduction or
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credit (Hall 1987), (5) providing a general housing deduction or credit (Hall 1987), (6)
eliminating or limiting the deduction for second homes (Tax Analysts 1993; see CBO
proposal in Tax Analysts 1995c and 1995e), and/or (7) taxation of rental value of the
home as income under Simpson s definition of income (Pechman 1989).   Other
possibilities enumerated by America s Community Bankers et al. (1995) (most of which
are also evaluated by CBO) include limiting the benefit of itemized deductions to 15
percent, as well as including mortgage interest deduction amounts in the calculation of
the alternative minimum tax, and replacing itemized deductions with a consumption tax. 
Finally, the   USA Tax System   plan of Sens. Pete V. Domenici, R-N.M., and Sam Nunn,
D-Ga., retains the deduction entirely (Tax Analysts 1995d).
Republicans running for their party s nomination in the 1996 presidential race
were divided on the mortgage-interest deduction. Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr. wanted to
eliminate it; Patrick Buchanan wanted to keep it, and Senators Bob Dole and Phil Gramm
avoided a hard position. 
Astute observers have noted that any radical change in the HMI deduction would
probably require some transition.  One proposed plan would be to grandfather those who
already have mortgages,  letting them deduct mortgage interest until they sell their homes
or refinance; another possibility would be to phase out the deduction over, say, a decade.
Further, one problem with a phase-out is that people with adjustable rate mortgages might
see their interest rates fall and reap the benefit of lower rates and a tax deduction. 
2.1.1.3.2 Indexing
Finally, although analysis is beyond the scope of the present research, this
 
7Indexing to achieve tax equity objectives has actually taken on two forms: (1) the
type of cross-sectional indexing as applied to municipal bond interest (IRC Sec. 103)
(discussed above), as well as in the context of federal grants-in-aid (discussed elsewhere
in this dissertation), and (2) inflation indexing to account for changes in living costs
across time.  The second type of indexing is applied to personal income tax brackets other
than the 36% bracket and 39.6% bracket (that does not apply until 1993 and later tax
years.  See IRC Sec. 1(f)), the standard deduction (IRC Sec. 1(f)), the personal exemption
(IRC Sec. 151(1)(d)), and the earned income credit (IRC Sec. 32(i)).  Although
accounting for inflation is certainly possible, cross-sectional (cross-state) indexing is of
particular interest in the context of a dramatically lowered HMI deduction cap.
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dissertation proposes that an indexation scheme associated with a lower cap, as alluded to
by America s Community Bankers et al. (1995) be added to the list of proposed options.
With regard to suggested lowering of the cap on mortgage loans eligible for
deduction from the current $1 million, when you begin considering lowering the cap on
the HMI deduction you run into the problem of finding a cap that is equitable across
states, as lowering the cap on regular mortgages could create significant regional
disparities due to the wide range of housing costs.  It is interesting to note that cross-
location variation in home price is less for lower income households (i.e., most of the
variation in average home price probably comes from differences on the upper end of the
scale (Weinstein, 1979)).  The idea of indexing a cap has precedent in U.S. tax policy (see
Kenyon and Kincaid (1991)  for detailed discussion of the effects of indexing applied to
tax exemption of interest on state and local borrowing).  Analysis of such a policy
proposal (i.e., an indexed cap on deductible HMI) should be the subject of future
research.7
2.1.2 Tax Expenditure
The concept of tax expenditure is fundamental to the motivation for this
 
8In other cases, however, an item such as the deduction for property taxes may be
regarded on tax policy grounds as an adjustment in computing ability to pay taxes rather
than a subsidy.
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dissertation.    Tax expenditure   is the official term for a government spending program
that is implemented through the tax system.  To understand the nature of tax expenditure
it is informative to examine the words of the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation:
  Special tax provisions are referred to as tax expenditures because they are considered to
be analogous to direct outlay programs. . . . Tax expenditures are most similar to those
direct spending programs that have no spending limits, and that are available as
entitlements.   Joint Committee on Taxation, 1994, p. 2. See also Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93- 344), sec. 3(a)(3).
Each year, the congressional Joint Tax Committee and the Department of
Treasury must report their tax expenditures and estimated costs.  These   tax expenditure
budgets   include most tax provisions that are considered by some analysts to be the
equivalent of spending programs.8  The HMI deduction is generally regarded as one such
  subsidy.    Some analysts go so far as to refer to such subsidies as   entitlements   (CTJ).
2.1.2.1 Redistributive Expenditure
It is reasonable to argue that the deductibility of HMI goes beyond the first time
and middle-class home buyers incentive that normally justifies its existence, and that its
benefit to the rich fits in the category of tax breaks often referred to as   loopholes.    
This dissertation further argues that (in agreement with Pace 1996) spending is
spending, whether it be through a government appropriation or through a deduction
granted in the tax code. Both have the effect of using government funds to subsidize
 
9  Both tax exemptions and  tax deductibility are a form of government subsidy
that is administered through  the tax system.   (Pace 1996 citing Regan v. Taxation with
Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 1988).
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social behavior and implement public policy.9  In terms of whether this spending is
justified (an issue that is beyond the scope of this dissertation), the nation must carefully
consider its priorities.
2.1.2.2 The Nature of the HMI Deduction: Tax or Expenditure?
The purpose of this dissertation is not to take a position on whether the HMI
deduction expenditure is justified, but rather to answer the question:  Does it redistribute
resources from state to state?  If the answer is affirmative, is there adequate justification
for the federal government to act in such a manner?  If it is to be argued that such transfer
is based on the power of Congress   To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the ... general Welfare of the United States 
(U.S. Constitution, Article. I. Section. 8. Clause 1), then two important issues must be
settled:  (1) does the deduction constitute a tax or an expenditure?, and (2) does it actually
promote, or provide for the general welfare?
If the HMI deduction is considered a tax (or part of one), then the Sixteenth
Amendment applies, and there is no constitutional issue with respect to the provision in
question.  If this is the case, then the issues of state sovereignty and tax equity are the
only bases for investigating the state-to-state transfer aspect of the deduction.  
If, on the other hand, it can be maintained that the deduction is actually an
expenditure, similar in nature to an appropriation, then, as Pace (1996) and others believe,
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in light of  the effort to help maintain a balanced federal budget, perhaps Congress should
consider  putting a stop to such government spending through the tax code on the grounds
that wealthy individuals should not be permitted such a generous subsidy.  
There is no doubt among legal scholars that Congress has been using the tax  code
as a vehicle for implementing social policy, but as I am unaware of a rational social or
economic policy reason for at least the higher levels of HMI deductibility, one
explanation emerges as likely:  it must be the strength of the real estate and home finance
industry lobbies that keeps Congress from rectifying this injustice.  In any case, a large
part of the deduction appears to fail the   promote the general Welfare   constitutional
requirement.
 Under traditional  tax expenditure  analysis, whether the deductibility of HMI
payments would be termed a   tax expenditure   (as the term is used in the Budget Reform
Act of 1974) would depend on whether or not the expense was considered to be
associated with the production of income (Surrey and McDaniels 1976). If the rental
value of the home were taxed as income (as under a Haig-Simons definition of income),
HMI payments could theoretically be viewed as an   ordinary and necessary   business
expense, and one might argue that the deduction of these payments is necessary to the
application of a normal income tax--part of the revenue raising nature of the tax system.
However, if you adopt the view that the expense is not   ordinary and necessary   to the
production of income, then its deductibility would constitute a   tax expenditure.    Under
the present definition of income then, it is appropriate to treat the HMI deduction as a tax
 
10Courts have held that tax law is intended to tax only net income, not gross
income, and should not be used to promote nontax policy. See Pace (1996) at note 188 for
case references. 
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expenditure rather than an adjustment to gross income in deriving net or taxable income.10
2.1.2.3 Size and Income Distribution of the HMI Deduction Expenditure
In terms of the overall budget picture the total of all the items in the tax
expenditure budget comes to about $456 billion in fiscal 1995. To put this into
perspective, this represents roughly two and a half times the amount of all means-tested,
direct spending programs, and almost as much as the government spends on defense and
interest on the national debt combined (CTJ).  As Table 9 illustrates, the HMI deduction,
a close second in size only to the tax benefit from employer paid health benefits, is one of
the largest personal expenditures, and ranks as the largest itemized deduction, accounting
for over half of all itemized deductions.
2.1.3 Distribution of the HMI Deduction Benefit
Like all subsidies structured as personal tax deductions, HMI write-offs lead to
  upside-down,   or regressive distributional effects.  That is, the higher a person s income
(and tax bracket), the larger the share of mortgage interest that the government subsidizes. 
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the cross income distribution of the HMI deduction. 
 In 1994, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that about 27 million tax
returns reported a deduction for mortgage interest. That compares to about 63 million
home-owning households. Thus, for one reason or another, more than half of all home
owners get no tax reduction at all from the mortgage interest deduction. Another 40
 
11Measuring benefit as a ratio of the dollar amount of tax benefit over the total tax
paid serves to control for the effect of the progressive rate structure.
12For example, an analysis of tax savings from itemized deductions provided by
McIntyre (1995) is found in Table 8, as well as estimated size and distribution of the
mortgage interest deduction for 1995, by income class (shown in Table 7).
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million or so families rent rather than own, and of course they  get no help from the
mortgage interest subsidy either. On average, mortgage interest deductions are worth
almost $6,000 a year each to taxpayers making more than $200,000, but only $116 a year
to families earning between $30,000 and $40,000.
It seems obvious that a $52 billion a year direct government housing subsidy
program with such an effects would have no chance at all of being enacted. Nevertheless,
the mortgage deduction has been on the books so long and is relied on by so many people, 
that curtailing it would have to be done slowly and gradually to avoid serious unfairness
during the transition. 
As expected with most any deduction allowed under a progressive tax structure,
one certainty about the HMI deduction is its regressive nature.  Not only do higher
income households have a higher propensity to own their homes and have more to spend
on housing, but they benefit more dollar for dollar from their deductions than their lower
income counterparts.11  Numerous analyses show that the benefit of the deduction is
closely and positively correlated with income.12 
A Tax Analysts (1995d) news release shows what income classes actually claim
the HMI deduction.  The analysis shows that the largest group taking advantage of the
deduction, those earning between $50,000 and $75,000 per year represent over 7.6
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million taxpayers representing about 69 percent of the total number of taxpayers for that
income group.  The deduction will reduce this group s taxable income by an estimated
$64.4 billion, or an average of $8,389 per taxpayer/home owner within the group.  By
comparison, even though the number of taxpayers in the $1 million and more income
group is small (only 37,402 taxpayers), their estimated average deduction per taxpayer is
$43,374.  For all 27.4 million taxpayers that will claim the mortgage interest deduction in
1995 (representing almost a quarter of all taxpayers/households), an average deduction of
$8,687 for each is expected.  The difference between rich and poor is compounded even
further when consideration is given to the effect of graduated rate schedules.
Although public attitude on the matter of income redistribution is   divided and
shifting   (see Witte 1985 for detailed discussion) it is probably safe to conclude that some
form of government sponsored income redistribution is generally supported.  Even in
conservative circles, it is agreed that some form of temporary subsidy for the poor, or a
  social safety net,   is acceptable, and that life-cycle redistributions such as Social
Security (Menchik 1991) as well as those in favor of the disabled are worthwhile
functions of government.  Given, in any case, that income redistribution is a function of
government, arguments as to which level of government should perform the redistribution
are inconclusive (Pauly 1972).  
Pauley (1972) makes the argument that:  
if the desired level of [social welfare] is lower under a unitary government,
this happens because unitary government compels people to make
payments for the poor about whom they have no concern [referring to
spatially remote poor, e.g., the poor residents of a state other than that of
the taxpayer s residence].  Such an arrangement can raise the effective
 
13Donald B. Susswein served as tax counsel to the Senate Finance Committee
from 1981 to 1985. 
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price to taxpayers of making payments to those poor about whom they are
concerned.  
What makes the distribution of the HMI deduction particularly interesting is that not only
may the issue of cross-state subsidy be possible, but that rather than the rich subsidizing
the poor, the poor and middle class subsidize the rich.  A possible explanation developed
by Inman and Rubinfeld (1996) is that   middle and upper income households ...
constitute the likely decisive coalition in state politics.    In other words, just as it is
possible that the wealth transfer effected by the HMI deduction serves the interests of the
rich as against the poor, so too it may serve the interests of the residents of certain states
as against residents of others.
Susswein13 (1994) discusses the failure of the traditional tax expenditure budget to
treat as tax expenditures the preferential tax rates enjoyed by some individuals under the
graduated rate structure.  Susswein points out the   strange results   that follow from the
traditional approach, including the fact that lowering tax rates on high-income individuals
technically produces a more equitable distribution of tax expenditures.  Susswein (1994)
recommends adoption of a more comprehensive method of keeping track of income tax
provisions intended to implement social or industrial policies such as the HMI deduction. 
According to the Susswein article, the root of the distortion problem is in the
nature of the tax expenditure budget that was created in 1974 to help Congress understand
the policy effects of the income tax. The problem is that the theory behind the tax
 
14Externalities created by an expenditure are beyond the scope of the present
study.  In this case I consider only the direct tax effect of the expenditure.  If other
research indicates that housing is a public good, this may justify a government subsidy. 
Such subsidy should, however, be directed so as to maximize the public benefit.  In other
words, if it is beneficial to society for someone to own rather than to rent their home, then
subsidize that decision.  The current HMI deduction is not such a subsidy.
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expenditure budget in its present form fails to take into account the most important social
and economic policy embedded in the tax code--that is, the differing rates at which
taxpayers are required to pay their income taxes. 
Given that incomes vary significantly from state to state (an assertion that can be
easily tested), former tax counsel to the Senate Finance Committee (from 1981 to 1985)
Donald B. Susswein s (1994) implication for the present study is that a cross-subsidy
from lower- to upper-income states should be expected due to the progressive federal
income tax rate structure.
The present study analyzes the distribution of the federal tax expenditure for the
HMI deduction across states.  Assuming that the proceeds from disallowance of the HMI
deduction would be distributed among the states either in the form of a reduced national
debt, or a general reduction of federal income taxes, winners and losers (i.e., states whose
residents pay less than their pro rata share and those who pay more) should emerge under
the current distribution scheme.14  The question of how to measure the benefit of the
deduction is addressed in the methodology chapters of this study.
In an effort to keep the analysis as simple as possible, I proceed under the
assumption that the present tax structure is acceptable in terms of the distribution of
burden of payment (as opposed to   economic   burden) across income levels of the
 
15Aaron (1972) was one of the first to address the tax benefit question with respect
to owner occupied housing; also see de Leeuw (1971) for an overview of early cross-
sectional housing demand literature.
16Externalities created by an expenditure are beyond the scope of the present
study.  In this case I consider only the direct tax effect of the expenditure.  If other
research indicates that housing is a public good, this may justify a government subsidy. 
Such subsidy should, however, be directed so as to maximize the public benefit.  In other
words, if it is beneficial to society for someone to own rather than to rent their home, then
subsidize that decision.  The current HMI deduction is not such a subsidy.
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population.  Past research has shown quite clearly that the federal tax expenditure to
subsidize HMI is skewed in favor of the upper income levels (i.e., is regressive).15  The
focus of the present study is on the distribution of the expenditure across states within 
income levels, rather than simply across income levels.  In other words, a major goal of
this dissertation is to examine its distribution across states holding incomes constant.
As an example of the existence of myth in the tax rhetoric, the following quote is
attributed to Senator Russell Long:    Don  t tax you, don t tax me, Tax that fellow behind
the tree   (Miller 1993, citing George F. Will, Morality and the Martini Lunch. Newsweek,
Oct. 17, 1977, at 120).  In terms of the HMI deduction, one myth is that, as a tax
deduction, everyone who qualifies to take the HMI deduction benefits from the policy (it
is a sort of   free lunch  ).  Therefore, no one should object to it.  When viewed as a
federal expenditure program, however, the deduction takes on a different complexion.  As
everyone knows, with any expenditure there is no such thing as a free lunch.16
Another common misperception is that the United States enjoys a high rate of
home ownership (relative to other industrialized nations), and that this is due to the HMI
tax deduction (see Bartlett s 1996 counter to this argument, also in subchapter 2.2 of this
 
17Perpetuated by real estate industry proponents (Brinner et al. 1995) as well as
some politicians (for example see Senator D Amato s comments quoted from Tax
Analysts 1995e in subchapter 2.2 Current political debate surrounding the HMI
deduction, of this dissertation).
18Through higher prices of overall housing services resulting from the HMI
subsidy as well as the federal subsidy interest costs for rental property, the poor are
probably hurt in terms of their chances of affording their own home.
19An example of the upside-down effect: Two taxpayers A & B each take the same
$1,000 deduction.  Taxpayer A is in a 15% marginal tax bracket while B is in a 39.6%
bracket.  The government s expenditure on A is $150 ($1,000*15%) while B s same
$1,000 deduction cost the government $396 ($1,000*39.6%).
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dissertation).17
In terms of the potential to achieve progressivity (or even neutrality), it is
important to recognize certain inherent limitations at the outset.  First, by the very nature
of the activity being subsidized it is unlikely that many, if any, of the poor will ever
benefit directly from any subsidy of home ownership.18  Assistance for this group must be
dealt with separately.  On the other hand, there is ample room for improvement in the
area of designing a policy that more closely accomplishes its stated objective.
It is important to recognize that as long as an income tax system has a progressive
rate structure this will inevitably result in an   upside-down   or regressive effect on any
tax expenditure styled as a deduction (McIntyre 1995, and Susswein 1994).19  In this
dissertation, the present progressive rate structure is accepted as given and controlled in
the empirical analysis.
It is not difficult to understand public disapproval of  any form of government
involvement in redistributions favoring special business interests (which includes the
HMI deduction to a large extent).  Confusion surrounding the HMI deduction stems
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largely from the fact that it enjoys the support of both powerful special interests such as
the real estate and mortgage banking industries (America s Community Bankers et al.
1995, as well as Brinner et al.1995 writing for the National Association of Realtors), as
well as existing home owners, and more objective parties who support home ownership
as a public good.  The point is that support for home ownership and the desire to
subsidize certain classes of potential home purchasers may be misdirected into support
for the HMI deduction.  This is particularly true if the deduction acts to encourage higher
home prices in areas where high prices act as a barrier to entry to the home market, as
well as cases where taxpayer income is too low to allow full use of the deduction.
2.2  Current Political Debate Surrounding the HMI Deduction
This subchapter is intended to place the HMI deduction in terms of its political
importance as well as to illustrate the positions taken on the issue by significant political
interests.  Although determination of the correct (be that most efficient, most equitable,
etc.) policy on this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is important to view
the HMI deduction in light of the federal government s strategy with respect to the
expenditure.  This subchapter deals briefly with the strategy issue as well.  It is interesting
to note that, although traces of concern for fiscal federalism appear in this debate, the
issue of federalism has not been a dominant concern.
The current political debate regarding the HMI deduction is dominated on one
side by real estate and mortgage banking interests wishing to preserve the HMI deduction. 
On the other side, the HMI deduction is opposed by those in favor of broadening the
federal income tax base (typically in the form of a flat tax).  Further, the mortgage-interest
 
20Such behavioral effects include: (1) reduced incentive for home ownership as a
result of a reduction in both the after tax cost of home ownership of between 10 and
16.1% resulting in a $1.7 trillion loss of equity, as well as a reduction in the relative value
of a home as compared with other investment opportunities, (2) reduced property tax
revenues, also as a result of lower real estate prices, (3) elevated levels of default losses
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deduction has been referred to as   the most treasured tax benefit of the middle class.   
The largest benefits, however, are reaped by the affluent with some 44 percent of the tax
benefit in 1995 going to the five percent of households earning $100,000 or more. 
Bruce Bartlett of the National Center for Policy Analysis (a non-profit,
nonpartisan research institute) responds to many of the claims of HMI deduction
advocates in the real estate and real estate finance industries.  Essentially, these groups
supporting the HMI deduction have taken the position of opposing the flat tax, primarily
because of the probability that a flat tax would eliminate or seriously reduce the HMI
deduction.  Bartlett (1996), responding largely to the Brinner et al. (1995) paper reporting
the DRI/McGraw-Hill (a private economic consulting firm) study results.  The DRI study,
that was sponsored by the politically powerful National Association of Realtors, attempts
to bolster the real estate industry position on several of the key issues in the HMI
deduction/flat tax debate.
Bartlett challenges conclusions drawn from the DRI study by Brinner et al. (1995)
that eliminating the HMI deduction would adversely impact home ownership, as well as
impose unfair hardship on real estate and related industries.  Real estate and mortgage
banking industry organizations (America s Community of Bankers et al. 1995; Brinner
1995; and others) argue that reduction or elimination of the HMI deduction would have
numerous adverse behavioral effects.20
 
estimated at about $11 billion resulting from the elimination of the HMI deduction,
capital erosion, commercial bank failures and credit contraction, (4) reduced spending on
amenities resulting in a diminished standard of living, and finally (5) a general decline in
the real estate industry leading to numerous adverse economic consequences.
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Most recent opposition to the HMI deduction stemmed from concern over the
federal deficit, and the view that the HMI deduction represents largely a subsidy of the
real estate industry.  Numerous flat tax proposals have recommended elimination of the
deduction primarily as a base broadening measure (Freedom and Fairness Restoration
Act of 1994 sponsored by Representative Armey).  Other flat tax proposals advocate its
preservation.
During the March 2, 1995 Finance Committee hearing on middle-income tax
proposals (Tax Analysts 1995e), demonstrating awareness of the federalism issue in the
context of the HMI deduction, then Senate Finance Committee Chairman Packwood
commented:
If you want to see an interesting dichotomy, posed to an audience of
basically upper income people, this question. And you are right on your
percentages. I figure three percent  [of home mortgages are] above $
250,000 on the [amount of] mortgage interest. There are relatively few
mortgages above $ 250,000.
If you would limit the mortgage interest deduction to $ 250,000 you could,
dollar-for-dollar, pay for an individual 17 percent capital gains tax rate.
Ask them which they would prefer. If you are in  Des Moines,  they prefer
the capital gain. If you are in downtown San Francisco, they prefer the
home.
Whether the motive was a concern for fiscal federalism, merely a pro-business
posturing on the issue, or both, at that time Packwood s statement is important in that it
places the federalism issue in the political debate over the HMI deduction, and reflected
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the struggle between housing industry interests and other non-housing related business
interests toward the HMI deduction (as well as other itemized deductions).  There
appeared to be a strong preference on the part of the business community in general for
the capital gains tax break (Stephen E. Nordlinger. Venture capitalists defend special tax
treatment for capital gains.  The Baltimore Sun, May 5, 1985 referenced by Tax Analysts
1985).   Leading up to TRA  86, when it appeared that many of the proposals in the
Treasury tax plan would be detrimental to business, corporate policymakers felt that, to
the extent that a trade-off was likely, priority should be given to reducing the federal
deficit (i.e., reducing tax cuts) over tax simplification.  Astute business leaders must have
realized that to be of any size, such a capital gains cut might preclude a mortgage interest
break in a deficit reducing or at least revenue neutral package.
During a March, 1995 Senate Finance Committee hearing on middle-income tax
proposals (Tax Analysts 1995e), then Chairman Packwood recognized that the social
policy imbedded in the mortgage interest deduction was   to create broad middle class
home ownership.    Later in the same discussion, Senator D Amato commented that   I
just think that it (the HMI deduction) is the cornerstone for home ownership in this
country.    D Amato continues, commenting on the value of the HMI deduction to   a
young couple moving from an apartment.    To which Senator Moynihan replies   I do not
think that there is a very strong relationship to be found there that home ownership
depends on the home mortgage interest deduction.    Packwood immediately agrees   You
can go even further. Canada has no home mortgage deduction.  They have roughly the
same percentage of home ownership that we do.    The chairman further comments on the
 
21The unanswered question is why don  t the lower cost regions come to mind?  Is
it that they fear the ripple effect of damage to the national status quo that might result
from a shock to the major metropolitan housing markets?  Investigation of this issue is
left for future research.
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possibility that the home mortgage deduction has artificially increased the price of houses
  because as long as you can deduct some portion of it you are willing to pay a slightly
higher price, and that without the mortgage deduction you would have lower-priced new
homes. 
Yet, another indication of public officials  awareness of the federalist issue
addressed in this dissertation came on the day before the New York Republican primary. 
As Torry (1996) reports:  Dole supporters Gov. George Pataki and Sen. Alfonse D Amato
commented that the Forbes flat tax plan would   financially hammer   New Yorkers
because they could not  deduct home  mortgage interest  or the state s own steep tax
payments on their federal returns.  
Thus, there is anecdotal evidence of the interest on the part of higher cost of living
states (e.g., New York, see comments by Gov. George Pataki and Sen. Alfonse D Amato)
in the continuation of the HMI deduction.  This is further evidence of the conflict
between higher and lower living cost states in the words of Sen. Robert Packwood of
Oregon.   Support of the HMI deduction may, in essence, be support for the status quo in
highly developed (i.e., more expensive) regions of the country.21
2.2.1 Model Tax Treatment 
1984 U.S. Treasury model tax treatment (as explained by Bradford et al. 1984)
recommends deductibility of HMI as a personal itemized deduction.  Bradford et al.
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explains the Treasury s position as follows:  
The effect of this policy may be equated to allowing any taxpayer to enjoy
tax-free the value of consumption services directly produced by a house
(or other asset), regardless of the method he uses to finance the purchase
of this asset.  The tax-free income allowed is thus the same whether he
[the taxpayer] chooses to purchase the asset out of funds previously
accumulated or to obtain a mortgage loan for the purpose.
In other words, allowing a deduction for HMI levels the playing field in terms of tax
effect between wealthy taxpayers who choose to finance a home with   funds previously
accumulated,   and others who may need to finance their home purchase.  This result
comes about because the taxpayer with other invested capital is currently (before buying
the residence) paying tax on the income from the home, thus will save that tax by shifting
the investment capital to a residence.  No such effect occurs when the home buyer must
finance.  Nevertheless, the model allows for the argument in favor of disallowing interest
deduction on tax base widening grounds as well as to end the   tax bias against renting. 
This position reflects an attempt on the part of Treasury to level the playing field
between those who must borrow to finance a home purchase and those who have access
to   previously accumulated   funds.  The only alternative means of leveling the playing
field would involve measuring and taxation of implicit rental income from the owner-
occupied home--a quagmire the Treasury wisely wished to avoid.
In other words, there are obvious differences between lower (renters) and middle
(owner-financed) classes as well as between middle and upper (owner-non-financed)
classes.  HMI deduction intensifies the difference between low and middle, but mitigates
the difference between middle and upper economic levels.  The implication is that
 
22Although not shown in the table, the position of middle income taxpayers can
differ from that of either their lower or upper income counterparts.
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perhaps this is not a single linear function, but rather there is a structural change in the
function across income/wealth levels.
Part of Treasury s argument, also, is that HMI deduction benefit is likely not to be
a linear function of wealth/income.  Rather, as shown in Table 10, both the critical
housing finance issues as well as the effect of the HMI deduction differ greatly between
lower and upper income taxpayers.22
2.2.2 Political Compromise
In his criticism of TRA 86 Pechman (1989) discusses what he calls   earmarks of
numerous political compromises.     In his discussion of the 1986 Tax Reform, he refers
to existing federal tax subsidy of owner occupied housing as   (p)erhaps the most
unsatisfactory feature of the act. 
Regardless of the rhetoric used, one thing is clear--the real estate and mortgage
banking industries stand to suffer the brunt of any reduction in the HMI deduction.  Thus,
it is safe to assume that these industry lobbies have attempted to preserve their tax
favored status.  Finally, given the obvious bias on the part of the federal government, it is
probably safe to say the likelihood that the U.S. public spends more than the natural
market equilibrium amount on personal residence.
2.2.3 The Federal Administration
In terms of the intended consequences of the HMI deduction, the position of the
Clinton administration and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
 
23Ashley et al. (1996) provides an extensive literature review in this area.  Using a
combined archival and survey methodology, they offer evidence that, although past
research has had mixed results, the HMI deduction is an important factor in the home
purchase decision only for upper income taxpayers (as defined by the IRS).
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(HUD) deserves mention.  The HUD   National Homeownership Strategy,   developed
under Housing Secretary Henry Cisneros in 1994, is capsulized in the slogan   the goal
67.5%   (i.e., a national home ownership rate of 67.5%).  The question   Why
homeownership?   is addressed by referring to four fundamental national benefits or areas
of commitment associated with home ownership23:  (1) personal financial security, (2)
strengthening families and good citizenship, (3) community, and (4) economic growth.
(HUD National Homeownership Strategy and Background)
The Clinton Administration  s goals with regard to home ownership are
summarized in the HUD   National Homeownership Goals.    The statement of these goals
includes recognition of the fact that upper income households headed by persons over 45
years of age have done well in terms of home ownership; their younger counterparts with
less income have actually experienced significantly declining rates of home ownership. 
Also noted are the low rates of home ownership for African-American and Hispanic
households.  The Administration sees a   special responsibility and an important
opportunity to target underserved populations. 
The basic theme of the National Homeownership Strategy, then, is to reach an all-
time high level of home ownership by cutting the cost of home ownership (particularly
for those potential home owners who are presently   priced out   of the market), opening
up markets for home ownership (with emphasis on minority households), and expanding
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home ownership opportunities primarily through education (presumably targeted at
disadvantaged segments of the population).  In the HUD 100-item action plan, actions 29-
51 deal specifically with cutting transaction costs, reducing down payment and mortgage
costs, and increasing availability of financing.
Given what is known about the distribution of the HMI deduction across income
and ethnic categories, the only HUD objective that appears particularly well served by the
HMI deduction may be that of economic growth through stimulation of the housing
industry.
2.2.4 Political Power
It may simply be that the HMI deduction represents the use of political power to
effect a wealth transfer, rather than an attempt to achieve any particular social goal.  As
Inman and Rubinfeld (1996) comment regarding the federal subsidy of state taxation of
housing (i.e., the deductibility of real property taxes): 
The rate of subsidy is the taxpayer s federal income tax rate and is limited
to only those who itemize their deductions; typically, middle and upper
income households.  By the arguments here, middle and upper income
households are the appropriate target group [to receive the tax benefit], for
they constitute the likely decisive coalition in state politics.
 
Inman and Rubinfeld (1996), in their discussion of legislative choice models, remind us
that federal government legislatures are merely   representatives elected from the states
with a mandate to represent the preferences and concerns of their state constituents.   
Future research might examine lobbying and voting on HMI deduction and related issues 
(particularly in the mid 1980s surrounding the 1986 and 1987 Tax Acts) to seek evidence
of federalist bias.
 
24In the context of the wide range of economic development incentives currently
offered throughout the 50 states, Kenyon and Kincaid (1991) question whether such
incentives merely shift activity (and thus resources) from one jurisdiction to another.
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Perhaps a major cause of the lack of success experienced by flat tax legislation to
date is the problem of the impact on the flat tax rate required in order to maintain the
seemingly indestructible HMI deduction.
Despite the potentially beneficial behavioral consequences of increased home
ownership, in terms of actually footing the bill for the HMI deduction, it can reasonably
be argued that such subsidy is largely a zero-sum game.24  The seemingly national support
for the HMI deduction is evidence that this point is not widely understood.  As in all such
cases, it is of interest to ask who wins and loses.
2.2.5 International Evidence
The National Center for Policy Research (Bartlett 1996), takes a position against
the pro-HMI deduction lobby.  Bartlett argues that, based on observable rates of home
ownership where interest is not deductible, international data suggest that the HMI
deduction may not have as significant an effect on housing as the opposition believes.
Bartlett shows that home ownership rates in other countries do not appear sensitive to
HMI deductibility. Israel and Australia, for example, have home ownership rates
significantly higher than the United States and no mortgage interest deductibility.  Also,
Canadian and Japanese home ownership rates are about the same as in the United States,
with no deductibility.  France and the Netherlands, on the other hand, have much lower
home ownership rates despite mortgage interest deductibility and higher tax rates. 
2.2.6 Home Ownership and the Community
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In order to put the HMI deduction in proper context one must consider the relative
necessity of home ownership.  For example, most would agree that   a home   (i.e., a
shelter, as opposed to being homeless) for each of its citizens should be a fundamental
goal for a civilized nation.  Further, in an egalitarian society, to the extent that a citizen or
class of society is homeless, those who are more fortunate should be willing to provide
financial aid for their less fortunate counterparts.  Home ownership, on the other hand,
while desirable, does not share the same level of basic necessity as a fundamental human
need.  In other words, home ownership (particularly in the case of upper income citizens)
is, by its nature, different than a welfare program.  Where one might favor income
redistribution for the purpose of providing basic shelter for the homeless, one might
reasonably reject the idea of income redistribution for the purpose of promoting home
ownership.
Hopefully, an American citizen who is fortunate enough to have his or her basic
shelter need met would be interested in helping others who are not as fortunate, regardless
of where either lived.  While the benefits of home ownership (and thus its desirability) are
undisputed, it is not necessarily the case, however, that a resident of Des Moines is
interested in subsidizing home ownership for a resident of San Francisco.  In other words,
while good citizens of every community are interested in doing their share to promote the
standard of life in their own community, it is not necessarily true that residents of one
community feel obligated to make financial sacrifices for the benefit of residents of other
communities beyond a basic level of welfare.
It seems unfair and illogical to ask someone to make financial sacrifice for the
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benefit of someone else who is better off than themselves.  To some extent, this is what
the HMI deduction accomplishes.  If I choose to live in San Francisco (perhaps because I
can earn a higher wage there than elsewhere), is it fair to ask a resident of Des Moines
(who may be giving up earning potential by living there) to subsidize me for a non-
necessity?
Musgrave s 1965 argument that personal preferences differ furthers the case
against a national level HMI deduction (or at least in favor of some sort of indexing).  
Other concerns that further cloud the issue of public sentiment include (Sheffrin
1993): (1) the lack of public understanding of such concepts necessary to the
understanding of the effects of taxation, and (2) to the extent that an issue has not been
discussed seriously in the public domain and public opinion will be ill-formed and
volatile on that issue.
2.3  Fiscal Federalism
The philosophy of federalism is a key factor in motivating the present study.  The
purpose of this subchapter is to briefly define federalism and its significance in American
society, and its expected importance in federal tax policy--in particular, its possible
significance with respect to the HMI deduction for federal income tax.  A more detailed
historical background on the subject is available on request.
The concept of federalism deals generally with the division of powers between
national and regional (state) governments.  Under federalism, both levels of government
operate simultaneously and exercise power directly over the people, with the basic
alternatives to federalism being unitary (i.e., a single, centralized control structure) and
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confederate (i.e., a completely decentralized control structure with all political power
resting at the state level) forms of government.  Thus, federalism represents somewhat of
a compromise between the two extreme forms of government in terms of power
centralization.
At the time of the formation of the United States, the Federalist founders were
concerned that direct democratic power would be suboptimal, since masses could
manipulate government to play a confiscatory role by redistributing wealth through the
tyranny of a majority.  At the same time, antifederalist leaders feared that government
would be controlled by commercial elites who would not be motivated to act in the
interest of the common good.  Madison, therefore, proposed federalism--with divided
government, checks and balances, and pluralism of interests--as a means of moderating
the clash of interests between monied and debtor classes (Ladenheim, 1999a).  
In his descriptions of the evolution of the relationship between the states and the
national government, Ladenheim, (1999b) includes a chronology of critical points in the
evolution of U.S. federalism, with particular focus on the second half of the twentieth
century. Finally, it offers several useful web links for further exploration.  Ladenheim
(1999b) presents the Sixteenth Amendment, adopted in 1913, as a   watershed for modern
federalism.    Although the size of the tax was extremely modest by today's standards, it
created the foundation for twentieth century federalism, with its emphasis on
intergovernmental transfers and the use of taxing and spending powers to further national
policies. 
2.4  State-to-State Variation in the Mortgage and Fair Housing Environments
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The fiscal federalism literature examines across-state disparities in federal
expenditures.  Normally, however, in the context of tax expenditures, Federalists tend to
focus on expenditures with more or less direct impact on state budgets such as the
deductibility of state and local taxes, as well as the excludability of interest income from
state and local obligations.  As this subchapter shows, there are many differences between
states that provided a reasonable basis to expect the possible existence of cross-state
differences in the federal income tax expenditure for the HMI deduction.  An objective of
this dissertation is to bring the HMI deduction into the light of federalist scrutiny.
In his discussion of the economic pitfalls of decentralization, Prud homme (1995)
offers the following rationale for concern over regional disparities in general within a
federal system.  The theoretical justification of the present research extends Prud
homme s notion of regional differences logically to apply to states:
each region is a social and political entity that exists beyond the
individuals who reside there.  In assessing their well-being, the citizens in
a region consider not only their own income but also the income of their
fellow citizens much more than the income of inhabitants of other regions. 
Interregional disparities are not merely statistical artifacts; their perception
is a sociological reality.  There is a political demand for action to reduce
interjurisdictional disparities.
Detailed discussion of specific personal and state characteristics is included later in this
dissertation as part of the discussion of fully partialled model variables.
Regarding fair housing, in testing Hypotheses 6 and 7 (as stated in subchapter 4.5
of this dissertation), the possible existence of noticeable state-to-state differences in the
HMI deduction benefit resulting from the respective state s fair housing environment
(HUD 1979; Metcalf 1988; BNA 1988; Turner, et al. 1991; Yinger 1999) is tested.  Fair
 
25It was in Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 that Congress made explicit
the Nation s policy on fair housing.
26Tenure choice is defined as the decision to own versus rent ones residence.
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housing (as defined in the 1968 Civil Rights Act) refers to the basic human right to
  choose a place to live, within one s means   (Yinger 1999).  It is important to recognize
that the effect on HMI deduction distribution of most fair housing cases is probably
negligible, however these cases are hypothesized to be a reasonable proxy for an overall
environment conducive to equal home ownership opportunity.
  For purposes of this study, fair housing is measured principally by looking at
whether the state or its various localities has been recognized by the Assistant Secretary
for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity as being   substantially equivalent   to Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196825 (Bureau of National Affairs 1988), as well as other
factors contributing to the homeownres   ability to enjoy fair housing.
2.5  Tenure Choice, Housing Demand and Mortgage Choice
The economics literature in the areas of Tenure Choice,26 Housing Demand and
Mortgage Choice provide much of the theoretical basis for the second part (the fully
partialled model) of this study.  This subchapter contains a short summary of the
literature.
2.5.1 Tenure Choice and Housing Demand
First, in terms of the closely related issues of tenure choice and housing demand,
the idea that the housing decision is actually a joint process is well developed in the
 
27Li and Trost use 1971 PSID data to first test for simultaneity between the
expenditures and choice decision models.  The analysis uses a maximum likelihood ratio
test of the ratio of the vector of assumed unrelated OLS and Probit estimates of the
expenditure and tenure models respectively in the numerator, over the vector of two-stage
maximum likelihood estimates in the denominator.  The asymptotically distributed X2
ratio indicates statistically significant simultaneity.
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economics literature.  Li and Trost (1977) similarly found simultaneity present.27  A
significant contribution of the Li and Trost (1977) paper is that previous studies modeling
the housing choice processes independently are suspected of yielding biased estimates,
and that accounting for simultaneity is, thus, appropriate. 
Rosen (1979a) uses the 1970 PSID to extend the housing choice literature by
developing a model that allows for investigation of the impact of the implicit tax subsidy
on both decisions.
The economics literature is replete with models of tenure choice, each slightly
different from the other, but with the vast majority of more recent studies including tax
effects in some form or another.  A fundamental tenet underlying this literature is that the
relative cost of renting versus owning influences the tenure choice decision.  One might
argue that there is actually no difference between renting and owning in terms of the
benefit of a tax deduction for mortgage interest because both the home owner and the
landlord are entitled to the same deduction.  On the other hand, there is little question that
for the home owner who itemizes, the HMI deduction results in real cash savings. 
Although as Ashley et al. (1996) point out, results are somewhat mixed, there is abundant
empirical support for the theory that tax effects are an important determinant of home
ownership.   Since the HMI deduction for federal income taxes provides a cost advantage
 
28MSAs are defined by the Bureau of the Census as   relatively freestanding 
metropolitan areas not closely associated with other metropolitan areas, and typically
surrounded by nonmetropolitan areas (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1993).
29Financial variables include out-of-pocket costs, expected appreciation, and
opportunity costs of equity in the house.  For a rented household, out-of-pocket cost is the
gross rent.  For the owner occupied household it consists of mortgage and real estate tax
payments, utility costs, insurance payments, etc., reduced by estimated savings on federal
income taxes resulting from deductibility of payments.  Borsch-Supan and Pitken (1988)
find out-of-pocket costs to be highly significant in determining tenure choice.  In the
present study, the focus is on out-of-pocket costs.  Consideration of expected appreciation
and opportunity costs is omitted.
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to owning over renting for those who mortgage, it (the HMI deduction) should be among
the explanatory variables in a model seeking to explain the choice between renting and
owning.
Borsch-Supan and Pitken (1988), using data from the 1977 Annual Housing
Survey for the Albany-Schenectady-Troy, New York, MSA (Metropolitan Statistical
Area28), to estimate a model of tenure choice and housing demand categorize tenure
choice explanatory variables as either demographic or financial.29  Demographic variables
used by Borsch-Supan and Pitken (1988) include marital status, number of children, age,
and race.  A drawback to the Borsch-Supan and Pitken (1988) model results from its
design and purpose--to evaluate a single metropolitan area.  Wilson (1979), Murdock and
Hamm (1988), Narwold and Sonstelie (1992), Linneman (1985) (discussed in subsection
2.4.3.2 Demographics) contribute to this literature.
Rosen and Rosen (1980) use a time series to show that tenure choice is largely a
function of the relative prices of renting versus owning, and that for the period from 1949
to 1974, the long run home ownership rate would have been some four percent lower
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without federal income tax subsidies (including not only HMI deduction, but property tax
deduction and exclusion of imputed rental value of the home as well).  In a separate
study, Rosen (1979b) finds similar results.  In the present study, a major drawback is the
inability to measure the cost of renting at the household level.
It should be noted that often the tenure choice decision is modeled concurrently
with the   housing demand   decision.  The two are not equal where tenure choice refers to
the choice between renting and owning (assumed to be closely related to the length of
time or tenure in that home).  Housing demand, on the other hand, has to do with the
characteristics of the home chosen (e.g., number of bedrooms, bathrooms, size of the
home, etc.).  
2.5.2 Mortgage Choice
Recently, and influenced largely by the research efforts of a Canadian Economist
Lawrence Jones (see Jones 1986, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995a and 1995b), a body of
literature has developed that looks empirically at the determinants of mortgage debt. 
Early research in this area questioned whether mortgage borrowing was more supply or
demand determined, whether the demand portion was properly characterized as consumer
credit related, or more derived from asset demand and portfolio optimization (as in Jones
1986).   Advances in the mortgage choice literature are reviewed by Folain in 1990. 
More recently, Jones (1994 and 1995a) decomposes the demand side of mortgage debt
based on the realization that not all mortgage debt is used to finance home purchase (i.e.,
recognizing the existence of non-housing related financing via home mortgage), as well
as the possibility that some home financing may be from non-mortgage sources.  In short,
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demand for housing and demand for mortgage debt are not necessarily inextricably
related.
For purposes of the present study, a rudimentary model of mortgage demand is
used to model potential differences between states that might ultimately result in
differences between states in the benefit from the HMI deduction.
Although sometimes for different reasons, it is not surprising that the group of
variables that impacted the mortgage choice decision bears resemblance to the group that
impacts housing decisions (tenure and demand).  A major exception to the similarity
between the two groups of causal variables (i.e., housing and mortgage choice) may have
to do with the legal environment of the mortgage industry that can vary from state to
state.  A review of selected legal/regulatory factors is available on request.
As discussed above in Section 2.5.1 of this dissertation   Tenure Choice and
Housing Choice,   there is widespread (although somewhat controversial) theoretical and
empirical support for the claim that the HMI deduction is a factor in the tenure choice
decision.  Modeling the joint demand for housing and mortgage debt, however, leads into
an area of the literature that is relatively less developed.  
Aside from the fact that at an intuitive level it is reasonable to assume a joint or
simultaneous process of tenure choice, housing demand and mortgage choice, there is
support in the literature for such a proposition.  Henderson and Ioannides (1986) examine
the joint tenure choice and housing demand functions with a significant addition.  They
introduce a   rationing function   into the tenure choice function to represent the
possibility that a family may be excluded from the mortgage market.  This can occur
 
40
when a loan officer perceives a high default risk with a particular family, or because of
discrimination.  Henderson and Ioannides (1986) hypothesize that high risk may be
inferred (by the loan officer)   on the basis of age, sex, race, low education or low current
income, controlling for socioeconomic characteristics.  They might discriminate on the
same basis.    The hierarchical model discussed in Chapter IV of this dissertation is a
preliminary step in exploring this possible three-way joint process, factoring in
differences between states.  
The literature on   redlining   in mortgage lending generally supports the
Henderson and Ioannides (1986) hypothesis of rationing.  In his 1985 theoretical paper,
however, Ostas (1985) explains that the empirical work in the area of redlining suffers
from the problem of identification.  That is, alleged redlining behavior is observed in
certain areas, but the problem (particularly with reduced form models) is to disentangle
supply or mortgage lending influences from those on the demand side.  Ostas (1985)
develops a skeletal model of the mortgage and housing markets.
Jones (1993) points out that two streams of literature have developed dealing with
home mortgage debt.  The first considers borrowers   choices of loan attributes from a
  menu   made available by lenders (see Folain 1990 for a comprehensive overview).  The
second focuses on the borrowers option to terminate the loan contract (a comprehensive
overview is provided by Hendershott and Van Order 1989).  Jones (1993) further points
out the partial nature of both streams of literature in that the desired debt level is not
endogenized (i.e., it is not determined within the model).  
Jones (1993) speculates that the lack of a model accounting for the desired debt
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level is a result of a hypothesized   strong linkage   between mortgage and housing
demand.  Pointing out the fact that nearly half of U.S. home owners have no mortgage
debt, the strong linkage hypothesis is questioned.  Results suggest that mortgage demand




METHODOLOGY - INDIVIDUAL MODEL FILE (IMF) ANALYSIS
3.1  General Overview
This first part of the analysis focuses on the Statistics of Income Individual Model
File as the dataset used for empirical study.  The general approach here is to first test for
significance of the effect of income and state of residence on mortgage interest deduction
benefit.  Then, assuming significant effects are found, the next step is to partial out the
effect of income and test for a residual effect of state of residence.
3.2  Preliminary Analysis
The data analysis performed in this study involves mainly the first two steps of
what Hartwig and Dearing (1979) describe as a four-step exploratory data analysis
process.  The first of the four steps involves the preliminary, or descriptive, analysis of
single variables, and is discussed further in Section 3.2.1 below.  The second step begins
to consider relationships between variables, however it is limited to bivariate analysis. 
This second step results in several of the hypotheses tested in this study.  Finally, the third
and fourth steps are the construction of a model involving multiple variables, and the
testing of causal relationships.  Although the present study ventures into this third and
fourth steps at a conceptual level, and in a very limited way with the actual data analysis,
these last two steps of the analysis are the subject of future research.
The first step in the actual data analysis involves the preliminary descriptive
 
1Each case in the IMF contains a weighting factor which could be applied in order
to produce a closer representation of the actual underlying population.
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analysis and   symmetrizing   of the data (i.e., attempting to redistribute the data about its
mean in a more symmetric fashion so as to approximate a normal distribution).  Since the
state-by-state perspective has not been examined closely in prior literature, some
reporting of this basic process is appropriate.  The process here is to describe and possibly
reexpress/transform the data as necessary.
3.2.1 Description
Although the procedures actually used may extend beyond those suggested here,
at a minimum, the single variable descriptive methods suggested by Hartwig and Dearing
(1979)  are used to describe the data in terms of the three basic characteristics of location,
spread and shape.  
One of the most important and obvious characteristics of the data chosen for this
study is the fact that the dependent variable, HMI deduction benefit, is a censored
variable.  A censored regression model is one in which the dependent variable value is cut
off for some observations (in the case of the HMI deduction tax benefit, at zero), however
the corresponding independent variable information is available (Pindyck and Rubenfeld
1991).
For HMI deduction federal income tax benefit (the dependent variable), Table 1
provides the following descriptive statistics by state: mean HMI benefit per tax return,
number of returns in the sample, standard deviation, median, minimum, maximum, and
variance.1  It is important to note that the figures provided in Table 1 are statistics of the
 
2According to Hartwig and Dearing (1979), non-normality and non-linearity (that
arises in the bivariate analysis step that follows) are not the same thing; however, the two
  go hand in hand.    In any case, reexpression is a   useful response   to either. 
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data set used to test the hypotheses listed below.  They are derived from the IMF
(Individual Model File), a stratified random sample which systematically over samples
from higher income levels, and which is also truncated for this study at income greater
than $200,000 (due to suppression of the state identification for such cases).  Thus, while
these data are effective for purposes of comparing between states, they should not be
interpreted as representing the overall population.  
Also of importance in determining the reference group for testing H3, Colorado,
with a mean HMI benefit of $658 per return comes closest to the national average of $657
per return.
3.2.2 Reexpression
At this point in the analysis of a variable, if non-normality is detected, this is an
opportune time to consider possible transformation or reexpression of that variable.  This
may be accomplished through the application of some arithmetic function other than the
one on which the variable was originally recorded.  The purpose here is to rescale the data
so as to cure the non-normality in a way that can be related back to the original data.2
In the IMF, taxpayer AGI (Adjusted Gross Income, a key independent variable in
this study) is, as expected, both highly skewed, as well as heteroskedastic.  Throughout
the literature, income measures are frequently logged as a cure for both the
heteroskedasticity and skewness, which are normal characteristics of most income
measures.  Since the income measure chosen for the present study, however, is the
 
3The two forms of the income variable were similar, and the log transformation
produced a slightly stronger association with the dependent variable.  The results of the
log transformation are reported below.  Due probably to the strength of the causal
relationships among variables, there was, however, no significant difference in the overall
outcome of any of the three hypotheses tested between the two forms of the income
variable.  In order to log the income variable without losing those with negative AGI (a
significant number of cases), it was also necessary to add a constant amount of 4,400,000
to AGI.  This figure was chosen because the bottom end of the range of AGIs was
4,389,000 and this was a round number which made all AGIs positive, thus preserving all
cases.
Since the AGI variable was truncated at the high end, and AGI values below zero
indicate no taxable income and, thus, should have no effect on HMI tax benefit,
truncation at the low end could also be considered as a further transformation option
which would tend to improve the linearity of this variable.
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taxpayer s AGI, the distribution of this tax reporting figure tends to be lower than most
other income measures (i.e., most of the adjustments to AGI in deriving the income
measures used in other studies tend to be primarily positive or   add back   adjustments). 
As a result, of this characteristic of AGI, combined with the effect of high end truncation,
the income measure used in the present study is, although right skewed as normally is the
case, actually highly heteroskedastic with increased variance at both the high and low
income levels.  The result of this effect is that the normal log transformation provides
only a marginal improvement in the skewness problem (while actually having an adverse
effect on heteroskedasticity).3
3.3  Data
3.3.1 Tax Database Overview
The data set used to test hypotheses regarding differences in HMI tax deduction
benefit between states is the Internal Revenue Service 1992 Individual Public Use Tax
File (IMF) compiled as part of the Statistics of Income Program (Individual Statistics
 
4Although most of the 113.6 million returns in the population were filed for the
1992 calendar year, a few were actually filed for prior years during the 1993 calendar year
and were used in place of a 1992 return under the assumption that the yet unfiled 1992
return was best represented by the returns for previous income years processed in 1993. 
Also, tentative and amended returns were not sampled.
5This blurring and loss of high income cases results in obvious limitations on the
generalizability of these results.  
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Branch, SOI 1992).  The 1992 IMF contains 93,262 records compiled from a stratified
random probability sample chosen to represent all unaudited individual income tax
returns filed either by U.S. citizens or U.S. residents for the 1992 tax year.4  Each record
represents an individual tax return (i.e., either a 1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ) filed during
1993.  As of Summer 1997, the 1992 IMF is the most recent file available.
Of the original sample of 93,262 tax returns, 32,976 are unusable because they
have no state code.  All but 288 of these have no state code as a result of blurring due to
high income (for confidentiality purposes).  The remainder have no state code for reasons
other than high income leaving a usable sample of 60,286 returns.5
3.3.2 Income Variable
There are several choices for the income variable.  Income measurement varies
widely depending on data used.  In the present study, AGI is used as the income metric
because it is considered to be the best measure of what is thought of as income in a tax
context.  Because of the motivation on the part of most taxpayers to minimize current tax
liability, AGI will tend to be lower than most other common definitions of income.
Because of the close theoretical linkage between the mortgage interest deduction
and income, the measurement of taxpayer income is expected to be of critical importance
 
6Future research should examine the relationship between income and mortgage
consumption in order to determine the precise level of income where this relationship
changes.
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in terms of the results of this empirical analysis.  A limitation of the chosen data is the
lack of information about taxpayer wealth other than income, thus income must serve as a
proxy for wealth.  
Income measurement varies widely depending on data used.  Nonetheless, income
(or its natural log as it is often specified) is generally one of the most highly significant
causal factors, and is included in virtually all housing and mortgage choice models. 
Higher income is associated with a greater tendency to own, increased housing service
demanded, and increased mortgage demand (up to a certain level6).  
Rosen (1979a), using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (not usable for the
present study due to its failure to represent each of the 50 states as well as its omission of
rural households from the sample), employs the concept of   net permanent income,   that
is the sum of permanent adjusted gross income after taxes, transfer payments (i.e., Social
Security, public assistance, etc.), and net imputed rent.  
In analyzing the process of measuring the distributional effects of tax changes for
the Congress, Davis (1991) discusses various income concepts.  In the   traditional
[distribution] table   analysis, families are classified by   nominal   income groups.  The
advantage of nominal income is that it requires minimal explanation for the Congress.  Its
two main drawbacks are: (1) nominal income does not correlate well with ability-to-pay,
and (2) the number of families in nominal income classes is normally unequal (e.g.,
compare the number of families with incomes between $30,000 and $40,000 with the
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number with incomes above $200,000).  
Another family income measurement technique discussed by Davis (1991) (and
attributed by Davis to the CBO 1987 study), called   adjusted family income,   adjusts
family income relative to the poverty line, that, in turn, is adjusted for family size. 
Further, as applied by CBO (Congressional Budget Office), this measure is normally used
to create percentile groups (overcoming the uncertainty as to the number of families in
each group as with nominal income ranges discussed previously).  The drawbacks of this
technique pointed out by Davis are: (1) the family size adjustment is somewhat arbitrary,
and (2) Congress has relatively more difficulty explaining the concept to their
constituents.
Any discussion of income concepts would be incomplete without mention of the
Haig-Simons definition:  
income is the money value of the net increase to an individual s power to
consume during a period.  This is equal to the amount actually consumed
during the period plus net additions to wealth.
This definition has become the standard of public finance economists against
which any income measure is compared (Rosen 1988).  In the context of an owner-
occupied housing discussion, the primary implication of Haig-Simons is the notion of
  net imputed rental income.    Although numerous (but not all) studies on housing choice
include net imputed rental income, the present dissertation omits further consideration of
the concept.
Yet another concept in the measurement of income is that of annual or temporary
versus lifetime or life cycle income.  As it applies to the present study, the implication
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might be that since the HMI deduction is intended to help first-time home buyers (see
discussion under subchapter 2.2 Current Political Debate Surrounding HMI Deduction),
the deduction might be viewed as a form of life-cycle redistribution.  In this case, the
logical implication would be that a life-cycle accounting period would be more applicable
(Menchik 1991).  For simplicity, however, the present study will use a single year
analysis, leaving cross-temporal considerations for future research.  A possible significant
drawback to the single period approach is that, even with adjustments designed to smooth
out effects of non-recurring items of income, it is widely accepted in the literature that an
average income over a longer period of time is preferable to a single year   snap-shot, 
particularly when income is being used as a proxy for wealth as it is in part in the present
study (Davis 1991).
Other studies have used similar concepts of income for taxpayer classification
purposes.  Some of the common measures used with tax return data are referred to as
expanded income (Joint Committee on Taxation 1985), family economic income (U.S.
Department of Treasury, Office of State and Local Finances 1985), modified expanded
income (Nelson 1987), and adjusted expanded income (Ricketts 1990).  Ricketts (1990)
thoroughly discusses and compares these alternatives.
Adjusted gross income (reported on individual tax returns) was designed to
facilitate tax administration.  Its composition has changed over time making comparison
across time difficult. The Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division
(Individual Income Tax Returns 1991) has developed a measure of individual taxpayer
income called   1979 Total Income   designed primarily to facilitate analysis of changes
 
7The calculation of Total Income for 1991 is available on request.
8The income measure used for this study is the taxpayer s adjusted gross income
per the federal tax return.
9One could, however, assume that under the constraint of rational decision
making, the amount of HMI consumed by a home owner will reflect his or her preference
or need to borrow given housing choice decisions.
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over time across the 1980s (from 1979 through 1991).  The total income concept,
although not applied here, might facilitate future research tracing the determinants of the
HMI deduction across time.7 
Finally, regarding the use of income as a proxy for wealth: wealth functions
differently from income in determining borrowing in that wealth reduces the need to
borrow, where income increases the tax benefit of borrowing.8
3.3.3 Tax Benefit Variables
The federal tax expenditure for HMI deduction must be distinguished from its
close relatives.  First, caution must be exercised not to confuse the tax expenditure with
the benefit to the taxpayer from the HMI deduction.  This would refer to the pleasure or
satisfaction actually received by the taxpayer.  Economists might refer to this as the
taxpayer s utility from his or her consumption of mortgage borrowing.  It is not the goal 
of this study to measure the utility actually derived by an individual or household from
any such consumption.9
3.3.3.1 Change in Dollar Amount of Tax
The dollar amount of benefit from the HMI deduction for each return filed is
computed as the total tax for each return as filed under 1992 law, minus the total tax for
 
10This calculation takes into account the taxpayer s standard deduction so that, for
example, if removing the HMI deduction causes total itemized deductions to fall below
the standard deduction, then the standard deduction replaces itemizing.
11Bezdek and Zampelli (1986) use a similar procedure for calculating tax
expenditure.
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that same return without the benefit of the HMI deduction computed by recalculating the
total tax after reducing itemized deductions by the actual HMI deduction claimed on the
return.10  The effect of the HMI deduction is removed from the tax on a static basis.11
A primary advantage of using the TAXSIM calculator (please see further
discussion of TAXSIM in the Methodology chapters of this dissertation) is that the
process of manually simulating tax liability as done by others (see Zorn (1989), Rosen
(1979a) and Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) for examples) is avoided.  Further, TAXSIM
includes a complete state tax calculator which automatically accounts for the effect of the
interaction between state income tax and federal.
The interaction between state and federal tax assumes that current state tax is
deducted against current federal taxable income.  This simplification results in the timing
of taxpayer state income tax deduction being off by one year in some cases since many
taxpayers actually pay their state income tax (and thus are able to deduct it) in the year
following the year in which the income was claimed.  The effect on this study is assumed
to be trivial.
A key observation regarding the HMI deduction benefit variable is that it is
censored at zero on the low end (see subchapter 3.5 for further discussion).  This censored
distribution indicates the use of a Tobit regression procedure as discussed later in this
 
12Certain fields of these high income returns have also been   blurred   (an
averaging procedure designed to further disguise the taxpayer) including state and local
tax deductions, wages and salaries, and real estate tax deduction.  All returns, regardless
of income level are blurred for state and local tax and real estate tax deductions.  The
HMI deduction amount is not affected by the blurring procedure.
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subsection of this dissertation.
3.3.3.2 Change in Tax as a Percent of Total Tax
In order to take into account the effect of the change in tax relative to the
taxpayer s overall federal income tax bill, the dependent variable described in the
previous subsection (i.e., the dollar amount of benefit from the HMI deduction for each
return) is divided by the taxpayer s total tax including as per the form 1040.  The total tax
amount used includes the effect of the HMI deduction benefit.
3.3.4 State Code Variable
A serious limitation of the tax database chosen for this study results from the
disclosure avoidance procedure required to make the otherwise confidential tax
information available for public use.  The criteria used by SOI to identify returns where
all geographic indicators (i.e., state and region codes) are zeroed out is multi-pronged. 
The state code is zeroed out for all returns with either AGI over $200,000, total income or
loss of $5,000,000 or more, business plus farm receipts of $50,000,000 or more, or for
non-taxable returns with expanded income of $200,000 or more.  Thus, the sample is
effectively truncated, and results must be interpreted with this in mind.12  For the
simplified regression model used to test hypotheses H1-H3 the state code field from the
1992 IMF is converted into a set of 52 0/1 dummy variables.  
A second limitation in the tax database with respect to the state indicator variables
 
13The 1989 federal income tax supertax was essentially an additional five percent
tax on income between certain levels of relatively high income.  For example, for married
couples filing jointly, the tax was paid on income between $74,850 and $155,320.  The
effect of this five percent additional tax is to phase out the benefit of the fifteen percent
bracket and personal exemptions for higher income taxpayers.  This element of the
federal income tax is expected to effect very few returns in the IMF sample, and have
little impact on the results of this study.
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(closely related to the first) is that for smaller states such as Wyoming, Vermont,
Montana, South Dakota and Alaska with 109, 170, 201, 226, and 232 state coded records,
respectively (all of which exceed the largest territory), inadequate sample size may result
in those states being dropped from the analysis.  The  lack of sample size, when interacted
with the high end truncation, further compounds the problem caused by loss of usable
cases because the cases lost will tend to be disproportionate in their HMI deduction
benefit. 
3.4  TAXSIM Simulator
The TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts (1993), and National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) (1999)) calculator made available by the NBER is a FORTRAN
program for calculating Federal and State income tax liability for individual returns.  The
program itself is not released.  Table 5 provides the mapping between IMF data and
TAXSIM input.
As Table 5 shows, although somewhat simplified, the list of TAXSIM input
variables offer sufficient coverage to encompass ordinary and supertax brackets,13 the
earned income credit, the child care credit, the partial taxation of Social Security, and
 
14Although not applicable during the years under study here, the secondary earner
deduction for federal income tax is computed by TAXSIM.
15These are available in the full TAXSIM model, but are not included as part of
Internet TAXSIM (the version used for the IMF portion of this study).
16The procedure described by Feenberg (1997) is designed to test the general
accuracy of the TAXSIM Simulator, hence, focuses on the areas of known deficiency in
the TAXSIM program.  The issue of interest for the present study is more narrowly
focused, and asks whether error in the simulator is correlated with the HMI deduction
benefit which the simulator is used to calculate.  To the extent the HMI deduction benefit
is found not to be significantly correlated with the error, the case is made that the
simulator is reasonably accurate for purposes of the present study.  The procedure used to
answer this question is a modification of the method suggested by Feenberg.
In the discussion that follows, tax refers to the taxpayer  s total federal tax liability.
 The first step in the validation test is to compute the error term from the following OLS
(Ordinary Least Squares) regression:
Tax per IMF = ± + ²1(Tax per TAXSIM) + µ.
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other important features of the tax code.14  Certain features of the tax code which are
ignored by TAXSIM are expected to have minimal impact on the results of this study. 
They include:  the capital gains deduction, limits (such as the limit on the amount of
deductible long term capital loss per year), floors and ceilings on deductions, adjustments,
tax preferences, etc.15
Feenberg (1997) suggests a methodology for validating the TAXSIM calculator.16 
Although such a validation study is beyond the scope of the present analysis, and its lack
represents a weakness in the present study, the need for a validation study also represents
a future research opportunity.
3.5  Regression Procedure
As mentioned previously, an important attribute of  the HMI deduction benefit
 
17This process of testing a general proposition, followed by a more detailed
analysis is commonly referred to as   testing up.   
18Future research in this area should begin to examine the behaviors of some of
the variables that are theoretically linked to the state-to-state differences in HMI
deduction tax benefit.  An hierarchical procedure to test up to a model which is
approximately fully partialled should follow the present study.  
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variable is that it is censored at zero on the low end.  This is to say that at the low end, the
amount of benefit received by a taxpayer from the provision allowing for deduction of
HMI is zero if the taxpayer either does not have sufficient deductions to itemize, or does
not have HMI to deduct.  Although practically speaking this variable is always positive,
because it is theoretically possible for it to be negative the econometric literature suggests
the use of a Tobit model for estimating regression models with this type of departure from
the normal distribution is present in the dependent variable (Maddala (1992) provides
references).  The Tobit model assumes an underlying normal distribution of the
dependent variable were it not for censoring.
3.6  Preliminary Hypotheses (H1-H3)
The hypotheses tested in this study explore the state-to-state differences in the
HMI deduction tax benefit.  The models used to test these hypotheses are not fully
partialled, rather, they are designed to most efficiently address the question of whether or
not state-to-state variation is present in HMI deduction benefit.  For this reason, the
testing in this subchpater is considered preliminary.  If the results of these preliminary
tests indicate the existence of significant state to state variation in the HMI deduction
benefit, further testing (as in H4-H7) is justified.17  All hypotheses below are stated in
their research form.18  The hypotheses of this part of the study are tested using the IMF
 
19Although not tested in the present study, compared to the   a   form (dependent
variable stated in dollars), the  b   form (dependent variable stated as a percentage of total
tax) of the dependent variable might be expected to demonstrate a weaker relationship for
low and middle income taxpayers.  This effect is expected to be the opposite, however,
for high income taxpayers whose itemized deduction benefit is phased out.  The phase out
56
tax database described above where the unit of observation is the 1992 individual tax
return.  Test statistics are derived from a series Tobit regression estimations. 
First, H1 merely confirms the conclusion of prior research by testing for first order
correlation between income and HMI deduction tax benefit.  A simple bivariate
correlation coefficient could be used to test the correlation of these two variables without
regard to causality.  Here, the model is simply:  
HMIBENE = F(Income)
As discussed earlier in this dissertation, and without regard for any other possible factors
that might affect the HMI deduction tax benefit, household income is predicted to be
positively correlated with HMI deduction tax benefit.  Thus, I expect to reject the null
hypotheses in H1.  
Because of the effect of the progressive rate structure, as well as that of other
factors affecting federal income tax (such as filing status, number of dependents, etc.),
each of the first three hypotheses control for the taxpayer s total tax bill by measuring the
HMI deduction tax benefit in the dependent variable as a percentage of total income tax. 
The first three hypotheses, then are stated in an   a   and a   b   form where the former
states the dependent variable in dollars of tax benefit, while the latter stated the dependent
variable as the percent of this tax benefit to the taxpayer s total federal income tax for the
year.19 
 
effect is partially lost with the IMF database due to data censoring or   blurring   of the
data (for taxpayer confidentiality purposes) at AGI above $200,000.  Blurred cases are
omitted from the study because state of residence is not known for these cases. 
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H1 is stated below in its research form for both the dependent variable stated as a
dollar amount, and as a percentage of total tax:
H1a: Income is correlated with HMI deduction tax benefit, as a
dollar amount.
H1b: Income is correlated with HMI deduction tax benefit, as a
percentage of total federal income tax.
It is clear that H1a examines the dollar amount of tax difference for the household. 
Because the   tax benefit   is measured as the dollar amount, it also represents the amount
of federal   tax expenditure   per household, or more accurately per taxpaying unit.
Although discussed in more detail in a later section, due to the simplicity of the
model, H1 could be tested using a simple ANOVA procedure.  Rather, though, a
regression procedure is used.  As will be seen later, the regression results of H1 testing
will be used in testing H3 as well.
H2 tests for first order correlation between HMI deduction tax benefit and the
taxpayer s state of residence.  Stated in their research form, H2a and b are as follows:
H2a: The HMI deduction tax benefit, as a dollar amount, varies
significantly from state-to-state. 
H2b: The HMI deduction tax benefit, as a percentage of total
federal income tax, varies significantly from state-to-state. 
In general terms, the H2 model is as follows:
HMIBENE = F(State of Residence)
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Based on the numerous differences between states with the potential to impact HMI
deduction benefit (including that of differences in income), H2a and b are expected to
show a significant, positive correlation between the set of state variables and the
dependent variable.
As with H1, H2 could be tested using an ANOVA procedure.  As a matter of
preference, however, and to allow for a bit of additional information to be gleaned from
the analysis, a regression approach is used.
  In terms of federalist/equity implications, rejection of the null hypothesis in H2a
indicates uneven distribution of federal tax expenditure across states without considering
the effect of the progressive rate structure.  Rejection of H2b, having controlled for the
effect of the progressive rate structure, would make a stronger statement regarding the
degree of uneven distribution indicated (i.e., since tax benefit would be expected to be
higher in states whose residents pay higher federal income tax due to the effect of the
progressive rate structure on tax liability).  Such an uneven distribution is believed
(anecdotally) to be commonly accepted on the grounds that it is driven by differences in
incomes across states.  This common belief is the basis for H3.
 Finally, H3 tests whether the HMI deduction tax benefit varies significantly from
state-to-state after partialling out the effect of income on tax benefit. 
H3a: Controlling for income, state of residence makes a
difference in the HMI deduction tax benefit, as a dollar
amount.
H3b: Controlling for income, state of residence makes a
difference in the HMI deduction tax benefit, as a percentage
of total income tax.
 
20This method is used by CBO and others, and is discussed by Davis (1991).  It
could be, but is not applied in this dissertation.  
21The likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis might be increased by grouping or
clustering states into   regions   by key characteristics. 
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By measuring tax benefit as a percent of total income tax, H3b would control for
factors other than income that affect the amount of income tax.  For the present analysis
of the HMI deduction, the method considered to accomplish Susswein s (1994) objective
of controlling for the effect of the progressive rate structure is through the use of change
in average or effective tax rate associated with a change in the HMI deduction, or simply
to analyze the deduction amount, thus eliminating the impact of any rate schedule (as in
Tax Analysts (1995d), discussed in section 2.1.3 Distribution of the HMI Deduction
Benefit, of this dissertation).20  
 In terms of the methodology used to test, a partial F-test on the incremental HMI
benefit explained by the set of state dummy variables representing state of residence
provides the test statistic in H3.  The H3 restricted and unrestricted models respectively
are as follows:
HMIBENE = F(Income)                                 
HMIBENE = F(Income + State of Residence)
Rejection of the null hypothesis in H3a or b indicates the existence of an uneven state-to-
state distribution of the HMI deduction tax benefit beyond that which is caused by the
distribution of income across states.21  Such uneven distribution indicates the need for
further exploration in at least two directions: (1) examination of the characteristics of
states that drive the differences (discussed in H4-H6), and (2) identification of which
 
22It might also make sense to examine the possibility that state-to-state variation in
the HMI deduction is not the same across all income levels as the following: 
Hypothesis: State-to-state variation in the HMI deduction
tax benefit is the same for all income levels.
Significance of the coefficient on this (income*state of residence) interaction would
provide a test of this hypothesis.  The following multiple regression model would be
estimated:
HMIBENE = F(Income + Income*State of Residence + State of Residence)
Recall the theory posited earlier, that the decision process that includes mortgage
choice is not the same for everyone.  Particularly, where a poorer household faces a
choice between renting and buying in which a mortgage is the only means of financing,
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states gain and which lose as a result of the HMI deduction differences (discussed in H7).
The regression estimated in testing H3 also provides information on which states 
residents gain and which lose as a result of the HMI deduction.  The reference group in
the set of state dummy variables was Colorado since its average HMI benefit per tax
return is closest to the national average.  Any state with a positive coefficient on its
dummy variable benefitted more than the average, and visa versa for those states with
negative coefficients.  
Without regard to economic significance (i.e., without commenting on the
significance of the dollar amount of the difference, and whether the amount makes an
economic difference to the taxpayer), a state s HMI deduction benefit varies significantly
from the national average if the coefficient on its dummy is statistically significance. 
This result is reported below.
Finally, characteristics of individuals and their state of residence driving
differences in HMI deduction benefit is the topic of the next part of this study.  This next
part of the study must, by necessity utilize a data set with the demographic information
lacking in the SOI Individual Model File used in this first part of the analysis.22
 
the mortgage choice is the   buy   choice.  Because of the existing federal tax structure, the
poorer family may receive little or no tax benefit from the HMI paid, whereas a wealthier
household first decides (probably on the basis of a different set of decision criteria) to
buy, then secondly, selects the means of financing (e.g., one of which is the use of a
mortgage secured by the residence).  It is far more likely that the wealthier family will
benefit taxwise from most or all of the HMI expense incurred.  Also recall that in the
context of federal grants-in-aid, Weinstein (1979) theorizes the existence of larger cost of
living differences at higher income levels than at lower.  On this basis, it is predicted that





METHODOLOGY - CENSUS ANALYSIS
4.1  General Overview and Description of Causal Analysis
As stated in the introduction, the strategy employed in the empirical analysis is to
use a causal hierarchy to first identify significant sets of factors affecting the distribution
of HMI deduction benefit across states.  By controlling for the effects of personal and
identifiable state characteristics on HMI deduction benefit, the possible existence of a
residual socio-political force is tested.  The primary data sources are the 1990 Census of
Population and Housing 5% Public Use Microsample (PUMS) as well as 1989 tax data
extracted from the Statistics of Income, Individual Public Use Tax File, Level III Sample. 
Other sources include the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), Mortgage Bankers of
America (MBA), U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and
Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstracts (U.S. Census Bureau, 1999).  Actual hypothesis
testing employs regression (Ridge, Tobit, and ordinary least squares (OLS)) analysis.
The data analysis performed in this preliminary part of the study concludes the
process discussed in Chapter III (i.e., the Hartwig and Dearing (1990) four-step
exploratory data analysis process). 
Given that the results of the IMF analysis (see Chapter III for methodology and
subchapter 5.2 for results) indicate significant variation in HMI deduction benefit across
states and, thus, the existence of a resource transfer between states, a next logical step is
 
1Because it is hypothesized that certain household characteristics (income, for
example) will tend to vary more from state-to-state at the higher income levels, in testing
state-to-state variation it also may be informative to examine this variation at different
income levels (say low, medium and high).  One way to test the cross income bracket
significance of a variable would be to interact the variable with an income measure (such
as a set of dummy variables indicating an income group such as first, second, third or
fourth quartile).  Once identified, these factors could be individually tested for cross-state
variation.  
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the development of a causal hierarchy for the process of benefitting form the HMI
deduction.  A causal hierarchy analysis (Cohen and Cohen, 1983) identifies those factors
that contribute to variation in the HMI deduction tax benefit.  The factors of interest in
the present study are those which contribute to variation in the HMI tax deduction
benefit.1  The first set of hypotheses tested in the present study examine the causal effects
of a related set of variables (organized in a causal hierarchy) on the HMI deduction
benefit.
4.2  Data
4.2.1 Data Sources and Issues
4.2.1.1 Census (PUMS) Data
The basic household data for this analysis begins with the 1990 Census of
Population and Housing 5% Public Use Microsample (PUMS) state files for CA, CO, FL,
KY, IA, IL, NY and TX.  These data, once converted to tax returns for those households,
are combined with actual tax return statistical data, other demographic data, real estate
and mortgage market data, as well as tax and legal data based on state of residence.  The
remainder of this subsection discusses the issue of deleted cases.
Regarding deleted PUMS cases, from the set of all persons in the PUMS, all
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group quarters and institutional cases are dropped from the sample since the data allows
no clear way to identify home ownership status for these cases.  Finally, within these
households, any person (roomer, boarder, or housemate, etc.) who was likely to be paying
rent to the primary householder, and was also likely (based on age and income) to file
their own separate individual tax return, was also dropped from the sample.  The
remaining households are headed by the primary householder of their place of residence,
who is assumed to be the household s either single or joint taxpayer.  These taxpayers
either rent or own their residence (where the place of residence can be either a single or
multiple housing structure or mobile home).  If they own, they may or may not have a
mortgage.
Approximately 3% of households sampled report the presence of a subfamily.  All
such cases are deleted from the sample to avoid the need for arbitrary assignment of
dependency exemptions between the household head and the subfamily head.  The single
largest group of subfamily members are grandchildren of the householder, followed by
children of the householder.  These two groups, combined with   other relatives   of the
householder constitute the vast majority (nearly 90%) of all subfamily members.  In terms
of dependency exemptions, for purposes of this study, subfamily members are treated the
same as any other household member having the same relationship to the head of
household.  In those cases where this assumption is incorrect, the number of exemptions
claimed on the head of household s tax return is overstated.  Since the actual dependency
relationship between these household members is unknown, the alternative (short of
either dropping these persons from the household, or dropping the household from the
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sample) is to treat all such persons as non-dependents.  In either case, since the effect of
this decision on the results of this analysis is assumed not to be of major significance, and
since leaving these individuals in the sample facilitates further analysis (as part of future
research), these individuals remain in the sample.
As with any survey data, some Census questions may be difficult for subjects to
interpret or respond to correctly.  Incorrect interpretation/response to certain key
questions could have a material impact on the results of this study.  In order to avoid
problems with the allocation of home costs between personal and business uses, housing
units with a combined residential and commercial or significant agricultural sales use
could be dropped from the sample.  For the present analysis, since the amount of
mortgage interest deduction is based on statistical data rather than subjects  response to
the Census questionnaire,  these cases are left in the sample.
4.2.1.2 Tax Return Data
Statistical data from the Statistics of Income, Individual Public Use Tax File Level
III Sample are provided for this study by Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ).  The dependent
variable as well as two independent variables for the regression (one, the average amount
of state income tax payed by taxpayers claiming a deduction, and two, the amount of local
income tax payed which is derived directly from the state income tax measure) are
derived from the 1988 Individual Public Use Tax File Level III Sample.  This subsection
describes the Level III Sample, as well as the computation of the HMIB (Home Mortgage
Interest Benefit) variable.
In comparing the IMF used in the first part of this study with the Level III Sample
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used here, one significant difference is that upper income (AGI greater than $200,000)
returns are included in the Level III sample (recall that the IMF had no upper income
returns), however, these returns are actually   synthetic.    The synthetic upper income
returns are developed by SOI in order to allow for the inclusion (if only on a statistical
basis) of such returns, while at the same time preserving the confidentiality of all
taxpayers.  It is important to point out that due to limitations in the underlying data, not
all 204 cells are filled for all states, resulting in a possible loss of cases.  
In terms of sample size, of the 109,473,036 individual Federal income tax returns
filed for Tax Year 1988, the Level III sample selects 365,225 returns on a stratified (by
AGI) random basis.  These include 364,562 lower and middle income and 663 (13 from
each state plus   other areas  ) upper income (AGI > $200,000) returns.  Recall that the
1992 IMF used in the first part of this dissertation was void of upper income returns.  For
the eight states selected for this analysis, the number of returns on which the CTJ
statistics are actually based ranges from a low of 3,576 lower and middle income, and
4,373 upper income returns not including the 13 synthetic returns (discussed above) for
Iowa, to 44,352 lower and middle income, and 117,478 upper income returns not
including the 13 synthetic returns for California (SOI 1988).  Averages for these returns
are used as a basis for certain variables used in the fully partialled model (including the
dependent variable, discussed below).
The starting point of the CTJ variables (which includes the HMIB dependent as
well as the ASIT (Average State Income Tax Deduction for the household s cohort
group) and LOCIT (Average Estimated Local Income Tax Deduction for the household s
 
2Luttman (1990) discusses database merging with tax data.
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cohort group) variables) is the Internal Revenue Service 1988 Level III Sample.  The
Level III Sample was selected as part of the Statistics of Income program in an effort to
make publicly available statistical information on Form 1040, 1040A, and 1040EZ
individual tax returns filed for 1988.  CTJ has then applied an update procedure to
convert the 1988 returns to approximate 1989 returns.  Detailed information on the
update procedure is available through CTJ (CTJ 1999).  CTJ has then applied their own
tax simulator to the approximated 1989 tax return to derive the average reduction in
federal income tax from the deduction for home mortgage interest for all individual filers. 
The actual HMIB values matched with the PUMS-based tax returns are based on a
3*2*2*17 = 204 cell classification. 
4.2.1.3 Combining PUMS and Tax Return Data
Through the application of a series of assumptions focusing primarily on the
relationships between household members, the PUMS housing/person records remaining
after deletion of certain cases (discussed above) are collapsed into a set of hypothetical
tax returns for the householders.  The detail of the conversion logic is available upon
request.  In summary, however, based on responses to the 1990 Census of Population and
Housing questionnaire, the state of residence, marital status, number of dependents, age,
and income of the taxpayer (previously referred to as householder) and spouse (if any) are
approximated.  These five variables serve as the basis for combining PUMS records with
data derived from actual tax returns.2  In addition to these five characteristics, vital and
other personal characteristics of the householder and spouse are gathered and used as
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right-hand-side variables in the regression model (the detail of which is included below).  
In developing the approximated tax return records for the regression analysis,
these four characteristics of the householder/taxpayer (marital status, number of
dependents, age, and income) form the basis for statistically merging 1989 tax data from
the Individual Public Use Tax File Level III Sample, with the Census-based tax return
records.  Three statistics taken from the Level III Sample are used in the analysis.  These
tax statistics were extracted from the Level III sample, and provided by Citizens for Tax
Justice (CTJ).  Table 11 lists and briefly describes the CTJ variables used in this analysis,
while Tables 12 and 13 describe the PUMS/CTJ matching process.
4.2.2 Model Variables
  Descriptive (univariate) statistics for each of the variables included in the model
are provided in Table 14.  This section discusses these variables in the context of the
causal model.
4.2.2.1 Dependent Variable (HMIB)
As discussed above, the HMIB dependent variable (the average reduction in
federal income tax from the deduction for home mortgage interest for all individual filers)
begins with averages extracted from the Internal Revenue Service 1988 Level III Sample
which CTJ has updated to simulate 1989 returns.  These averages have been merged with
PUMS data based on the 3*2*2*17 classification described above.  Based on the 204 cell
classification, the CTJ value is then assigned to the HMIB variable for cases with a
mortgage (as identified in the PUMS housing record) and a value of zero is assigned for
all others.  Thus, the HMIB variable is used to approximate the actual mortgage interest
 
3An alternative (and preferred) procedure considered for producing the dependent
variable was to use the actual mortgage interest deduction amount along with other
characteristics of the tax return/household as input to the TAXSIM simulator.  Then,
using a procedure similar to that followed in the first part of this study (please see the
section of this study on the analysis of the 1992 IMF dataset), create a tax benefit amount
to be used as the dependent variable.  This added step can be performed as future
research, and the results compared with those of the present study.
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deduction benefit.
Following this procedure, the amount of deduction benefit assigned for returns
with itemized deductions is understated (since the aggregate deduction benefit amount is
spread over returns with and without the deduction).  This understatement should have
the effect of biasing against finding results as variability of the dependent variable is
reduced.  To overcome this shortfall, two alternative procedures for preparing the
dependent variable were considered.  The first alternative was to use the average tax
benefit amount for only those returns with the mortgage interest deduction.  This would
have the benefit of not averaging the benefit over returns without the deduction (as is
done in this study).  By assigning the higher deduction benefit amount (i.e., that based on
only returns with the deduction) to all returns based on the presence of a mortgage, those
returns with a mortgage but without sufficient itemized deductions to actually benefit
from the mortgage interest deduction are assigned a benefit when none is actually present. 
The added variability introduced by this procedure would tend bias in the direction of
finding significance results.  For this reason, the more conservative procedure was
followed.3
Table 15 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variable by state, while





The set of personal characteristics of the taxpayer are divided for discussion
purposes into a set of what the Census literature calls   vital   characteristics, followed by
a set of   other   personal traits.
4.2.2.2.1 Vital Personal Characteristics
The age, race, and relative income of the household head are important factors in
predicting the value of the house.  To the extent that these factors vary significantly from
state to state (as in the case of age) or regionally (as in the case of race), they are expected
to be causal factors in any between-state differences in HMI deduction benefit.  Also,
because factors such as race and sex of the household head may be associated with
discrimination (both in the housing and mortgage markets) that may also vary by state, or
region, their importance for the present study is increased.  Most studies in this area use a
dummy variable for the characteristic (for example, age, sex, race, etc.) of the head of
household to factor in the anticipated effect on the decision process.  These variables may
be contributing factors in any or all of the processes being modeled (e.g., tenure choice
and housing quality decisions, as well as the mortgage choice decision).
Each of the following characteristics describes the individual head of the
household.  The question of interest in this study is whether in aggregate, they constitute
an important feature of the state of residence.  Thus, by examining differences across
states, a significant innovative aspect of this dissertation is that these characteristics are
modeled.
 
4The actual age of   retirement   is both difficult to define and even more difficult
to predict.  Although this study makes no attempt to determine and correct for retirement




The first vital characteristic modeled as a causal variable with respect to home
mortgage interest deduction benefit is age.  Householder/spouse age comes directly from
the PUMS person records.  All other factors held constant, HMI deduction benefit is
predicted to increase as age of the householder increases for ages ranging up to close to
retirement.4  As the householder and the mortgage mature, both housing needs reduce,
and mortgages tend to produce less interest expense.  The result of this change is that
HMI deduction benefit begins to decrease as age continues to increase.  As modeled, the
overall direction of the age effect is not readily predictable.  The model includes both the
average age of all residents for the particular state, as well as the age of the householder. 
In the case of married/joint taxpayers, the age of the highest income spouse is used.
The age of the head of household may have multiple effects.  First, as age
advances, normally until retirement, so does human capital, or the ability to consistently
earn a higher wage, and in turn wealth.  Given the data available for the present study, age
is probably the best proxy for wealth.  With increased wealth, the value of the home is
expected to increase (in part because of an assumed correlation between resources and
ability to purchase a home, but also because the home, as an asset, is part of the owner s
wealth).  At the same time, as wealth increases, the need to finance the purchase of the
home is reduced.  Thus, the amount of mortgage interest is also reduced.  This assumes,
 
5In terms of the effect of increased wealth (assumed to be associated with
increased age) Jones (1986, 1994, 1995a), using Canadian microdata, and others (e.g.,
Ioannides (1989)) provide empirical specifications of debt/equity structures to distinguish
consumption from investment motivated home mortgage activity, attribute a strong
negative correlation found between wealth and mortgage borrowing to be an indication
that wealth and mortgage borrowing are substitutes in financing household portfolio
objectives.  Manchester and Poterba (1989), however, using Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) (U.S.) data interpret the same negative coefficient as
indicating the opposite--that mortgage debt is used primarily to finance consumption. 
Manchester and Poterba conclude that 75% of second mortgage borrowing and 30% of
new borrowing from refinancing first mortgages is used to finance consumption.  Maki
(1995 and 1996), using the Consumer Expenditure Survey panel and focusing on 1986-
1990, finds strong evidence that high income households engaged in portfolio shuffling
from consumer debt to home mortgage debt in response to the TRA  86 phase out of
deductibility of interest paid on consumer debt.  Both conclusions, however support the
proposition that not all mortgage debt is driven strictly by housing choice decisions.  In
fact, one could reasonably question whether the housing choice decision was not itself
partially driven by expected future borrowing needs.  
None of the literature in this area considers the role of state specific lending
restrictions.  For example, although Texas has since repealed its long standing homestead
laws, in 1990, Texas residents were prohibited by law from using their homes as security
for non-housing related debt.  Thus, the interaction of the state variable with age (as a
proxy for wealth) may prove significant in determining the amount of second, and to a
lesser extent, primary mortgage borrowing.
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of course, that the funds raised through the use of debt secured by the home are, in fact,
used for the home5--that is not always the case (e.g., Jones 1994).  
Additionally, to the extent that the average age of household heads is significantly
different from state to state, the average HMI deduction benefit may vary.  For example,
in a states such as Florida and Arizona where, due to their popularity as retirement
communities, the average age of residents is above the national average, the average age
may be a factor driving any difference in average HMI benefit.
Sex
Sex of householder is also provided directly through the PUMS person records. 
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The PUMS person variable (SEX) is used as coded with male equal zero and female
equal one.  The model includes both the sex of the individual householder as a vital
characteristic as well as the percent of males for the particular state of residence as a state
characteristic.    In the case of a married householder, the sex used for this study is that of
the spouse with the highest wage income.  For single householders, being male is
assumed to be an advantage in being positioned to benefit from HMI deduction because
of higher income and ability to buy and finance a home.  With SEX=0 for males, the
coefficient on this variable should be negative, reflecting the negative relationship
between being female and HMI deduction benefit.  For married householders, I am unable
to predict the effect of sex (i.e., that of the higher income spouse) on the dependent
variable, thus sex may not be a significant factor.  Overall, sex should be mildly
significant and negative.
Rosen (1979a), includes the sex of the head of household as a causal variable in
his housing choice model   because demographic differences may influence preferences
between housing and other goods.    Rosen (1979a) finds a significant negative influence
in both models of tenure choice, as well as a model of quantity of housing services
demanded by home owners when 1=female head of household, 0=not.  The variable
continues to be widely used in similar models of housing choice literature and mortgage
choice (similar to the use of the race variable).  Jones uses sex as an explanatory variable
in each of the studies mentioned in the previous discussion of the race variable (in both
his U.S. and Canadian studies).  Although the sex discrimination issue is not widely
examined in the housing and mortgage choice literatures, discrimination on the basis of
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sex is a problem that is specifically addressed by the Fair Housing Act and enforced by
HUD.    All other factors held constant, males are more likely to be home owners, and
will find it easier to obtain mortgage financing, and thus, benefit from HMI deduction.
Race
Race of householder or spouse is also derived directly from the PUMS person
record.  The model includes both the race of the householder as a personal characteristic
as well as the percent of residence of each state.    With a married householder, the race
used here is that of the spouse with the highest wage income without regard to sex.
Rosen (1979a) includes the race (white, non-white) of the head of household to
control for   tastes    in his owner-occupied housing and finds significance with some
model specifications.  Henderson and Ioannides (1986) find non-white race to be a
significant negative factor in a joint tenure choice, and housing consumption decision
model.  Likewise, Goodman (1988) finds race (dichotomous white, non-white) to be
significant in determining housing price, permanent income, tenure choice, and housing
demand.  Linneman and Wachter (1989) use two dichotomous dummies, an Hispanic,
non-Hispanic, as well as a black, non-black to model the effects of borrowing constraints
on home ownership.  In short, the housing choice literature strongly supports the
inclusion of race as a causal variable in determining HMI debt benefit.  
Jones (1986), using Canadian micro cross-section data, does not model race as a
causal variable in determining home mortgage debt; and he again leaves race out in his
1995b study of wealth and tax effects on demand for mortgage debt in Canada.  Jones
does, however, include a dichotomous (non-Hispanic Caucasian, other) race variable in
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his 1991 analysis of home mortgage debt demand using U.S. and Canadian data; his 1994 
analysis of mortgage debt financing of nonhousing investments using U.S. data; and again
in his 1995a study of tenure choice in the United States and Canada.  
The literature on mortgage redlining (e.g., Ostas 1985), however, suggests that
race may be an important factor in mortgage supply (although demand differences may
also be present) decisions.  In addition, this effect is expected to be more pronounced
regionally within the United States
For those states where racial bias exists, the non-white race of the household head
is expected to have a significant negative effect on the HMI benefit when interacted with
a social environment of racial bias.  
4.2.2.2.2 Other Personal Characteristics
Classifier Income
Income is the first personal, non-vital attribute modeled.  The income measure
used for this study is called   Classifier Income   (CLASSINC).  Classifier Income is
derived from the PUMS person records and approximates taxpayer gross income.  Table
17 provides a description of the CLASSINC variable.
From the PUMS person record, the following categories of income are gathered
for taxpayer and spouse to create the comparable income classifier:  wages or salary
income, nonfarm self-employment, farm self-employment, interest, dividends, and net
rental, social security, public assistance, retirement, and all other income.  In addition, the
income of children under fourteen includable on the parent s return is added to the
parents   income.  In computing classifier income, probably the single most significant
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deviation from tax-basis income is the omission of capital gain income in computing
classifier income.  This difference arises from the fact that income reported on the Census
includes only recurring types of income, of which capital gains are assumed not to be
part.
Educational Attainment
All the studies mentioned as using the race variable also model for the education
level and occupation of the head of household, although the form of representation varies. 
Jones (1986) and others use a continuous variable to indicate the education level attained
by the head of household, and a series of six dichotomous dummies to represent various
occupations.  Jones (1994) uses a single dichotomous variable to indicate whether the
head of household either has at least 16 years of schooling and is working in a
managerial/professional position, or not.  Educational attainment as well as
professional/managerial job status are predicted to be associated with a greater tendency
to own, increased housing service demanded, and increased mortgage demand.
Householder educational attainment data are provided by the PUMS person
record.  The actual Census question regarding educational attainment places the subject in
one of the seventeen categories shown in Table 18.  The actual PUMS variable (YRSCH)
is recoded to create the following set of dummy variables:  (1) Non-high school graduate,
no diploma, (2) High school graduate, diploma or GED, (3) Some college, with either no
degree or associates degree, (4) Bachelor's degree, and (5) Graduate degree.    Non-high
school graduate   is the reference group.  Coefficients on the other four groups are
expected to be positive with magnitude and significance increasing as education level
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increases.  In the case of a married householder, the education used for this study is that
of the spouse with the highest wage income without regard to sex.
All the studies mentioned above as using the race variable also model for the
education level of the head of household, although the form of representation varies. 
Jones (1986) and others use a continuous variable to indicate the education level attained
by the head of household.  Jones (1994) uses a single dichotomous variable to indicate
whether the head of household either has at least 16 years of schooling and is working in
a managerial/professional position, or not.  It is expected that as educational attainment
increases, all things constant, HMI deduction benefit will increase as a result of improved
ability to purchase a home and obtain financing, as well as take advantage of itemized
deductions. 
Occupation
As with higher educational attainment, professional/managerial job status are
predicted to be associated with a greater tendency to own, increased housing service
demanded, and increased mortgage demand.  As mentioned in the prior section, Jones
(1994) uses a single dichotomous variable to indicate whether the head of household
either has at least 16 years of schooling and is working in a managerial/professional
position, or not.  
Information on the occupation of the householder/spouse is provided by the
PUMS person record (the details of which are found in Appendix I of the PUMS
Technical Documentation; see U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1993).  The actual Census
variable (OCCUP) provides a highly detailed classification which is recoded to form the
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following set of dummy variables:  (1) Managerial and Professional Specialty, (2)
Technical, Sales, and Administrative Support, (3) Service, (4) Farming, Forestry, and
Fishing, (5) Precision Production, Craft, and Repair, (6) Operators, Fabricators, and
Laborers , (7) Military , and (8) Experienced Unemployed Not Classified (Last Worked
1984 or Earlier).    Last Worked 1984 or Earlier   is the reference group.  In the case of a
married householder, the occupation used for this study is that of the spouse with the
highest wage income without regard to sex.
The related housing/mortgage literature also uses head of household occupation
(again, in various forms of representation) as an explanatory variable.  Jones (1986) and
others use a series of six dichotomous dummies to represent various occupations.  Jones
(1994) uses a single dichotomous variable to indicate whether the head of household
either has at least 16 years of schooling and is working in a managerial/professional
position, or not.  Professional/managerial job status is predicted to be associated with a
greater tendency to own, increased housing service demanded, and increased mortgage
demand.
Marital Status
Marital status of the householder is provided by the PUMS person record through
the presence of a household member identified as the spouse of the householder.  This
relationship is identifiable through the   relationship to householder   variable (RELAT1). 
The detail of the RELAT1 variable are provided in Table 19.
Once a household member is identified as a spouse, a marital status variable
(MARSTAT) is coded to reflect this status.  Simply by virtue of the fact that two people
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occupy more space than one, it appears reasonable to expect that housing expenditure by
a married couple would exceed that of any other filing status (although not necessarily on
a per capita basis).  This is independent of the likelihood that a married couple is more
likely than any other status to have dependents and, thus, a higher demand for housing
(please see the following discussion of dependents).  All other factors held constant,
married taxpayers as a taxpaying unit are expected to enjoy higher levels of HMI
deduction benefit than their single counterparts.  
Dependents
Dependency status is determined through a series of statements approximating
IRC dependency exemption rules (the actual code is available on request).  A limitation to
the use of PUMS data is that dependency status is only possible for individuals who are
household members living in the household.  By the simple logic that more people
occupy more space it might be reasonable to expect that a larger number of dependents
would be associated with increased demand for housing.  This logic, however, presumes a
certain level of planning on the part of parents as well as a particular set of priorities.  It is
not beyond reason to believe that not everyone plans well for added dependents.  Further,
as a house and dependents are competing uses of limited household income, even in the 
presence of planning it is likely that a trade-off exists between more dependents and a
larger house.  Thus, the sign of this variable is difficult to predict.
4.2.2.3 State Characteristics
A significant number of factors are suggested by the literature as potentially
contributing to the variation in HMI deduction benefit.  Thirty one of these state
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characteristics are selected for use in this study.  In order to reduce the number of
variables in the model, and avoid the predicted multicollinearity problems associated with
this quantity of often highly related variables, these thirty one variables are factor
analyzed and the first five components (explaining 81% of the total variance of the set)
are used in the hierarchical model to represent the set.  This subsection of the study
discusses the actual thirty one variables, and at the end, provides a brief discussion of the
factor analysis procedure as well as a description of the results.  Table 22 provides basic
descriptive statistics on the variables in the set.
4.2.2.3.1 Personal/Individual Demographics
Although a number of individual characteristics of the householder are captured as
household level variables, the variables listed in Table 20 as Personal Characteristics
represent the state averages for these attributes.  A few personal characteristics in this
subsection describe the general population of the state, where the corresponding variable
from the previous subsection describes the individual head of household.
4.2.2.3.2 Housing Market and Economic
The state statistics listed in Table 20 are modeled as explanatory variables in order
to reflect the demographic makeup and economic conditions of the taxpayer s state of
residence.  Although this group of variables is general in terms of its descriptive capacity,
the housing/tenure choice and mortgage choice literatures all support their inclusion as
causal characteristics in the present analysis.  The table also indicates the source of each
variable.  Although numerous other variables are modeled under this heading, this




Home Value and Selected Owner Costs
Clapp (1987) outlines the following set of general data requirements for
determining the value of a house:  trends in environmental conditions, employment,
population composition, and public safety and health programs.   Environmental
conditions include such factors as fuel adequacy, mass transit facilities, and pollution
control efforts.  Employment includes basic areas as well as levels of employment. 
Population composition considers age, household size, nationality and ethnicity, as well
as the urban-rural balance.  Finally, public safety and health programs are those aimed at
such areas as planning, zoning and engineering, public assistance for low-income
households, as well as those programs aimed at assisting middle-income households. 
These factors are assumed to be impounded in the housing value estimated for owner
occupied homes in the Census database.
Further, in terms of specific features impacting marketability of a particular home,
the following is a summary list: style of home, shape of lot, location (corner, etc.), front
footage, site topography, kitchen features, mechanical features (such as heating and air
conditioning), external attributes, bedrooms, baths, privacy, public transportation, school
district, and general layout (Clapp 1987).  Murdock and Hamm (1988) provide a more
comprehensive checklist of elements of market analysis for evaluating a particular
property (site location) decision, many of which overlap, and many of which do not apply
at the state level of analysis. 
Murdock and Hamm (1988) identify the following factors as being among the
 
6In providing a detailed description of the Texas real estate market, these authors
emphasize change aspects of the demographic variables.  Although a time series model
has the potential for improved explanatory capability, the present study is limited to a
cross-sectional analysis, and leaves a panel data analysis for future research.  The latter
three of these four variables in particular are used as explanatory variables consistently
throughout the tenure choice literature.  The Murdock and Hamm (1988) paper provides
useful guidance on the measurement of these variables.
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most important demographic factors affecting residential real estate markets: (1)
population size, past rate and source of growth (whether in-migration or natural
increases); (2) population age structures; (3) household, family and marital
characteristics; and (4) racial and ethnic characteristics.6
These effects are important for the present analysis in that, up to a certain level,
the greater the cost of a house, the greater the expected mortgage amount.  As with
legal/regulatory factors, however, market measures are assumed to factor in these effects. 
Market factors such as the value of a house as well as a housing cost index are commonly
used throughout the housing demand and tenure choice literature.
The higher the cost of housing the more a household must spend to achieve a
given standard of living.  Assuming tastes to be constant across states (except as
controlled for elsewhere in the model) this is expected to cause an increase in housing
expenditure and HMI deduction benefit.  Home value as estimated in the Census database
is used as a proxy for cost in the present study.
As examples of the prior literature, in computing their   individualized   price of
owning, Henderson and Ioannides (1986) assume a real interest rate (nominal interest rate
less the rate of inflation) of five percent, and a rate of maintenance of .75% to be
 
7A model designed by Wilson (1979) to evaluate the One Percent Sample of
Neighborhood Characteristics created from the 1970 Census controls for two
  suburbanization   (variation in the structure of urban areas) variables:  (1) the percent of
the metropolitan population resident outside the central city, and (2) the percentage of the
labor force employed outside the central city.  The present study using the 1990 Census
will use similar controls.
Narwold and Sonstelie (1992), in estimating a probit model of housing tenure (to
test tax arbitrage theory in the United States) use a dummy variable   METRO,   with a
value of one to indicate the family lives in a metropolitan area or zero otherwise.  The
authors predict that METRO should have a negative coefficient because houses in rural
areas tend to have a larger land to structure ratio resulting in less excess depreciation (i.e.,
the excess tax deduction for depreciation over economic depreciation).  As Linneman
(1985) also points out, excess depreciation is a positive factor in a property owner s
decision to rent out the property.  For purposes of the present study, it will be informative
in observing variation across residents of the fifty states to include a measure of
urbanization such as the percentage of residents living in metropolitan versus rural areas
of the state.
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applicable across all MSAs (across the nation).  The present study proposes to allow these
rates to vary by state.  Maintenance cost is assumed to be positively correlated with the
age of housing stock as well as with the cost of the home.  Maintenance cost is not being
reported in the PUMS (and is not a Census question).  It is, thus, omitted as it would
merely be collinear with home value.  
Housing Discrimination
In addition to the demographic variables normally included in a model of
tenure/housing/mortgage choice processes, this study applies a direct measure of housing
discrimination (variable named DISCRIM) derived from the work of HUD (HUD 1979).
The HUD study measures discrimination behavior in major  MSAs (Metropolitan
Statistical Areas).7  The present analysis averages these measures for MSAs within the
state to come up with an overall measure for the state.  The study reports four
discrimination measures each for both the housing rental and the housing sales markets. 
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The measures reported are: (1) no discrimination, (2) whites favored, (3) blacks favored,
and (4) overall discrimination.  The first three measures sum to 100 for each MSA
studied, and the overall discrimination measure is the difference between the second and
the third (and is thus a measure of the net difference in treatment between blacks and
whites).  For the present study, the second measure (whites favored) is the most useful. 
Table 21 shows the actual HUD measurements, as well as the MSAs included for each
state and the average measures for each state.
In the present study, of primary interest is the effect of discrimination on the
dependent variable (HMI deduction benefit).  In order to model this effect, the
discrimination measure (percent of cases where whites were favored) is interacted with
the percent of blacks in the population.  The resulting interaction measures the potential
lost benefit for a particular state resulting from discrimination.  It is important to note that
vacancy rate has been partialled out apart from the discrimination measure because higher
vacancy rates allow for the opportunity to discriminate.  Unfortunately, the HUD study
did not measure discrimination in any cities in either Colorado or Iowa.  These states
were assigned discrimination measures equal to the national average based on a
comparison of their region with the nation.
4.2.2.3.3 Mortgage Market Legal/Regulatory Characteristics
Of particular interest in the present study are state housing market and related
legal conditions.  The set of variables shown in Table 20 is used as a proxy for the
residential real estate and home mortgage markets.  The basic approach taken here is that
market conditions are considered to provide a proxy for actual housing market and related
 
8Although not modeled here, non-housing costs are expected to impact the
housing quality decision in that to the extent that the household must use its scarce
financial resources for non-housing expenses, there is less left over for housing.
All things equal, the higher the non-housing cost of living the less the household
has to spend on housing.  Thus, controlling for the cost of housing, the partialled effect of
non-housing price levels is expected to be negatively correlated with housing expenditure
and HMI benefit.  In the present study, a cost of living index is estimated based on the
state of residence as well as metro/non-metro characteristics for each household.
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legal conditions.  The one exception is use of a single variable to reflect the unique nature
of Texas   homestead laws (which, although in existence in 1990, have since been
repealed) through the MORTGAG2 (please see Table 20).
To the extent that there are legal/regulatory differences from state to state, these
differences may contribute to differences in availability of the HMI deduction between
residents of the various states.  Housing and mortgage market factors including legal and
economic conditions as well as non-housing costs are posited to be key in determining the
level of HMI deduction benefit enjoyed by federal income taxpayers.8  Demographic and
vital factors that vary from state to state should also tend to result in differences in the
overall ability of state residents to enjoy home ownership as well as the advantage of the
ability to borrow.  Finally, differences in state income tax, particularly housing related
provisions as with the federal income tax system, may influence housing decisions of the
state residents, and thus their ability to benefit from the federal HMI deduction.  These
differences between states provide the motivation for the federalist perspective adopted
for the present analysis.  
In terms of the prior literature, Jones (1993), in a contribution to what would be
considered the mortgage demand literature, examines differences in mortgage default
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between the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Alberta.  This study is unique in
that it attempts to model some of the differences between provinces that are known to
exist in the legal environment.  When compared with previous studies, a significant
advancement with the Jones (1993) model is in the recognition of state level differences
in the home mortgage environment.  
It is important to realize that regulation is likely to play an important role in any
market.  In the present study, federal regulation of housing and mortgage markets, to the
extent that it eliminates or reduces state specific factors, is assumed to reduce the
differences between states that would tend to directly impact the home purchase and
mortgage decisions.  This study assumes that market measures impound these differences. 
Detailed analysis of the effects of specific regulatory provisions is left as the topic of
future research.
Even though the present study uses market measures to proxy for the underlying
factors of the housing decisions, it is important to take at least a theoretical look at that
underlying environment.  In the prior literature, most of these factors are assumed to be
stable across all geographic locations (with some studies oven assuming equality between
nations).  One contribution of the present study is that these legal/regulatory and state
income tax factors are allowed to vary across states (although, as mentioned in subsection
2.4.2.2 State Income Tax, some cursory analysis of state income tax provisions in this
area exists in the literature).
Mondor (1988), Alexander (1993), and others provide detailed commentary on the
history of tremendous diversity between states in real estate finance and the laws that
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affect it.  A review of this literature is available on request. 
Historically, real property law has been the exclusive domain of the states.  Given
the changes that have taken place over the last sixty years, an important step toward
identifying those differences that remain between states is to understand the role of the
federal government in real estate finance, both as a regulator and a market participant. 
The courts have played an important role in determining when and to what extent federal
law should displace diverse state real estate finance laws and impose uniformity in an
environment that has been referred to as   chaos.    The present study simply uses the
reported home value per the 1990 Census (as seen in Table 20) as its measure.
4.2.2.3.4 State and Local Tax
Due to the nature of this study, state tax characteristics are considered separately
(even though they could otherwise be considered merely part of the overall
demographic/economic composition of the state).  In order to reflect the tax
characteristics most likely to impact HMI deduction benefit, the variables shown in Table
20 are included on the right hand side of the causal model.
State Income Tax (SIT)
The average amount of SIT paid for all individual federal filers with a SIT
itemized deduction is derived from the CTJ dataset.  Since the presence of SIT (a Federal
itemized deduction) increases the amount of federal itemized deductions, it is included
here as an independent variable, and is predicted to be positively correlated with HMI
deduction benefit.
SIT with HMI Deduction 
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In addition to the incentive to increase HMI deduction provided by the existence
of SIT, to the extent that the SIT allows a deduction for HMI, the incentive and predicted
federal tax deduction benefit are predicted to increase.  This effect is predicted to increase
with higher marginal tax rates, thus the interaction of the SIT with HMI Deduction
variable with the value of the Highest State Marginal Rate.
The impact of state income tax on federal HMI deduction benefit is twofold.  To
the extent that state income tax systems also have a HMI deduction, residents of those
states have additional incentive to mortgage, thus are expected to experience greater
benefit from the federal provision.  Second, because state income tax paid is an itemized
deduction for federal purposes, for those households where itemized deductions
excluding state income tax and HMI (i.e., deductible medical expenses, property and
certain other taxes, investment interest to the extent of investment income, gifts to
charity, personal casualty and theft losses, job expenses and miscellaneous itemized
deductions) are less than the standard deduction, the more state income tax paid the
greater the amount of benefit the household receives from their HMI deduction.
Bartlett (1996), in one of the few published discussions of the HMI deduction that
considers cross-state effects, takes the perspective that the states provide a laboratory: 
  18 states either have no income tax or do not allow mortgage interest deductions for
state taxes.    Eight states (Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania) have income taxes and no mortgage interest deductions. 
Bartlett (1996) also makes the point that if the HMI deduction for state income tax
had the anticipated effect (of increasing home ownership), then states that do not allow
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such deductions might be expected to have lower home ownership rates than states that
do.  Likewise, it would be reasonable to expect a positive correlation between a state s
tax rate and its home ownership rate (due to the increased value of the tax deduction).  In
fact, in 1993, the average home ownership rate for the 18 states with no income tax or
HMI deduction was 64.8%, compared to the national average of 64%.  Further, of the five 
states with the highest home ownership rates, West Virginia (73.3%), Michigan (72.3%)
and Pennsylvania (72%) allow no HMI deduction. 
On the other end of the scale, the 12 states with the highest marginal tax rates, and
the District of Columbia, demonstrate an average home ownership rate of 61.8%.  Of the
six states with the lowest home ownership rates, four are among this group with the
highest marginal tax rates.  Bartlett illustrates with the following examples:  California s
top 1990 income tax rate is 11%--tied with Montana for the highest in the nation--yet its
home ownership rate is among the lowest at 56%. New York, Hawaii and the District of
Columbia also have high tax rates and home ownership rates well below average. 
Among the possible explanations for the unexpected result would be the
possibility that it is the states with the lowest rates of home ownership that make efforts
(i.e., offer tax incentives) to increase home ownership, while those states that already
enjoy higher rates of ownership realize that they have no need to offer tax incentives to
further improve.
For simplicity, this study operates under the assumption that states will adjust
their income tax rate so as to hold (state income tax) revenues constant.  This assumption
eliminates the need to account for the interaction between state and federal income tax. 
 
9This correlation may decline above some level of income and age as richer, more
mature taxpayers may tend to spend less, relative to their income, on housing.
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With this assumption in place, the federal income tax computation proceeds with relative
ease giving up at most a minor degree of accuracy (if the assumption is false), and
possibly nothing (if the assumption is true).
Property Tax Payments on Home 
As discussed at the beginning of this subsection and earlier in this dissertation
(under Current Provision), mortgage interest payments may have significant out-of-
pocket income tax consequences for the home owner.  In most cases, this savings depends
on the taxpayer s marginal tax bracket, the amount of other itemized deductions
available, and the size of the taxpayer s standard deduction.  
Tax deductibility of property taxes provides additional incentive for home
ownership, and thus is used in most tenure choice models.  Narwold and Sonstelie (1992)
include a property tax variable, but without the predicted result.  The authors explain that
the problem is most likely the result of using the average tax rate for the state as a proxy
for individual household amounts.  The present study attempts to overcome this problem
by allowing the property tax payment amount to vary by tax return/household.
In addition to the reasoning discussed above under State income taxes, property
taxes should be positively correlated with higher HMI deduction benefit simply because
of its expected correlation with income and age.9  Upper-income as well as older
householders may be more likely to have investments in real property not used for
business, the, the state, local or foreign  tax on which is deductible on Schedule A along
 
10The households in Zorn s sample are all in metropolitan areas, so the assumption
of constant property tax is not unreasonable.  All things equal, tax rates in urban areas
should be lower as fewer services are expected.
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with the real property taxes paid on their homes (IRC Sec. 164 and Form 1040 Schedule
A Instructions).  
Zorn (1989) uses a model of household mobility-tenure in order to provide
evidence of the effect of mortgage qualification requirements as a constraint to home
ownership.  As is commonly done, Zorn  assumes that all home owners in his national
sample pay the same 1.5% of home value as a rate of property tax.10  The present model
allows property tax to vary by household.  In the present study, property tax payments are
known at the household level through the Census database.
Local Income Tax (LIT)
One of the advantages of the PUMS data is that household PUMA data make it
possible to distinguish residents of certain localities.  Fortunately for this study, residents
of New York City and Yonkers, NY, the two localities in the study whose residents pay a
local income tax (LIT), are identifiable.  The amount of actual LIT paid is approximated
as fifty percent of SIT (New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, 1989). 
Since the presence of LIT (a Federal itemized deduction) increases the amount of federal
itemized deductions, it is predicted to be positively correlated with HMI deduction
benefit.
4.2.2.3.5 Factor Analysis of State Characteristics
Factor analysis is a data reduction method that allows the common variation of a
group of variables to be represented by a smaller set of factor scores.  Factor analysis
 
11A varimax rotation method is also used and results are also listed in Table 24.
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using a principal component extraction method is appropriate in the present study for
several reasons.  First, the number of variables in the state characteristic group (thirty one,
as shown in Table 23) is quite large.  By factor analyzing these thirty one variables, the
common variation of the group can be captured with far fewer variables in the model.
Second, due to the high degree of multicollinearity among the state characteristics
(as shown, again, in Table 23), factor analysis allows the common variation to be
represented in factor scores, more efficiently than with the use of actual raw variables. 
Third, in the present study, the focus is not on the effects of individual state
characteristics, but rather on the effect of the group as a whole.  One drawback to factor
analysis is the loss of the ability to examine the individual effects of the actual variables. 
This drawback, however, does not represent a serious impediment for this study.  The
number of factor scores that could be included in the model was constrained by the high
degree of multicollinearity between the factor scores and the state dummy variables.  The
OLS and Tobit models allowed the inclusion of only the first five factor scores capturing
about 81% of the cumulative variation (unrotated11) of the group of thirty one actual
characteristics (as shown in Table 24.).  The Ridge adjustment allowed for the entry of
two additional factor scores for a total of seven (as shown in Tables 24 and 25).  The
scree plot shown in Figure 2 indicates that by the addition of the fifth component,
significant leveling of the plot line has taken place.  This, along with the decision to
accept 81% as the amount of common variation in the set, provides the justification for
the decision to proceed with five factor scores in the model.
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Table 25. shows the correlations between individual state characteristics and the
first seven factor scores (of which, the first five are used in the fully partialled model
reported in this study).  Finally, Table 26. provides basic descriptive statistics for the first
seven factor scores.
Table 25. shows how each of the 31 state characteristics correlates with each of
the first seven factors (with each factor score represented by a column in the table).  For
example, from the bolded correlation coefficients in the first column (corresponding to
the first factor score), the rate of white residents in the state (WHPOP) shows a high level
of inverse correlation with the first factor (with a correlation coefficient of -0.966).
4.2.2.4 State Dummies
In order to test for the presence of residual state-to-state differences after
removing the effect of all the variables in the model, a set of state dummies is introduced
as the final level in the hierarchical model.  Significance of this set of state dummies is an
indication of the existence of other characteristics such as socio-political or cultural
influences that are not reflected in the model as described.  
4.3 Model Specification
The model hierarchies used in this analysis, added in causal order, are as follows: 
HMIB = F(Personal Characteristics)
HMIB = F(Personal Characteristics + State Characteristics)
HMIB = F(Personal Characteristics+ State Characteristics + State Dummies)
where the dependent variable is the home mortgage interest benefit (HMIB) as a dollar
amount.  All independent variables (including the variables reduced by factor analysis)
along with their source and variable name are shown in Table 20.
 
12The most severe multicollinearity in this model exists among the state
characteristic variables (as discussed in the principle components analysis discussion of
this dissertation), and between the state characteristics and the state dummies.
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4.4 Regression Procedure 
As the model specification indicates, a regression procedure is used to test the
significance of three sets of causal variables.   Normally, in this sort of analysis, an OLS
model would be the first choice.  In this case, however, the nature of the data indicates the
use of other regression techniques.  First, (as with the IMF based model) the censored
nature of the dependent variable indicates the use of a Tobit regression.  Second, due to
the high degree of multicollinearity in the right hand side variables, and the resulting
impact on the regression coefficients, a Ridge regression is used.
4.4.1 Ridge Regression
Ridge Regression is a technique for analyzing multiple regression data that suffer
from multicollinearity.12 When multicollinearity occurs, least squares estimates are
unbiased, but their variances are large so they may be far from the true value.  Variance
inflation factors (VIFs) indicate a high degree of multicollinearity between the state factor
scores and the state dummy variables in the fully partialled model being considered. 
Tables 30 provides a side-by-side comparison of OLS, Tobit and Ridge state dummy
coefficients.  This comparison helps to illustrate the improvement in coefficient
magnitude reasonableness with the Ridge adjustment.  By adding a degree of bias to the
regression estimates, Ridge regression reduces the standard errors. It is hoped that the net
effect will be to give more reliable estimates (Hintze 1995; SPSS 1999; SAS 1980; and
Mendenhall and Sincich 1989).  A key decision in applying the Ridge technique is
 
13Often, standardized coefficients are used for this purpose in place of the actual
coefficient values.  The trace graph provided here plots the change in actual coefficient
values across a range of k values.   Also, conventionally, the opening coefficient values
used in ridges plot are the OLS estimates.  In this case, due to the magnitude of the OLS
estimates, including the OLS coefficients would have caused the scale to loose the
smooth curve effect captured in the plot provided.
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choosing the degree of bias or   k.    In selecting the optimal level of k, a number of
factors are considered.  The remainder of this section discusses the choice of a k value for
this study
First, in the presence of multicollinearity, as k increases, the change in magnitude
of the regression coefficients tends to decrease (i.e., they stabilize).  One objective in
applying a Ridge adjustment is to alleviate the problem of unstable regression
coefficients.  As the Ridge Trace13 graph for the state dummy coefficients (shown in
Figure 1) indicates, the k value of .19 selected for the present analysis lies in an area
where coefficients on the highly collinear regressors have largely stabilized (as evidenced
by the flattening-out of the trace plot).
Also, as k increases, the magnitude (i.e., absolute values) of the regression
coefficients tend to decrease.  This requires a Bayesian approach to the research (i.e., that
there be some preexisting expectation as to what constitutes a reasonable result).  In the
present study, state dummy coefficient magnitudes were compared with the states 
respective averages for the dependent variable.  This approach offers at least a reasonable
range for the fully partialled state effects. 
Secondly, (although not reported in this dissertation) regression coefficient
variance inflation factors (VIFs) tend to decrease as k increases.  In the present study,
 
14At the present time, statistical application packages such as SAS, SPSS and
NCSS provide for a Ridge adjustment to an OLS regression, future research might look
into the implementation of a Ridge adjustment concurrent with other non-OLS methods
such as Tobit, logit, etc.
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VIFs were examined for each of the regression coefficients.  Normally, k is increased
until VIFs reach some acceptable level.  Although the selection acceptable/desired VIF
levels is somewhat arbitrary, the smaller the VIF the less multicollinearity is affecting the
regression.  The final k value of .19 for this study resulted in a maximum VIF of about 1
(as compared with VIFs in the thousands in the unadjusted OLS and Tobit models).  
Finally, as k increases, R2 decreases.  The mathematically optimal k considers the
reduction in R2 that is traded off for increased stability.  In the present study, the
regression R2 drops from .626 in the fully partialled (five factor score) OLS model (see
Table 28.b.4)  to .557 with the Ridge adjustment (see Table 28.a.4.A).14
4.4.2 Tobit Regression
Although the censored nature of the dependent variable (home mortgage interest
deduction benefit) calls for a Tobit regression, the severity of the effect on regression
results of multicollinearity existing in the model at hand supercedes the need to correct
for abnormality in the distribution of the dependent variable.  As a result, the advantages
of the Tobit model are traded for those of Ridge.
4.4.3 OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) Regression
OLS regression results are reported here primarily for comparison and verification
purposes.  Although the reader may wish to compare OLS results with those of Ridge and
Tobit procedures, it is important to keep in mind that OLS regression coefficients are
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unstable in this part of the study and caution should be exercised in any attempted
interpretation of these coefficients.
4.5 Hypotheses
The hypotheses tested in this part of the study are a logical extension of the
investigation done in Chapter III of this dissertation   Methodology - IMF Analysis.    In
Chapter III, the state-to-state differences in the HMI deduction tax benefit were explored
preliminarily using the 1992 Statistics of Income, Individual Model File.  Recall that
Chapter III examines the hypothesis that, controlling only for the effect of income, there
was no significant effect of state of residence on HMI deduction tax benefit using a model
which was not fully partialled.  This part of the study begins to examine the effects of
some of the variables that are theoretically linked to the HMI deduction tax benefit, and
tests up to a model which is approximately fully partialled.  All hypotheses below are
stated in their research form.  
As each set of variables in the causal hierarchy enters the regression model, a
partial Chi Squared (Ç 2) statistic (similar to a partial F-statistic which might be used in an
OLS regression analysis) tests the significance of the incremental effect of the set on the
dependent variable.  In other words, the statistical significance of the incremental
variation in the dependent variable attributable to the entering set is tested using the Chi
Squared statistic.  
4.5.1 Tests of Significance for Hierarchical Sets
The significance of each set is tested as it enters the model.  The first set of
variables is referred to as   Personal Characteristics   because they describe the individual
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taxpayer and include the most immutable or fundamental characteristics of the household
head hypothesized to impact HMI deduction benefit.  As discussed previously (under
Description of Data), this set includes the age, sex, and race of the household head.  Also
included in the set of personal variables are variables which, although personal in nature,
are somewhat controllable by the household head and include income, education,
occupation, marital status, and number of dependents (also discussed previously).
H4: Personal characteristics of the taxpayer have a significant
effect on the HMI deduction tax benefit.
Next to enter the equation in causal hierarchy order is the set of   State
Characteristics   which have a theoretical link to the HMI deduction benefit enjoyed by
the household.  This set consists of Demographic, Housing, State Tax and Legal attributes
of the state of residence. 
H5: Characteristics of the taxpayer s state of residence have
significant incremental effect on the HMI deduction tax
benefit beyond that explained by personal characteristics of
the taxpayer.
Finally, the set of state dummy variables is introduced to test for any residual
state-specific effects yet unaccounted for in the model.  To the extent that this set is
significant after partialling out the effects of all other characteristics considered in the
model, this residual variation is hypothesized to be evidence of an interstate transfer
resulting largely from the state s fair housing environment (HUD 1979; Metcalf 1988;
Bureau of National Affairs 1988; Turner, et al. 1991; Yinger 1999).  
In terms of expectation, Jones (1986) finds no significance for regional geographic
indicators in explaining mortgage choice in several studies.  The conclusion from this
 
15Alternatively, as in the first part of this study (involving the analysis of the 1992
IMF), a similar test could be performed by estimating a multiple regression on a
standardized dependent variable with the following model (from H5):
HMIBENESTD = F(State Dummies)
In this case the coefficients on the individual state dummy variables allow for a test of the
significance of variation of the HMI deduction benefit with a single reference group (the
median or average state) explained by the condition of residence in that particular state
without partialling out the effects of other possible causal factors.  
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result is not that federalism is not important, or that no interstate competition exists,
rather that if it exists, it is does so along lines already represented in the model.
H6: Taxpayer s state of residence has a significant
incremental/residual effect on HMI deduction tax benefit
beyond that explained by personal characteristics of the
household head and the characteristics of the state of
residence included in the model.
Provided H6 indicates significant state effects, it is logical to consider how the
eight states in the present model compare with one another.  The following section
describes such a comparison.
4.5.2 Winner Versus Loser States
Assuming, once again, that H6 indicates significant state socio-political effects,
H7 addresses the question of which states are the  winners   and which are   losers   with
respect to the distribution of the federal HMI deduction tax benefit.
H7: Holding other personal and state effects constant, there is a
significant difference in the mean residual HMI deduction
benefit, as a dollar amount per household between the
reference group (Colorado) and any other state.
H7 is tested straightforwardly using the t-values on state dummy variable coefficients in
the fully partialled model.15  In this case (as in the earlier part of this dissertation),
 
16Recall that Colorado was chosen as the reference group because of its position as
the median value state in terms of HMI deduction benefit.
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Colorado (in being consistent with the IMF analysis) is used as the reference group.  A
statistically significant t-value would indicate that the state in question differs
significantly from Colorado16 in terms of the fully partialled effect.  
The economic theory set forth in this dissertation as the basis for the sets of
personal and state variables in this model addresses the expected HMI deduction benefit
based on those factors, without considering any other sociopolitical/legal/regulatory
factors which might vary by state.  After controlling for personal and state characteristics,
H7 tests for any residual differences between states.  Significance of a state dummy
coefficient here indicates that a state s residents  ability to benefit from the HMI
deduction for federal income tax is impacted by sociopolitical/legal/regulatory factors. 
Specifically, the state s fair housing environment is considered to be a proxy for such
factors, and thus, a primary source of this residual variation.  The following paragraphs
discuss the expected outcomes for each of the eight states in the model based on the
state s fair housing environment. 
California is expected to be a net winner as a result of high personal incomes, high
home prices, and a high state income tax.  Although none of the state s localities have
been recognized by the Secretary for Fair Housing, based on state and federal activity,
California, along with New York, appears to have a highly successful fair housing
program in place.  This, along with the state s status as substantially equivalent to Title
VIII, should strengthen the prediction that California would emerge a relative winner in
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terms of HMI deduction benefit distribution.
Colorado is selected as the reference group for its position nearest the national
average in terms of the unpartialled HMI deduction benefit (the state is also generally
average demographically, although more similar to western states than eastern). 
Although (like California) Colorado has no localities recognized as substantially
equivalent, the state itself was among the earliest to be recognized as substantially
equivalent to Title VIII.  
Florida s high home prices should increase relative HMI deduction benefit,
however, average age of residents (assuming resident age indicates lack of need to
mortgage), as well as absence of a state income tax, should work in the opposite
direction.  In terms of fair housing, Florida, has been substantially equivalent to Title VIII
since 1984 (late relative to Colorado, Kentucky and New York which gained recognized
status in 1974), and has the highest number of localities with recognized status of any
state in the nation.  It is interesting to note that according to the 1979 HUD study, Ft.
Lauderdale-Hollywood (along with Dallas, Texas) ranks as one of the worst metro areas
in this sample in terms of housing discrimination against blacks.  Ft. Lauderdale-
Hollywood is also not recognized as substantially equivalent (in terms of its laws).
Kentucky with its relatively low incomes and home prices should be at a relative
disadvantage, offset possibly by its state income tax.  On the other hand, the state s fair
housing policies (Metcalf 1988) are among the most aggressive in the nation, and should
tend to promote home ownership (although, whether Kentucky s legal environment
promotes home ownership in the price range where HMI results in a deduction is
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uncertain).  Further, Kentucky was among the earliest group to gain recognition as
substantially equivalent to Title VIII.
Economic theory predicts that Iowa, with its low home prices should be at a
disadvantage, however its state income tax could offset this effect.  In terms of fair
housing, although Iowa was a relatively late (1984) recipient of HUD substantially
equivalent status, most of the state s major metropolitan areas (Des Moines, Dubuque and
Iowa City) are recognized by the Secretary.  Also, because of the relatively low rate of
Iowa minority residents, fair housing is not expected to play as important a role as in
other states (assuming parity with other states in terms of other forms of housing
discrimination such as gender based and discrimination against children).  
Illinois, with a relatively high level of discrimination (when compared with the
other states in this study, as reported in HUD 1979), as well as a high level of recent fair
housing activity (indicating possible problems in the area of racial and sexual
discrimination, e.g. 1/13/1997 National Fair Housing Advocate Press release), should be
at a relative disadvantage.  This effect may be offset by the effect of relatively aggressive
fair housing policy in the state including substantially equivalent status since 1980.
New York, with high incomes, high state income tax and even local income tax
should be at a relative advantage, however this advantage could easily be offset by a low
rate of home ownership.  In this sample of states, New York also has one of the most
active and effective fair housing programs including substantially equivalent status since
1972.  Further, Albany-Schenectady-Troy, according to the 1979 HUD study, is one of
the best metro areas in this sample in terms of equal housing treatment of blacks.  Except
 
17It is interesting to note that Ft. Worth, the only recognized Texas locality, ranks
well in terms of the 1979 HUD discrimination measure, while Dallas, with no state or
local recognition of its fair housing laws, ranks low.  The situation described here could
be taken as anecdotal evidence that fair housing   substantially equivalent   status is
correlated with lower levels of housing discrimination against blacks.
103
for the fact that New York City and Rockland County are the only recognized localities in
the state, all these factors (except the low rate of home ownership) would lead to the
prediction that New York should be a relative winner in the HMI deduction tax benefit.
Finally, Texas, with no state income tax and its unique (recently repealed)
homestead laws limiting the ability of its residents to take advantage of second mortgages
(Harris 1985) should be on the losing end of the HMI deduction redistribution.  In terms
of fair housing policy, Texas is the only state in the study (and only one of five nationally)
that has not been recognized by the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing And Equal
Opportunity as being   substantially equivalent   to Title VIII.  Additionally, the 1979
HUD study shows Dallas to be one of the worst metro areas in this sample in terms of
housing discrimination against blacks.17 
Regardless of the statistical significance, however, it is meaningful to consider the
question of economic significance:  Is the dollar amount of the difference important in an
economic sense?  Finally, at this point the difference between the mean state effects and
the fully partialled state effects can be examined.
 
1Limdep also estimates an OLS regression along with the Tobit result.  In testing
H1-H3 in both the a and b versions, OLS results agreed with the Tobit results reported
here.  While Tobit results are reported in Tables 4.a and discussed below, Tables 4.b




5.1  H1-H3 Results
This subchapter reports the results of testing each of the three hypotheses laid out
in subchapter 3.6 of this dissertation.  In all cases, a Tobit regression is estimated (with
H3 requiring both a restricted and an unrestricted model) using Limdep, Version 7.0 by
Greene (1995).1  Tables 2 and 3 provide standard regression reports.  In testing H1-H3, in
all cases, the test statistic is two times the increment in the regression log likelihood (or
the difference in the log likelihood) for the variable or set of variables introduced on the
right hand side.  This test statistic is distributed as a Ç 2 with degrees of freedom equal to
the number of variables added to the model (Steinberg and Colla 1991).
For H1a the increment is from Model 1 to Model 2 (i.e., adding income to the
right hand side of the regression equation as shown in Table 4.a.1) results in a Ç 2 of
30,259.4.  With one degree of freedom, this test statistic has a P value of 0.00000 (as
shown in Table 4.a.4).  This indicates a strong relationship between income and HMI
 
2All models were also rerun with a sample size of 2,000 with no significant
change in the final outcome.
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benefit as a dollar amount as predicted.2  Similarly, H1b (testing the incremental effect of
income on HMI benefit as a percent of total tax) resulted in a Ç 2 of 7,342.0 (as shown in
Table 4.a.1) which, although noticeably smaller than its version a counterpart, is still
highly significant (as shown in Table 4.a.4).  These results are as expected including the
prediction that the b form might show a weaker relationship than the a form since the
effect of the progressive rate structure is controlled for in b but not in a.
For H2a, the increment is from Model 1 to Model 3 (adding the state of residence
on the right hand side of the regression equation as shown in Table 4.a.2).  This change
yields a Ç 2 of  10,835.2 which, with fifty one degrees of freedom has a P value of 0.00000
(as shown in Table 4.a.4).  This indicates a strong relationship between income and HMI
benefit, once again, as predicted.  As with H1, the b version of H2 produces a somewhat
smaller, but still highly significant test statistic. This result indicates that HMI deduction
benefit varies significantly from state to state, even when controlling for the effect of the
progressive rate structure.
Finally, H3 tests the incremental effect of moving from Model 2 to Model 4
(testing the incremental effect of state of residence after that of income has already been
partialled as shown in Table 4.a.3) yielding  Ç 2 statistics of 2,067.6 and 784.8 for the a
and b versions of the test respectively.  With fifty one degrees of freedom both test
statistics are significant at a P value of 0.00000.  This indicates that even after partialling
out the expected effect on HMI deduction tax benefit of differences in income, a strong
 
3Recall that the 51 dummies represent the 50 United States, plus D.C. and
OTHERST (the dummy variable representing the group of all U.S., non-state
possessions), minus Colorado (the reference group).
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relationship between state of residence and HMI benefit still remains.  This is true, as
with H1 and H2, for both the a and b versions of the test, with the a version, or the
dependent 
variable measured in dollars of tax benefit rather than as a percent of total tax, showing a
stronger relationship.  
This relationship and its causal factors will be explored further in H4-H7 using an
analysis based on Census data.  Before concluding discussion of the H1-H3, it is
informative to examine these results on a limited basis by state.  Table 6 lists all 51 state
dummies included in Models 3 and 4 sorted by coefficient with the respective P-value for
each state dummy variable.3  States in Table 6 are grouped into winner and loser by the
sign of their coefficient (a state with a positive sign on its dummy coefficient is a
  winner   and visa versa for   loser  ).  In the context of the HMI deduction interstate
transfer, a winner state is defined as one whose citizens are beneficiaries of transfer at the
expense of loser state residents.  The reader is cautioned that the purpose of the Census
based analysis in H4-H7 is to provide a basis for interpreting these results on a fully
partialled, state-by-state basis.  The present discussion of state-to-state differences is
provided merely as a basis for discussion.
5.2  H4-H6 Results
This subchapter reports part of the results of hypothesis testing of the Census
 
4Both the Tobit and OLS results (reported in Tables 22e-l) are estimated using
Limdep, Version 7.0 (Greene 1995).
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based analysis.  For H4-H6,  Ridge regression results (confirmed by both Tobit and OLS4)
are reported.  These three hypotheses (regarding the significance of hierarchical sets of
causal factors) use a partial F-ratio for testing Ridge and OLS estimated results.  For
Tobit regression, as in H1-H3, the test statistic is two times the increment in the
regression log likelihood (or the difference in the log likelihood) for the variable or set of
variables introduced on the right hand side.  This Tobit test statistic is distributed as a Ç 2
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables added to the model (Steinberg
and Colla 1991).  Tables 29 provides a standard regression results report for each level of
the causal hierarchy model including all three regression methods (Ridge, Tobit, and
OLS), while Tables 30 provide the results and a summary of the test results for H4-H6.  
In H4, the significance of the effect on HMI deduction benefit of the defined set
personal characteristics is tested.  Recall that these characteristics describe the head of
each household (assumed to be the taxpaying unit for purposes of this study), and include
age, sex, race, marital status, number of dependents, educational attainment, and
occupation.  As Table 29 shows, H4 yields an F statistic of 2,293 that is highly
significant.  This result confirms the predictions of the housing, tenure, and mortgage
choice literatures outlined in Chapter II of this study.
H5 examines the incremental effect of certain attributes of the taxpayer s state of
residence (again, as suggested by the literature outlined in Chapter II, and as detailed
earlier in this Chapter IV).  As Table 29 shows, the Ridge regression yields an F-statistic
 
5More detailed analysis of the effects of individual characteristics, although
potentially informative, is left for future research.  Before such an analysis could be done
in a meaningful way, the multicollinearity problem must be addressed further.  For
purposes of the present study, it is sufficient to consider the significance of sets of
variables.
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of 128 that is significant at the 0.0000 level.  Essentially, factor scores capturing about
81% of the variation of state characteristics include personal and financial demographics,
mortgage market, and state and local tax characteristics of the taxpayer s state of
residence.  Although this set, by itself, is significant, the incremental significance of the
set is noteworthy.  
There are at least two alternative interpretations of the H4 and H5 results.  First, it
could be concluded that the set of personal characteristics was inadequate to fully explain
the variation in the HMI deduction benefit.  As a result, sufficient variation in the
dependent variable remained after partialling out the effect of the initial set of personal
characteristics to allow the set of state characteristics to be significant.  Alternatively, this
result could be interpreted as indicating that certain characteristics of the state of
residence included in the set possess explanatory power with respect to the taxpayer s
benefit from HMI deduction beyond that of individual taxpayer characteristics alone. 
Regardless of the interpretation of H5, an important purpose for setting up the analysis as
modeled is to lay the foundation for testing H6.5  
H6 examines the incremental effect of the taxpayer s state of residence on HMI
deduction benefit after partialling out the described sets of personal and state
characteristics.  Here, the set of state dummy variables proxy for a sociopolitical/legal and
regulatory environment that is hypothesized to influence HMI deduction benefit. 
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Although small relative to the F-values produced in H4 and H5, the H6 F-value of 30 is
significant at the 0.0001 level.  The significance of H6 result can be interpreted in one of
at least two possible ways.  First, assuming the model is correctly specified, one can
conclude that there are socio-political (or perhaps religious or philosophical) differences
between residents of the states included which are independent of the factors modeled. 
Alternatively, one could argue that the model is incorrectly specified.  This
misspecification might be the result of several things.  First, there may be omitted
variables in either the personal or state characteristic sets.  Alternatively, recall that the set
of state characteristics were reduced down into their principle components and that only
the first five factor scores were used in the model capturing approximately 81%
(unrotated) of the variation of the group.  Arguably, the other 19% represents
misspecification.  Table 25 shows the six state characteristics loading most heavily on the
sixth and seventh scores that were dropped from the model.  A convincing argument can
be made that the direct effect of these six variables, LOCIT (approximate local income
tax paid discussed above in subsection 4.2.2.3.4), ASITW (average state income tax paid
for the cohort group), DISCRIM (an approximate measure of housing discrimination
discussed above in subsection 4.2.2.3.2 Housing Market and Economic), PROPVAL (self
reported property value for owner occupied households provided from 1990 Census),
PTAX (self reported property tax for owner occupied households from 1990 Census), and
MORTG2 a 0/1 dummy representing absence/presence of second mortgage respectively
tax for owner occupied households from 1990 Census) is essentially omitted from the
model.  This being the case, it can be logically concluded that, to the extent the model
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would be correctly specified with the six variables included, the state dummy variables
are actually capturing the variation of these six omitted state characteristics.
5.3  H7 Results
For H7, t-values for the state dummy variable coefficients in the fully partialled
model provide the basis for testing the significance of the fully partialled difference in
HMI deduction benefit between Colorado (the reference group) and any of the other
seven states modeled (California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, New York, and
Texas).  H7 uses Ridge (as with H4-H6) coefficient P-values to draw conclusions
regarding relative benefit of states.  In actually testing H7, Table 30 shows the state
dummy coefficients and P-values in ascending order according to their Ridge regression
coefficient values.  The Ridge column of Table 30 Shows the significance of each state v.
Colorado.  The signs on the state dummy coefficients show that controlling for personal
and other state characteristics, home owners in Iowa, Kentucky, and Texas benefit less
from the HMI deduction than their counterparts in Colorado.  Iowans are the largest
losers v. Coloradans with Coloradans benefitting a bit over $103 more per
household/return holding other effects constant.   As the P-values in Table 30 indicate,
holding all factors in the model constant, the benefit derived from the HMI deduction for
Florida, New York, and Illinois residents does not differ significantly from residents of
Colorado.  Finally, California residents benefit more than their Colorado counterparts by
an average of almost $203 per household/return holding other factors constant.
For each state in the model, Table 31 shows the mean uncorrected or main effect
(i.e., tax benefit, taken from Table 15, Descriptive Statistics) ranked from lowest to
 
6
 This mean effect is computed as the sum of model variable coefficient multiplied
by the respective variable mean with all state dummy means of zero, except for the
indicated state with a value of one.
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highest mean effect.  Corresponding mean corrected or fully partialled effects for each
state in the model are also presented in Table 31 for comparison purposes.  Differences
between uncorrected and corrected effects (representing the effects captured for each state
by the rest of the model) are reported at the far right of the table.  As with the actual
hypothesis testing, the corrected effect values are produced using the Ridge regression
results.  Finally, Table 31 shows the difference in each mean effect between a given state,
and the next closest state ranked by uncorrected effect.
Further light can be shed on the   winner v. loser   question.  Given that the
hypothesis of systematic socio-political differences between states cannot be rejected,
Table 31 shows the mean of this fully partialled effect for each state in the present
model.6  For each state in the table, this mean represents the average effect of state of
residence on the dependent variable after removing all other effects represented in the
model.  For example, holding constant all effects represented in the model, residing in
Colorado has an average effect on home mortgage interest deduction benefit of




CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH & LIMITATIONS
6.1  Conclusions
The primary conclusion to be drawn from this study is that there is a significant
amount of variation between residents of different states in the HMI deduction benefit
realized in 1992.  This variation persists even after removing the effect of income on the
HMI tax benefit.  This conclusion is the basis for the second part of the study
investigating state characteristics which could explain the state-to-state differences.  This
part of the analysis reveals that even after partialling out the effects of personal
characteristics of the head of household, a set of state characteristics possesses significant
explanatory power in terms of household HMI deduction tax benefit.  Finally, after
factoring out both personal as well as the defined set of state characteristics, there still
remains a significant difference in HMI deduction benefit between states.  This difference
is hypothesized to be attributable to socio-political differences between states which are
not captured in the present model.  Future research should attempt to narrow down the
state-to-state differences causing this residual, unexplained variation in HMI deduction
tax benefit.
6.2  Contributions
This study extends existing research in the following areas: (1) distributional
analysis of the effects of Federal Income Taxation, (2) fiscal federalism and competition
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between states, and (3) determinants of mortgage borrowing choice, with implications for
housing and tenure choice.  Further, this study attempts to bridge the gap between these
areas.
To the extent that other nations are formed by the unification of heterogeneous
states, the issue of federalism is important.  To the extent that fiscal federalism exists as a
policy objective in the United States, this study may have important implications for
domestic income tax policy.  For other jurisdictions, the less cohesive the political union
(i.e., the less people feel they belong to the same group), the more important the
distributional consequences of federal tax policies such as the HMI deduction are likely to
be.  In other words, the less people feel they will benefit from being part of a particular
group (for example, the United States), the less willing they are to share with other
members of the group.  In such a case it is natural that concern will increase whenever
there is a perception that resources are being involuntarily appropriated and transferred to
an outside group (for example, the citizens of another state).
At a minimum, this study offers a rare national analysis of state-to-state
differences in a major tax provision.  The study also allows for variation across
households and states of certain potentially significant causal variables.  These variables
include a set of personal characteristics of the head of household as well as a set of
characteristics of the state.  The concepts and techniques applied in this study could easily
be applied to other provisions of federal tax, as well as to the possibly differential effects
of state tax provisions on residents of various localities within the state.  Finally, the
methodology employed in this study may be transferred to the exploration of tax settings
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of other federations.  It is hoped that by 
highlighting this federalist aspect of the HMI deduction benefit distribution, this work
sheds new light on the consequences of this tax provision as well as others.
6.3  Future Research
1. The quality of the dependent variable used in the fully partialled model can be
improved by employing a tax simulator such as TAXSIM to create a tax benefit
value taking into account more of the characteristics of the household (provided in
the PUMS combined housing and persons record).
2. The second part of the study could be expanded to include all U.S. states D.C. and
other possessions as in the first part of the study.
3. Although not necessarily a direct extension of the present study alone, a validation
procedure of the TAXSIM simulator would be an important contribution to the
tax literature.  Feenberg suggests regressing the error term from this regression (µ)
on the known flaws in TAXSIM to test each for significance.  For purposes of the
present study, µ is on the HMI deduction benefit.  This regression is modeled as
follows:
µ = ± + ²1*(HMI benefit) + ³.
The significance of ²1 provides the test of interest.
4. This study could be expanded to include other forms of home ownership subsidy
such as the federal income tax provisions for the deduction of real property taxes,
 
1During the time of this study, the Section 121 exclusion amount was $125,000
per return (half that amount for married filing separately).  Currently (for sales and
exchange after 5/6/97), the exclusion is $250,000 per return and $500,000 for a married
couple filing jointly (RIA, 2000).
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gain deferral provisions (Sec. 1034), one time gain exclusion (Sec. 1211), capital
gain preference (Sec. 1(h)); state income tax provisions that mirror federal; and
non-tax government subsidies such as HUD.
5. Future study is possible using the mortgage interest deduction along with other
IMF tax return data (such as income) along with statistics on investment/wealth
by income class, or even better, by state of residence and by income to predict
speculative real estate investment behavior based on the non-residence real
property tax deduction.
6. A possible extension of this study would be to actually simulate (on a static basis)
the effect of indexing (based on housing cost in each state) on the distribution of
the HMI deduction.
7. A panel data analysis would be helpful in revealing the changes in the observed
relationships across time.  In particular, the effect of such changes as a change in
taxpayer income or changes in tax policy could be studied.
8. The HMI deduction is but one feature of the U.S. Federal Income Tax.  This
analysis could be replicated on other individual features of the federal revenue
system including the system as a whole.  The deduction for HMI is the largest tax
deduction for personal income tax.  Each deduction, having its own rationale, is
subject to scrutiny for reduction/elimination purposes as the federal government
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attempts to reduce spending. 
9. Continuing in the vein of number eight (above), further comparison could be
performed by repeating the analysis using estimated household tax characteristics
based on survey information rather than the actual tax return data themselves. 
This is the predominant technique in the economics literature.
10. Future research might examine lobbying and voting on the HMI deduction and
related issues (particularly in the mid-1980s surrounding the 1986 and 1987 Tax
Acts) to seek evidence of a federalist motive.
11. Due to the gross nature of the state specific measurements used in this study,
additional insight might be gained by limiting the scope of examination to, for
example, two states.  More detailed demographic data could be combined with
survey data to allow a more refined analysis.  More detailed analysis could be
conducted on a limited number of states.  For example, California might be
compared with Texas.  Such a study might focus on the effect of a change (over
time) on the relative benefit from the HMI deduction between residents of states
where interdependencies are believed to exist.
12. The use of survey data in the present study is limited to aggregate statistical data. 
Future research might benefit from the collection and use of survey data in order
to obtain a closer approximation of the actual causal relationships being proxied
here.




14. This study should be followed up with a search for evidence of support or lack
thereof for the HMI deduction on the part of state representatives.
15. As mentioned in the Data section of this dissertation, a drawback to the use of
Census of Population and Housing data in the method proposed here is that,
unlike some other Census data that comes pre-aggregated, the Population and
Housing data are household level.  This requires that aggregate statistics be
extracted, which is an extra step in the analysis.  One benefit resulting from this,
however, is that it leaves the door open for the application of alternative
methodology such as a database merger technique.  A comparison of these
alternative techniques could, in itself, be valuable from a strictly methodological
standpoint.
16. Although outside the realm of accounting/tax research, further study may be
needed in the area of the joint housing/mortgage decision.
17. According to America s Community Bankers et al. (1995), the distribution of
home equity lines of credit (HELCs) across states is   extremely uneven   with
three percent or less in Iowa, Oklahoma, Louisiana and Arkansas, and 20 percent
or more in Hawaii, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
and Utah.  All things being equal, failure to model this disparity in the present
study biases against finding significant results (i.e., differences between states).  A
dynamic model should be developed to explore this area as part of future research.
18. Once identified, key characteristics of each state should be analyzed to determine
which are significant in determining the amount of HMI deduction necessary to
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equalize federal subsidy across states.  Next, these key factors could be used to
compute an index that, when applied to the HMI deduction, adjusts for key factors
causing differences between states.  Several approaches to implementing such an
equalization scheme including a cap on the deduction which might vary by state.
19. Given the close practical linkage between the flat tax and the HMI deduction, a
search of congressional discussion around the 1913 tax code could prove
interesting in revealing motivations for the HMI deduction in a flat tax context.
20. The techniques and data used here could be used to examine the question of
potential federal tax policy affecting resource transfers between metropolitan and
non-metropolitan areas.
21. Perhaps a similar analysis of the tax benefit of all itemized deductions is necessary
as a basis for comparing the benefit of the HMI deduction specifically.  Such
analysis would be meaningful in determining whether the HMI deduction is
unique, or merely reflects the pattern of benefit of itemized deductions in general.
22. A further extension of the present study is to combine this analysis with
traditional tax equity analysis using techniques such as the Suites Index (Suites
1977; Ricketts 1988).
23. The issue of federalism is not specific to the United States.  In fact, most nations
face this issue to some extent if their government is not either unitary or
confederate in form.  This being the case, other nations could provide the basis for
applying the methodology used here (assuming data availability).  For example,




1. Significant limitations of this research will result from the fact that part of the tax
database has been blurred for confidentiality purposes.  Such limitations exist at
high income levels.  Also, the same database may suffer from inadequate sample
size for smaller states.
2. Another major limitation of this study is model misspecification.  It is highly
likely that the true underlying model should be correctly specified as a
simultaneous system.
3. A limitation of the chosen data is the lack of information about taxpayer wealth
other than income, thus income must serve as a proxy for wealth.  Unfortunately,
the two are not equivalent (i.e., wealth and income are not always highly
correlated).  Take for instance a farmer who has a relatively large asset holding
(his farm) but who may have relatively little income.  On the other hand, a young
professional, say doctor or lawyer, just starting out may have substantial income
with relatively little wealth.  In the context of this study, the difference between
income and wealth could be important in determining the taxpayer s benefit from
the HMI deduction.  In addition to other differences in preference between the
wealthy and others, the wealthy don t need to finance home consumption the way
others, even those with incomes do.
4. A high degree of multicollinearity probably exists between the independent
variables.  This is not necessarily a problem for the present study as long as the
collinear variables are treated as a set.  The problem may arise in attempting to
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separate the effects of taxpayer income from average state income.
5. Variables such as property tax rates are simplified (i.e., averaged).  The variable
actually varies by county/locality within the state and is averaged for the state.  A
finer analysis would be useful, but would require more detailed data.
6. Due to the confidential nature of the individual financial data, the model used in
this study omits important nonfinancial characteristics of the individual and is,
therefore, misspecified.  Clapp (1987) suggests a fairly complete definition of key
variables.  Among the most important missing variables is a location variable (i.e.,
all residents of a given state are treated as though they lived in the same area--city
or county, ghetto or suburb).  Although income and other included variables may
proxy for some of those missing from the model, this remains a weakness of
unknown magnitude.  As suggested in the Future Research subchapter of this
dissertation, use of survey data offers a possible means of overcoming this
shortfall.
7. This study shows anecdotal evidence of the interest on the part of higher cost of
living states (e.g., New York, see comments by Gov. George Pataki and Sen.
Alfonse D Amato in subchapter 2.2  Current Political Debate Surrounding HMI
Deduction of this study) in the continuation of the HMI deduction.  There is also
evidence of the conflict between higher and lower living cost states in the words
of Sen. Robert Packwood of Oregon (also in subchapter 2.2).   Support of the
HMI deduction may, in essence, be support for the status quo in highly developed
(i.e., more expensive) regions of the country.  The unanswered question is: Why
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do the lower cost regions appear to mind as they will also lose the deduction?  Is it
that they fear the ripple effect of damage to the national status quo that might
result from a shock to the major metropolitan housing markets?  A full
investigation of this issue is left for future research.
8. To the extent that there are multiple definitions for such key variables as income
and various definitions of conditions such as regressivity, the results of analyses
such as the present one are easily manipulated.
9. There is an implicit assumption that taxpayer preferences are reflected in the
distribution of tax benefits.  A prerequisite for taxpayer preference, however, is an
awareness of the determinant issues.  Although a federalist attitude or interstate
competition (or lack thereof) might explain the present test results, this study does
not show conclusively that any such awareness exists with respect to the HMI
deduction specifically.
10. Because of the nature of the Census data used in the hierarchical model, there is
increased likelihood of Type I error (failure to reject a false null hypothesis). 
Understanding the exploratory nature of the study, this is not viewed as a serious
limitation.  Regardless of the result of the present study, the door remains open for
the application of other analytical techniques.
11. The inability of data to measure rental costs at the household level represents a
serious limitation to the hierarchical causal model.
12. The justification for using characteristics of the head of household (primarily in
testing H6) is that socially, economically and culturally the head of household is
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the best measure of the household in general.  An issue which is not dealt with in
this dissertation is the possibility of variation within the household in terms of the
variables tested which could impact the HMI deduction benefit enjoyed by the
entire household.  Exceptions to the assumption are inevitable, and are hoped to
be insignificant, or at leased not biasing in their effect on the hypotheses tested.
13. Another assumption underlying the models used in this dissertation is that
taxpayers refrain from   playing games   when it comes to tax reporting.  This
assumption could materially change the results of the present study if a group of
taxpayers, for example, engaged in some tax savings tactic in the year in question
in a way which biased the result.  There are opportunities to study taxpayer
behavior, however, the present methodology and analysis is not seen as the best
possible opportunity to study taxpayer game playing, thus, the issue is not
addressed.
14. Another possible weakness in this analysis is the possibility that taxpayers (who
are also Census participants) will fail to understand or otherwise fail to comply
with tax or Census reporting requirements.  It is also possible that wording of the
Census questionnaire might lead to systematic differences between tax and
Census reporting.  For example, wording of the Census questions regarding the
amount of mortgage payments may result in systematic differences between the
amount of mortgage interest estimated based on information reported to the
Bureau of Census and the amounts reported to the IRS for income taxes.
15. The Census data analysis portion (described in Chapter IV) of the present study
 
2In 1993, only Alabama, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma and Utah
allow a deduction for individual income taxes for federal income taxes (ACIR 1990).
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does not recompute the state income tax deduction taken for federal income tax. 
When federal income tax is increased (for example through the repeal of a tax
deduction), the effect would be an decrease in state income tax (resulting from an
increased deduction for federal taxes on the state tax return2) assuming no
adjustment in state tax structure to compensate for the change.  To the extent there
is an interaction between federal and state income tax (i.e., federal income tax is
deductible for state income tax and visa versa), this would create a bias in the
amount of state income tax used in the analysis to compute federal income tax. 
Since state tax rates tend to be relatively low, and the effect on the amount of HMI
deduction benefit for federal income tax would be the product of the change in
deduction times the federal rate times the state rate, the final amount should be
relatively small, thus, probably not significant.  If significant, the difference could
certainly bias the results of H6 and H8 against finding differences in HMI
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Table 1.  HMI Benefit per Tax Return by State for the 1992 IMF
State Mean N Std. Dev. Med. Min. Max. Variance
AL 351.158 816 994.92 0 0 8627 989864
AK 388.772 232 968.55 0 0 5509 938088
AZ 540.139 842 1145.08 0 0 10146 1311219
AR 299.39 520 1023.95 0 0 17670 1048465
CA 1365.703 8757 2856.28 0 0 51037 8158311
CO 658.441 952 1337.55 0 0 12445 1789032
CT 1085.428 859 2501.87 0 0 30507 6259346
DE 606.173 168 1189.86 0 0 7626 1415765
DC 905.063 158 1844.31 0 0 13277 3401468
FL 510.425 3303 1527.06 0 0 35912 2331902
GA 586.468 1431 1275.99 0 0 10575 1628141
HI 951.56 298 2409.12 0 0 27368 5803849
ID 418.085 270 1025.94 0 0 6977 1052561
IL 631.426 2634 1520.39 0 0 17323 2311576
IN 348.051 1151 1085.44 0 0 22469 1178176
IA 199.586 800 575.45 0 0 5337 331139
KS 324.189 604 896.52 0 0 12147 803740
KY 282.699 801 878.12 0 0 9665 771090
LA 329.136 832 984.68 0 0 10830 969591
ME 460.279 272 1500.2 0 0 16252 2250599
MD 1083.258 1197 2051.48 0 0 22339 4208553
MA 880.819 1489 1966.87 0 0 25641 3868582
MI 466.131 1939 1114.45 0 0 15069 1242002
MN 601.13 1156 1283.58 0 0 12350 1647583
MS 235.487 466 775.21 0 0 8832 600951
MO 310.69 1134 832.48 0 0 8281 693022
MT 203.075 201 663.68 0 0 6109 440475
NE 243.36 414 752.03 0 0 7408 565551
NV 679.689 360 1709.67 0 0 16905 2922955
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NH 796.718 308 2564.74 0 0 33821 6577896
NJ 919.886 1930 1945.64 0 0 26026 3785515
NM 387.239 351 981.02 0 0 6365 962391
NY 636.314 4006 1603.56 0 0 29222 2571410
NC 491.264 1451 1228.19 0 0 10555 1508458
ND 201.673 168 550.61 0 0 3355 303175
OH 419.683 2306 1140.34 0 0 14115 1300384
OK 252.887 743 738.35 0 0 7282 545163
OR 436.219 745 869.01 0 0 6420 755185
PA 492.73 2646 1334.32 0 0 19316 1780419
RI 661.757 243 1885.05 0 0 16061 3553414
SC 450.575 744 1184.76 0 0 13222 1403656
SD 109.894 226 561.17 0 0 5327 314917
TN 299.868 1074 864.25 0 0 7548 746921
TX 407.566 4009 1346.67 0 0 22228 1813509
UT 510.716 359 1218.74 0 0 9048 1485336
VT 443.577 170 1025.68 0 0 6905 1052029
VA 949.261 1462 1833.89 0 0 15465 3363139
WA 622.222 1318 1588.45 0 0 16535 2523167
WV 257.775 316 1068.17 0 0 14328 1140979
WI 428.288 1121 1074.62 0 0 14923 1154818
WY 136.000 117 454.4 0 0 3326 206479
Other 72.596 109 349.47 0 0 2586 122131
Total 657.159 60286 1733.56 0 0 51037 3005220
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Table 2.  IMF Based Regression Results - Dependent Variable in Dollars ($)
Table 2.a. OLS Regression Results ($)
Table 2.a.1. OLS Regression Results ($) - Model 1
(Constant only, results not reported)
Table 2.a.2. OLS Regression Results ($) - Model 2
  
 Dependent variable:     HMIBENE
 Model size: N =  60286, Parameters =  2,  Df=  60284 
 Residuals:  SS= .1736048880E+12, SD=   1696.99258 
 Fit:        R
2
=  .041755,   Adjusted R
2
 =  .04174 
 Model test: F[  1,  60284] = 2626.87,    P-value = .00000 
 Variable   Coefficient            SE        b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant  599.2227853      7.0033194        85.563  
.0000




Table 2.a.3. OLS Regression Results ($) - Model 3
  
 Dependent variable:     HMIBENE
 Model size: N =  60286, Parameters =  52, Df=  60234  
 Residuals:  SS= .1736399383E+12, SD= 1697.86814  
 Fit:        R
2
=  .041562, Adjusted R
2
 = .04075  
 Model test: F[ 51,  60234] =   51.22,    P-value = .00000 
 Variable   Coefficient            SE       b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant  560.4317460      47.832016       11.717   .0000
 AL       -209.2736578      76.293455       -2.743   .0061 
 AK       -171.6601943      121.29953       -1.415   .1570 
 AZ       -20.29279116      75.575146        -.269   .7883 
 AR       -261.0413614      88.496688       -2.950   .0032 
 CA        805.2708919      51.157563       15.741   .0000 
 CT        524.9966591      75.125536        6.988   .0000 
 DE        45.74087302      139.45309         .328   .7429 
 DC        344.6315451      143.29408        2.405   .0162 
 FL       -50.00667791      56.219844        -.889   .3737 
 GA        26.03575921      65.592732         .397   .6914 
 HI        391.1286567      109.36901        3.576   .0003 
 ID       -142.3465608      113.86297       -1.250   .2112 
 IL        70.99422208      58.157908        1.221   .2222 
 IN       -212.3804863      69.227656       -3.068   .0022 
 IA       -360.8454960      76.755111       -4.701   .0000 
 KS       -236.2430043      84.027834       -2.811   .0049 
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 KY       -277.7326199      76.725800       -3.620   .0003 
 LA       -231.2959287      75.846905       -3.050   .0023 
 ME       -100.1523343      113.51771        -.882   .3776 
 MD        522.8263993      68.528968        7.629   .0000 
 MA        320.3869242      64.991821        4.930   .0000 
 MI       -94.30126640      61.437976       -1.535   .1248 
 MN        40.69801176      69.149371         .589   .5562 
 MS       -324.9446216      92.054733       -3.530   .0004 
 MO       -249.7421517      69.498308       -3.593   .0003 
 MT       -357.3571192      128.95725       -2.771   .0056 
 NE       -317.0718426      96.182540       -3.297   .0010 
 NV        119.2571429      101.46703        1.175   .2399 
 NH        236.2857864      107.92358        2.189   .0286 
 NJ        359.4542643      61.494372        5.845   .0000 
 NM       -173.1924298      102.47381       -1.690   .0910 
 NY        75.88178368      54.840782        1.384   .1665 
 NC       -69.16779014      65.380726       -1.058   .2901 
 ND       -358.7591270      139.45309       -2.573   .0101 
 OH       -140.7483115      59.481198       -2.366   .0180 
 OK       -307.5448012      78.535272       -3.916   .0001 
 OR       -124.2129541      78.468931       -1.583   .1134 
 PA       -67.70158730      58.115220       -1.165   .2440 
 RI        101.3254556      118.95838         .852   .3943 
 SC       -109.8564772      78.502064       -1.399   .1617 
 SD       -450.5379407      122.65178       -3.673   .0002 
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 TN       -260.5639620      70.512639       -3.695   .0002 
 TX       -152.8655200      54.835872       -2.788   .0053 
 UT       -49.71586859      101.57688        -.489   .6245 
 VT       -116.8552754      138.72740        -.842   .3996 
 VA        388.8295399      65.266310        5.958   .0000 
 WA        61.79056050      66.896352         .924   .3557 
 WV       -302.6564296      106.82017       -2.833   .0046 
 WI       -132.1436104      69.710079       -1.896   .0580 
 WY       -424.4317460      164.09401       -2.587   .0097 
 OTHERST  -487.8354158      169.51462       -2.878   .0040
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Table 2.a.4. OLS Regression Results ($) - Model 4
  
 Dependent variable:     HMIBENE
 Model size: N =  60286, Parameters =  53, Df=  60233  
 Residuals:  SS= .1661061900E+12, SD= 1660.64064  
 Fit:        R
2
=  .083146, Adjusted R
2
 = .08235  
 Model test: F[ 52,  60233] =  105.04,    P-value = .00000 
 Variable   Coefficient            SE       b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant  500.5087442      46.797296       10.695   .0000
 AL       -215.1303435      74.620727       -2.883   .0039 
 AK       -166.2094331      118.63996       -1.401   .1612 
 AZ        30.13456182      73.924380         .408   .6835 
 AR       -259.1445042      86.556314       -2.994   .0028 
 CA        815.6197478      50.036273       16.301   .0000 
 CT        538.4441728      73.478782        7.328   .0000 
 DE        19.86647208      136.39634         .146   .8842 
 DC        291.0048981      140.15597        2.076   .0379 
 FL       -16.96461856      54.990800        -.308   .7577 
 GA        14.23808925      64.154941         .222   .8244 
 HI        373.8652482      106.97149        3.495   .0005 
 ID       -122.5448349      111.36705       -1.100   .2712 
 IL        49.56755788      56.884213         .871   .3835 
 IN       -227.5503314      67.710391       -3.361   .0008 
 IA       -360.8612186      75.072176       -4.807   .0000 
 KS       -219.2158272      82.186084       -2.667   .0076 
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 KY       -256.9798744      75.044558       -3.424   .0006 
 LA       -187.1756666      74.188686       -2.523   .0116 
 ME       -104.1979406      111.02874        -.938   .3480 
 MD        501.9898069      67.027585        7.489   .0000 
 MA        334.4611004      63.567379        5.262   .0000 
 MI       -111.5859147      60.091796       -1.857   .0633 
 MN        25.65450888      67.633812         .379   .7045 
 MS       -316.0163066      90.036501       -3.510   .0004 
 MO       -256.3031309      67.974602       -3.771   .0002 
 MT       -284.4908370      126.13743       -2.255   .0241 
 NE       -303.6357112      94.073990       -3.228   .0012 
 NV        132.6462728      99.242591        1.337   .1814 
 NH        259.1064546      105.55815        2.455   .0141 
 NJ        335.8632907      60.147739        5.584   .0000 
 NM       -153.2275338      100.22770       -1.529   .1263 
 NY        58.73480361      53.639345        1.095   .2735 
 NC       -78.91165661      63.947458       -1.234   .2172 
 ND       -333.4618527      136.39630       -2.445   .0145 
 OH       -161.9480324      58.178425       -2.784   .0054 
 OK       -244.2321393      76.822856       -3.179   .0015 
 OR       -138.1813537      76.748885       -1.800   .0718 
 PA       -88.51248579      56.842379       -1.557   .1194 
 RI        108.6268860      116.35018         .934   .3505 
 SC       -125.3739526      76.781400       -1.633   .1025 
 SD       -464.4004277      119.96281       -3.871   .0001 
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 TN       -257.7981108      68.966598       -3.738   .0002 
 TX       -108.1488672      53.640363       -2.016   .0438 
 UT       -28.21523884      99.350558        -.284   .7764 
 VT       -97.48127273      135.68616        -.718   .4725 
 VA        362.6469575      63.837245        5.681   .0000 
 WA        63.91527720      65.429594         .977   .3286 
 WV       -324.9005522      104.47889       -3.110   .0019 
 WI       -152.1490912      68.182689       -2.231   .0256 
 WY       -381.1033501      160.49822       -2.375   .0176 
 OTHERST  -495.7323673      165.79791       -2.990   .0028 
 INCOME    .2460083058E-02  .47067364E-04   52.267   .0000 
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Table 2.b. Tobit Regression Results ($) 
         
Table 2.b.1. Tobit Regression Results ($) - Model 1
  
  Dependent variable:      HMIBENE      
  N            60286      
  LL       -201963.9      
 Variable   Coefficient            SE      b/SE    
P[|Z|>z] 
 Constant -2141.658235      26.961712      -79.433   .0000
Table 2.b.2. Tobit Regression Results ($) - Model 2
  
  Dependent variable              HMIBENE      
  N            60286      
  LL       -191189.3      
 Variable   Coefficient            SE      b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant -3940.287153      32.623331     -120.781   .0000
 INCOME    .5010282137E-01  .36993050E-03  135.438   .0000 
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Table 2.b.3. Tobit Regression Results ($) - Model 3
  
Dependent variable:     HMIBENE      
N            60286      
LL       -200849.4      
 Variable   Coefficient            SE      b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant -2221.113551      134.66488      -16.494   .0000
 AL       -753.3707317      220.97145       -3.409   .0007 
 AK       -851.3601313      361.04029       -2.358   .0184 
 AZ        260.4419998      207.42787        1.256   .2093 
 AR       -850.9083315      258.85004       -3.287   .0010 
 CA        1629.299622      141.44838       11.519   .0000 
 CT        1226.421499      201.39466        6.090   .0000 
 DE        274.3251196      381.27804         .719   .4718 
 DC        915.0562160      380.24025        2.407   .0161 
 FL       -277.8452401      157.95355       -1.759   .0786 
 GA        247.1130591      181.15365        1.364   .1725 
 HI        703.7818972      297.17812        2.368   .0179 
 ID       -402.6420126      325.19044       -1.238   .2157 
 IL        146.5536679      161.86603         .905   .3653 
 IN       -660.9546971      198.31946       -3.333   .0009 
 IA       -1359.063384      230.42071       -5.898   .0000 
 KS       -662.9717608      242.10710       -2.738   .0062 
 KY       -1102.987709      227.12205       -4.856   .0000 
 LA       -1044.632794      224.12545       -4.661   .0000 
 ME       -582.8907257      330.89666       -1.762   .0781 
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 MD        1418.446183      183.34226        7.737   .0000 
 MA        843.2523739      177.18368        4.759   .0000 
 MI       -62.19902913      171.24404        -.363   .7164 
 MN        363.2264182      189.79414        1.914   .0556 
 MS       -1391.327212      281.80267       -4.937   .0000 
 MO       -735.6833581      199.60520       -3.686   .0002 
 MT       -1420.121392      400.54638       -3.545   .0004 
 NE       -1239.281359      291.02785       -4.258   .0000 
 NV        187.9957915      281.47512         .668   .5042 
 NH        579.4153765      292.81300        1.979   .0478 
 NJ        983.6665812      167.63455        5.868   .0000 
 NM       -669.7520228      298.51840       -2.244   .0249 
 NY        290.1517544      152.24677        1.906   .0567 
 NC       -179.0900793      183.44385        -.976   .3289 
 ND       -1447.460776      435.39189       -3.325   .0009 
 OH       -371.9392394      167.47194       -2.221   .0264 
 OK       -1071.128098      231.69562       -4.623   .0000 
 OR        179.8070536      214.95924         .836   .4029 
 PA       -196.0387355      162.89008       -1.204   .2288 
 RI        227.6562762      328.27204         .693   .4880 
 SC       -229.9044721      220.85450       -1.041   .2979 
 SD       -2980.457984      459.39928       -6.488   .0000 
 TN       -1187.012087      208.90281       -5.682   .0000 
 TX       -864.8299510      156.18454       -5.537   .0000 
 UT        200.4524947      278.04545         .721   .4709 
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 VT       -100.4428425      386.70256        -.260   .7951 
 VA        1105.955335      176.54486        6.264   .0000 
 WA        92.16275826      186.35996         .495   .6209 
 WV       -1618.835057      338.70421       -4.779   .0000 
 WI       -285.8858451      196.25123       -1.457   .1452 
 WY       -1663.685054      523.46693       -3.178   .0015 
 OTHERST  -3695.193471      722.68535       -5.113   .0000 
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Table 2.b.4. Tobit Regression Results ($) - Model 4
                
Dependent variable:      HMIBENE      
N            60286      
LL       -190148.5      
 Variable   Coefficient            SE      b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant -3941.933806      110.22678      -35.762   .0000
 AL       -365.6475867      177.22354       -2.063   .0391 
 AK       -709.2282004      298.47733       -2.376   .0175 
 AZ        456.9040374      165.14421        2.767   .0057 
 AR       -632.8836028      209.60425       -3.019   .0025 
 CA        1428.543563      112.84626       12.659   .0000 
 CT        757.4200823      160.24216        4.727   .0000 
 DE        59.23899337      300.92647         .197   .8439 
 DC        487.7957778      300.15011        1.625   .1041 
 FL       -130.9830698      126.34730       -1.037   .2999 
 GA        190.6023197      144.34276        1.320   .1867 
 HI        789.0145040      233.92598        3.373   .0007 
 ID       -63.54463499      260.20063        -.244   .8071 
 IL        22.35784197      129.23694         .173   .8627 
 IN       -375.3156139      158.61755       -2.366   .0180 
 IA       -860.5913726      185.36377       -4.643   .0000 
 KS       -481.6466254      194.68123       -2.474   .0134 
 KY       -696.2999936      183.75574       -3.789   .0002 
 LA       -789.2340113      182.45529       -4.326   .0000 
 ME       -199.9767260      264.00926        -.757   .4488 
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 MD        989.5793631      145.06207        6.822   .0000 
 MA        590.2228647      141.19537        4.180   .0000 
 MI       -45.14058318      136.70834        -.330   .7413 
 MN        258.8776122      151.11175        1.713   .0867 
 MS       -986.3951233      229.48690       -4.298   .0000 
 MO       -428.1289829      159.75584       -2.680   .0074 
 MT       -776.5652886      326.95507       -2.375   .0175 
 NE       -710.3287530      233.56551       -3.041   .0024 
 NV        162.6795106      225.27663         .722   .4702 
 NH        221.3105958      233.72366         .947   .3437 
 NJ        558.7642812      133.24466        4.194   .0000 
 NM       -300.6657789      241.28942       -1.246   .2127 
 NY       -11.99296267      121.66259        -.099   .9215 
 NC       -15.00680841      146.35779        -.103   .9183 
 ND       -1068.990428      353.08305       -3.028   .0025 
 OH       -167.0916033      133.59753       -1.251   .2110 
 OK       -655.7955725      187.39529       -3.500   .0005 
 OR        100.4128286      170.64239         .588   .5562 
 PA       -185.8388701      130.09256       -1.429   .1531 
 RI        303.0695281      261.70476        1.158   .2468 
 SC       -37.75961552      176.88933        -.213   .8310 
 SD       -2194.462109      378.74477       -5.794   .0000 
 TN       -701.1775184      167.88947       -4.176   .0000 
 TX       -726.9808418      125.74691       -5.781   .0000 
 UT        373.1297338      219.67816        1.699   .0894 
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 VT        293.9039890      308.27402         .953   .3404 
 VA        702.7778375      140.18627        5.013   .0000 
 WA        .8247285766      148.53915         .006   .9956 
 WV       -1131.569291      277.74785       -4.074   .0000 
 WI       -250.9878111      157.26415       -1.596   .1105 
 WY       -955.5362161      415.56868       -2.299   .0215 
 OTHERST  -2089.295559      563.47333       -3.708   .0002 
 INCOME    .4835378474E-01  .35655932E-03  135.612   .0000 
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Table 3.   IMF Based Regression Results - Dependent Variable as a % (%)
Table 3.a. OLS Regression Results (%)
Table 3.a.1. OLS Regression Results (%) - Model 1
(Constant only, results not reported)
Table 3.a.2. OLS Regression Results (%) - Model 2
  
Dependent variable:     HMIBEPCT
Model size: N =   60286, Parameters = 2, Df=  60284
Residuals:  SS= .2544232481E+11, SD= 649.64689  
  Fit:        R
2
=  .000177, Adjusted R
2
 = .00016  
  Model test: F[  1,  60284] =   10.69,    P-value =
.00108  
 Variable   Coefficient            SE       b/SE    
P[|Z|>z] 
 Constant  37.30139121      2.6810280       13.913   .0000
 INCOME    .6005951162E-04  .18373164E-04    3.269   .0011 
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Table 3.a.3. OLS Regression Results (%) - Model 3
  
 Dependent variable:     HMIBEPCT
 Model size: N =  60286, Parameters =  52, Df=  60234
 Residuals:  SS= .2532559642E+11, SD=  648.42386  
 Fit:        R
2
=  .004764, Adjusted R
2
 = .00392  
 Model test: F[ 51,  60234] = 5.65,   P-value =  .00000  
 Variable   Coefficient            SE       b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant  20.68326651      18.267273        1.132   .2575
 AL       -16.33454418      29.136831        -.561   .5751 
 AK       -16.53169328      46.324862        -.357   .7212 
 AZ       -10.53115753      28.862505        -.365   .7152 
 AR       -16.01070581      33.797303        -.474   .6357 
 CA        116.8742149      19.537315        5.982   .0000 
 CT        62.60703807      28.690797        2.182   .0291 
 DE       -16.09143997      53.257795        -.302   .7625 
 DC       -9.052027627      54.724687        -.165   .8686 
 FL        20.68704096      21.470624         .964   .3353 
 GA       -3.197168565      25.050174        -.128   .8984 
 HI        44.38149436      41.768542        1.063   .2880 
 ID       -12.21421493      43.484807        -.281   .7788 
 IL        4.653065372      22.210780         .209   .8341 
 IN       -16.80782783      26.438369        -.636   .5249 
 IA       -20.23979268      29.313139        -.690   .4899 
 KS       -17.31639666      32.090627        -.540   .5895 
 KY       -10.43704559      29.301945        -.356   .7217 
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 LA       -13.87071119      28.966291        -.479   .6320 
 ME        .3439121707      43.352949         .008   .9937 
 MD        28.90600969      26.171536        1.104   .2694 
 MA        49.60374454      24.820684        1.998   .0457 
 MI       -10.85186593      23.463453        -.463   .6437 
 MN       -8.536291649      26.408471        -.323   .7465 
 MS        7.335212182      35.156137         .209   .8347 
 MO       -15.17722455      26.541732        -.572   .5674 
 MT       -18.46543605      49.249383        -.375   .7077 
 NE       -18.18922199      36.732566        -.495   .6205 
 NV       -14.45223525      38.750738        -.373   .7092 
 NH        128.2329093      41.216526        3.111   .0019 
 NJ        24.90141983      23.484991        1.060   .2890 
 NM        16.09449573      39.135233         .411   .6809 
 NY        8.227404665      20.943954         .393   .6944 
 NC       -9.672360222      24.969208        -.387   .6985 
 ND       -20.65535623      53.257795        -.388   .6981 
 OH       -7.770708116      22.716150        -.342   .7323 
 OK       -18.96243861      29.992991        -.632   .5272 
 OR       -10.82929028      29.967656        -.361   .7178 
 PA       -11.26922910      22.194477        -.508   .6116 
 RI       -9.446117208      45.430767        -.208   .8353 
 SC       -15.78824768      29.980309        -.527   .5985 
 SD       -20.04294516      46.841296        -.428   .6687 
 TN       -6.935658336      26.929110        -.258   .7968 
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 TX       -3.481586486      20.942079        -.166   .8680 
 UT       -13.20032561      38.792692        -.340   .7336 
 VT        4.185186494      52.980649         .079   .9370 
 VA        8.968284488      24.925512         .360   .7190 
 WA       -5.488278032      25.548033        -.215   .8299 
 WV       -19.87403730      40.795126        -.487   .6261 
 WI       -8.668470818      26.622609        -.326   .7447 
 WY       -20.63901796      62.668277        -.329   .7419 
 OTHERST  -12.01513924      64.738434        -.186   .8528 
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Table 3.a.4. OLS Regression Results (%) - Model 4
  
 Dependent variable:     HMIBEPCT
 Model size: N =  60286, Parameters =  53, Df=  60233 
 Residuals:  SS= .2532058496E+11, SD=  648.36509 
 Fit:        R
2
=  .004961, Adjusted R
2
 =  .00410  
 Model test: F[ 52,  60233] = 5.78,    P-value =  .00000  
 Variable   Coefficient            SE       b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant  19.13776262      18.271101        1.047   .2949
 AL       -16.48559687      29.134222        -.566   .5715 
 AK       -16.39110999      46.320681        -.354   .7234 
 AZ       -9.230560632      28.862347        -.320   .7491 
 AR       -15.96178303      33.794242        -.472   .6367 
 CA        117.1411273      19.535697        5.996   .0000 
 CT        62.95386957      28.688372        2.194   .0282 
 DE       -16.75877949      53.253318        -.315   .7530 
 DC       -10.43513910      54.721193        -.191   .8488 
 FL        21.53924511      21.470096        1.003   .3158 
 GA       -3.501448127      25.048058        -.140   .8888 
 HI        43.93624523      41.764954        1.052   .2928 
 ID       -11.70349879      43.481117        -.269   .7878 
 IL        4.100439640      22.209343         .185   .8535 
 IN       -17.19908084      26.436215        -.651   .5153 
 IA       -20.24019819      29.310482        -.691   .4899 
 KS       -16.87724029      32.087970        -.526   .5989 
 KY       -9.901801228      29.299699        -.338   .7354 
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 LA       -12.73278361      28.965541        -.440   .6602 
 ME        .2395699296      43.349030         .006   .9956 
 MD        28.36860279      26.169627        1.084   .2784 
 MA        49.96673861      24.818656        2.013   .0441 
 MI       -11.29766287      23.461682        -.482   .6301 
 MN       -8.924286100      26.406317        -.338   .7354 
 MS        7.565486785      35.153014         .215   .8296 
 MO       -15.34644202      26.539371        -.578   .5631 
 MT       -16.58610560      49.247927        -.337   .7363 
 NE       -17.84268406      36.729374        -.486   .6271 
 NV       -14.10690955      38.747354        -.364   .7158 
 NH        128.8214884      41.213143        3.126   .0018 
 NJ        24.29297332      23.483524        1.034   .3009 
 NM        16.60942027      39.131970         .424   .6712 
 NY        7.785158390      20.942447         .372   .7101 
 NC       -9.923669119      24.967051        -.397   .6910 
 ND       -20.00290167      53.253302        -.376   .7072 
 OH       -8.317480642      22.714643        -.366   .7142 
 OK       -17.32951032      29.994002        -.578   .5634 
 OR       -11.18955621      29.965121        -.373   .7088 
 PA       -11.80597331      22.193010        -.532   .5947 
 RI       -9.257802392      45.426682        -.204   .8385 
 SC       -16.18846659      29.977816        -.540   .5892 
 SD       -20.40047945      46.837164        -.436   .6632 
 TN       -6.864322893      26.926677        -.255   .7988 
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 TX       -2.328277094      20.942844        -.111   .9115 
 UT       -12.64579220      38.789508        -.326   .7444 
 VT        4.684871016      52.976044         .088   .9295 
 VA        8.292996510      24.924020         .333   .7393 
 WA       -5.433478409      25.545722        -.213   .8316 
 WV       -20.44774651      40.791767        -.501   .6162 
 WI       -9.184442103      26.620615        -.345   .7301 
 WY       -19.52151379      62.663432        -.312   .7554 
 OTHERST  -12.21881344      64.732593        -.189   .8503 
 INCOME    .6344922336E-04  .18376544E-04    3.453   .0006 
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Table 3.b. Tobit Regression Results (%) 
Table 3.b.1. Tobit Regression Results (%) - Model 1
  
  Dependent variable:    HMIBEPCT      
  N            60286      
  LL       -176592.6      
 Variable   Coefficient            SE      b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]  
 Constant -916.1900729      8.1451036     -112.484   .0000
Table 3.b.2. Tobit Regression Results (%) - Model 2
  
Dependent variable:      HMIBEPCT      
  N            60286      
  LL       -172921.6      
 Variable   Coefficient            SE      b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant -1489.017643      13.147949     -113.251   .0000
 INCOME    .1111494949E-01  .15105895E-03   73.580   .0000 
 
159
Table 3.b.3. Tobit Regression Results (%) - Model 3
  
  Dependent variable:    HMIBEPCT      
  N            60286      
  LL       -176032.8      
 Variable   Coefficient            SE      b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant -953.0286250      43.947746      -21.685   .0000
 AL       -180.1488313      72.195587       -2.495   .0126 
 AK       -241.3524084      118.71032       -2.033   .0420 
 AZ        91.12523228      67.597503        1.348   .1776 
 AR       -181.9786457      84.280084       -2.159   .0308 
 CA        365.7751555      46.248761        7.909   .0000 
 CT        276.7004885      65.857120        4.202   .0000 
 DE        51.31785255      124.74360         .411   .6808 
 DC        145.7613515      125.04175        1.166   .2437 
 FL       -38.35978403      51.588725        -.744   .4571 
 GA        72.36588245      59.152568        1.223   .2212 
 HI        117.2596867      97.814876        1.199   .2306 
 ID       -85.90785036      106.12242        -.810   .4182 
 IL        21.78946969      52.960880         .411   .6808 
 IN       -145.4976528      64.722734       -2.248   .0246 
 IA       -304.5309761      74.901498       -4.066   .0000 
 KS       -132.5041415      78.833778       -1.681   .0928 
 KY       -250.3617460      74.012321       -3.383   .0007 
 LA       -267.2945581      73.358149       -3.644   .0003 
 ME       -156.0421367      108.49862       -1.438   .1504 
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 MD        305.5187829      59.913548        5.099   .0000 
 MA        218.1230166      57.860967        3.770   .0002 
 MI        12.99784464      55.877873         .233   .8161 
 MN        99.36143249      61.950352        1.604   .1087 
 MS       -283.5238865      91.122582       -3.111   .0019 
 MO       -146.3744359      65.019877       -2.251   .0244 
 MT       -324.6187555      130.04457       -2.496   .0126 
 NE       -287.8851269      94.765980       -3.038   .0024 
 NV       -22.10405511      92.769149        -.238   .8117 
 NH        282.4421724      94.491543        2.989   .0028 
 NJ        214.9594253      54.813176        3.922   .0001 
 NM       -113.0971085      96.942681       -1.167   .2434 
 NY        78.85957900      49.757891        1.585   .1130 
 NC       -42.55440639      59.969348        -.710   .4780 
 ND       -337.8028813      141.49054       -2.387   .0170 
 OH       -67.96072090      54.677872       -1.243   .2139 
 OK       -236.1290817      75.419911       -3.131   .0017 
 OR        116.4488235      69.769223        1.669   .0951 
 PA       -52.43856870      53.269514        -.984   .3249 
 RI        12.26300065      107.87104         .114   .9095 
 SC       -47.80981268      72.126569        -.663   .5074 
 SD       -798.8098476      150.37371       -5.312   .0000 
 TN       -284.9592878      68.208826       -4.178   .0000 
 TX       -233.5789424      51.129261       -4.568   .0000 
 UT        80.81904743      90.473773         .893   .3717 
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 VT        36.13472184      125.36754         .288   .7732 
 VA        224.0805801      57.752276        3.880   .0001 
 WA       -10.27978262      61.083395        -.168   .8664 
 WV       -438.9772699      111.36257       -3.942   .0001 
 WI       -43.25451910      64.007458        -.676   .4992 
 WY       -366.5366457      168.93523       -2.170   .0300 




Table 3.b.4. Tobit Regression Results (%) - Model 4
  
  Dependent variable:    HMIBEPCT      
  N =   60286      
  LL       -172529.2      
 Variable   Coefficient            SE      b/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant -1503.082751      47.121561      -31.898  
.0000
 AL       -127.3835708      75.721678       -1.682  
.0925  
 AK       -252.3759906      126.56414       -1.994  
.0461  
 AZ        151.0552524      70.730524        2.136  
.0327  
 AR       -160.5614124      88.750331       -1.809  
.0704  
 CA        342.4258253      48.465446        7.065  
.0000  
 CT        193.0315693      69.111816        2.793  
.0052  
 DE        7.357473806      129.78723         .057  
.9548  
 DC        52.96416216      130.50900         .406  
.6849  
 FL       -12.64612336      54.097858        -.234  
.8152  
 GA        64.70049407      61.883701        1.046  
.2958  
 HI        126.9234426      102.12418        1.243  
.2139  
 ID       -19.19446462      111.24151        -.173  
.8630  
 IL       -14.84574598      55.499066        -.267  
.7891  
 IN       -107.4456458      67.769007       -1.585  
.1129  
 IA       -237.6626870      78.488269       -3.028  
.0025  
 KS       -106.6447702      82.752780       -1.289  
.1975  
 KY       -199.9162403      77.951050       -2.565  
.0103  




 ME       -104.8047503      113.59827        -.923  
.3562  
 MD        238.7615020      62.545395        3.817  
.0001  
 MA        178.1396303      60.649865        2.937  
.0033  
 MI        14.76284473      58.487047         .252  
.8007  
 MN        83.48371578      64.781785        1.289  
.1975  
 MS       -237.0663573      96.068459       -2.468  
.0136  
 MO       -100.5385328      68.019491       -1.478  
.1394  
 MT       -208.3776457      137.68889       -1.513  
.1302  
 NE       -210.6670994      99.239913       -2.123  
.0338  
 NV       -38.12746751      97.773749        -.390  
.6966  
 NH        228.9573304      99.020562        2.312  
.0208  
 NJ        137.5178895      57.335231        2.398  
.0165  
 NM       -52.20800454      102.20714        -.511  
.6095  
 NY        17.30496224      52.147762         .332  
.7400  
 NC       -20.28923257      62.767597        -.323  
.7465  
 ND       -284.6592319      148.75719       -1.914  
.0557  
 OH       -39.46704153      57.189221        -.690  
.4901  
 OK       -164.2033183      79.448245       -2.067  
.0388  
 OR        119.5273182      72.698659        1.644  
.1001  
 PA       -65.05442943      55.782458       -1.166  
.2435  
 RI        16.52372462      113.34631         .146  
.8841  
 SC       -21.56865712      75.630082        -.285  
.7755  
 SD       -734.3989035      158.54075       -4.632  
.0000  
 TN       -220.2679858      71.579773       -3.077  
.0021  




 UT        132.9507703      94.132105        1.412  
.1578  
 VT        130.4229987      131.14173         .995  
.3200  
 VA        152.3088052      60.392353        2.522  
.0117  
 WA       -39.22217840      63.982238        -.613  
.5399  
 WV       -412.2943476      118.15231       -3.490  
.0005  
 WI       -47.21399599      67.100406        -.704  
.4817  
 WY       -242.6292902      175.27815       -1.384  
.1663  
 OTHERST  -785.1965620      239.94569       -3.272  
.0011  




3Where the constant equals one.
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Table 4.  H1-H3 Test Results        
Table 4.a.  H1-H3 Test Results (Tobit)
Table 4.a.1.  H1 Results (Tobit)
Model Model Description
Log Likelihood (LL)
H1a ($) H1b (%)
1 HMIBENE = F(Constant)3 -206,252.4 -176,592.6
2 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Income) -191,122.7 -172,921.6
The Ç 2 test statistic for H1a is: 2*[LL(2)-LL(1)] = 2*[-191,122.7-(-206,252.4)]=30,259.4.
The Ç 2 test statistic for H1b is: 2*[LL(2)-LL(1)] = 2*[-172,921.6-(-176,592.6)]=  7,342.0.
Table 4.a.2.  H2 Results (Tobit)
Model Model Description
Log Likelihood (LL)
H2a ($) H2b (%)
1 HMIBENE = F(Constant) -206,252.4 -176,592.6
3 HMIBENE = F(Constant + State of Residence) -200,834.8 -176,032.8
The Ç 2 test statistic for H2a is:  2*[LL(3)-LL(1)]=2*[-200,834.8-(-206,252.4)]=10,835.2.
The Ç 2 test statistic for H2b is:  2*[LL(3)-LL(1)]=2*[-176,032.8-(-176,592.6)]=  1,119.6.
Table 4.a.3.  H3 Results (Tobit)
Model Model Description
Log Likelihood (LL)
H3a ($) H3b (%)
2 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Income) -191,122.7 -172,921.6
4 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Income + State of
Residence)
-190,088.9 -172,529.2
The Ç 2 test statistic for H3a is:  2*[LL(4)-LL(2)] = 2*[-190,088.9-(-191,122.7)]=2,067.6.
The Ç 2 test statistic for H3b is:  2*[LL(4)-LL(2)] = 2*[-172,529.2-(-172,921.6)]=   784.8.
Table 4.a.  H1-H3 Test Results (Tobit, continued)
 
166
Table 4.a.4. Summary of Hypothesis Test Results (Tobit)
Hypothesis Test
Ç 2 P[|Z|>z]
a ($) b (%) a ($) b (%)
1 30,259.4 7,342.0 0.0000 0.0000
2 10,835.2 1,119.6 0.0000 0.0000
3 2067.6 748.8 0.0000 0.0000
 
4Where the constant equals one.
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Table 4.b.  H1-H3 Test Results (OLS)
Table 4.b.1.  H1 Results (OLS)
Model Model Description
R2
H1a ($) H1b (%)
1 HMIBENE = F(Constant)4 0.00000 0.00000
2 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Income) .041755 .000177
FH1a= [(.041755-0)/(1-.041755)]*[(60,286-0-1-1)/(1)]=2,626.842
FH1b= [(.000177-0)/(1-.000177)]*[(60,286-0-1-1)/(1)]=     10.672
Table 4.b.2.  H2 Results (OLS)
Model Model Description
R2
H2a ($) H2b (%)
1 HMIBENE = F(Constant) 0.00000 0.00000
3 HMIBENE = F(Constant + State of Residence) .041562 .004764
FH2a= [(.041562-0)/(1-.041562)]*[(60,286-0-51-1)/(51)]=51.216
FH2b= [(.004764-0)/(1-.004764)]*[(60,286-0-51-1)/(51)]=  5.653   
Table 4.b.3.  H3 Results (OLS)
Model Model Description
R2
H2a ($) H2b (%)
2 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Income) .041755 .000177




FH3b= [(.004961-.000177)/(1-.004961)]*[(60,286-1-51-1)/(52)]=    5.569   
Table 4.b.  H1-H3 Test Results (OLS, continued)
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Table 4.b.4. Summary of Hypothesis Test Results (OLS)
Hypothesis Test
R2 P[|Z|>z]
H2a ($) H2b (%) H2a ($) H2b (%)
1 2,626.842 10.672 .00000 .00108
2 51.216 5.653 .00000 .00000
3 522.922 5.569 .00000 .00000
 
5TAXSIM only recognizes the following three filing statuses:  single, joint, and
head of household (single parent).  This necessitated recoding married filing separate and
qualifying widow(er) as as single.
6This variable was the sum of Itemized deductions both including and excluding
HMI deducted, always excluding the amount of state income tax.
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Case ID N/A N/A N/A
Tax year Tax year N/A 1992
State (see list below) State STATE92 N/A
Marital Status (see list below) Filing Status MARS92 Minor5







Age exemptions (number of taxpayers
over 65 years of age)
Elderly/ Blind AGEX Minor
Wage and salary income of Taxpayer Salary & Wages E92_2 (2/3)(E92_2)
Wage and salary income of Spouse Salary & Wages E92_2 (1/3)(E92_2)
Dividend income Dividends E92_5 N/A
Other property income, including Self-
employment, may be negative.




Gross Social Security Income Gross SSI
Benes
E92_18 N/A





Rent Paid  (for state property tax
rebates)
none none N/A
Property taxes paid Real Estate Tax E92_77 N/A
Itemized deductions except state





Table 6.  Effect of State Residence on HMI Deduction $ Benefit




MD      1,418 0.0000
CT  1,226 0.0000
VA      1,106 0.0000
NJ 984 0.0000
DC 915 0.0161
MA  843 0.0000




DE      274 0.4718
AZ     260 0.2093
GA     247 0.1725
RI 228 0.4880
UT  200 0.4709
NV    188 0.5042
OR    180 0.4029




MI      (62) 0.7164
VT     (100) 0.7951
NC (179) 0.3289
PA  (196) 0.2288
SC (230) 0.2979
FL     (278) 0.0786
WI (286) 0.1452
OH  (372) 0.0264
ID   (403) 0.2157
ME   (583) 0.0781
IN     (661) 0.0009
KS    (663) 0.0062
NM (670) 0.0249
MO      (736) 0.0002
AL     (753) 0.0007
AR      (851) 0.0010
AK    (851) 0.0184
TX   (865) 0.0000
LA (1,045) 0.0000
OK      (1,071) 0.0000
KY      (1,103) 0.0000
TN  (1,187) 0.0000
NE      (1,239) 0.0000
IA  (1,359) 0.0000
MS (1,391) 0.0000
MT     (1,420) 0.0004
ND (1,447) 0.0009
WV (1,619) 0.0000
WY     (1,664) 0.0015
SD (2,980) 0.0000
OTHERST (3,695) 0.0000






MD      990 0.0000
HI    789 0.0007
CT  757 0.0000
VA      703 0.0000
MA  590 0.0000
NJ 559 0.0000
DC 488 0.1041
AZ     457 0.0057
UT  373 0.0894
RI 303 0.2468
VT     294 0.3404
MN 259 0.0867
NH 221 0.3437
GA     191 0.1867
NV    163 0.4702
OR    100 0.5562
DE      59 0.8439







MI      (45) 0.7413
ID   (64) 0.8071
FL     (131) 0.2999
OH  (167) 0.2110
PA  (186) 0.1531
ME   (200) 0.4488
WI (251) 0.1105
NM (301) 0.2127
AL     (366) 0.0391
IN     (375) 0.0180
MO      (428) 0.0074
KS    (482) 0.0134
AR      (633) 0.0025
OK      (656) 0.0005
KY      (696) 0.0002
TN  (701) 0.0000
AK    (709) 0.0175
NE      (710) 0.0024
TX   (727) 0.0000
MT     (777) 0.0175
LA (789) 0.0000
IA  (861) 0.0000








Table 7.  Estimated Size and Distribution of the HMI Deduction by Income Class (for
1995)
 
                                 Est. No. of       Est. Share of
                                  Taxpayers          Taxpayers
                                  in Group           in Group
                                  Claiming           Claiming
Income (AGI) Group                Deduction          Deduction
______________________________________________________________
Under $ 5,000                         108,084            0.61%
$ 5,000 under $ 10,000                352,380            2.28%
$ 10,000 under $ 15,000               670,820            4.66%
$ 15,000 under $ 20,000             1,058,114            8.85%
$ 20,000 under $ 25,000             1,447,665           14.77%
$ 25,000 under $ 30,000             1,850,066           23.14%
$ 30,000 under $ 40,000             4,419,847           35.11%
$ 40,000 under $ 50,000             4,652,321           51.73%
$ 50,000 under $ 75,000             7,673,964           69.45%
$ 75,000 under $ 100,000            2,684,288           79.10%
$ 100,000 under $ 200,000           1,888,855           78.59%
$ 200,000 under $ 500,000             506,269           76.45%
$ 500,000 under $ 1,000,000            87,224           69.88%
$ 1,000,000 or more                    37,209           63.73%
Total                              27,432,963           23.50%
 
                                                    Est. Avg.
                                 Est. Total         Deduction
                                 Amount of        per Taxpayer
                                 Deduction          Claiming
Income (AGI) Group              ($ Thousands)        Deduction
______________________________________________________________
Under $ 5,000                       $ 859,877          $ 7,956
$ 5,000 under $ 10,000              2,248,869            6,382
$ 10,000 under $ 15,000             4,069,670            6,067
$ 15,000 under $ 20,000             6,814,256            6,440
$ 20,000 under $ 25,000             8,778,504            6,064
$ 25,000 under $ 30,000            11,370,651            6,146
$ 30,000 under $ 40,000            29,340,151            6,638
$ 40,000 under $ 50,000            33,570,993            7,216
$ 50,000 under $ 75,000            64,376,528            8,389
$ 75,000 under $ 100,000           29,772,648           11,091
$ 100,000 under $ 200,000          30,118,974           15,946
$ 200,000 under $ 500,000          12,259,783           24,216
$ 500,000 under $ 1,000,000         2,929,697           33,588
$ 1,000,000 or more                 1,613,897           43,374
Total                           $ 238,302,492          $ 8,687
 
Source: Tax Foundation (1994)
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Table 8.  Tax Savings from Itemized Deductions
1994 Levels
         All Itemized Ded.   Mortgage Interest
Income   _________________  ___________________
Group     % of $   Average   % of $    Average
($-000)  Benefits  Benefit  Benefits   Benefit
_______________________________________________
 
<$ 10        0.0%     $ 2       0.0%       $ 0.0
$ 10-20      0.4%      13       0.4%         7.2
$ 20-30      1.4%      53       1.5%        38.6
$ 30-40      3.2%     155       3.8%       116.7
$ 40-50      4.5%     300       6.3%       269.7
$ 50-75     18.0%     801      22.0%       625.5
$ 75-100    18.0%   1,921      21.9%     1,496.3
$ 100-200   26.7%   3,969      27.6%     2,628.4
$ 200+      27.8%  15,698      16.5%     5,968.8
_______________________________________________
 
Notes: Averages include all taxpayers in each group
(including those who do not benefit from the deductions).
"All itemized deductions" includes listed items plus
casualty losses. The total is less than the sum of the
individual items because of an offset for the standard
deduction. Source: Joint Committee on Taxation (1994);
Citizens for Tax Justice (1995).
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Table 9.  Federal Tax Expenditures
Table 9.a.  Tax Expenditures, Fiscal 1995-1999, A Detailed List ($ -billions)
 
                                   Corporations & Individuals
Corporations &             _________________________________________
Individuals Combined       1995   1996   1997   1998   1999  1995-99
 
TOTAL, ALL TAX
  EXPENDITURES            $455.4 $483.1 $508.3 $535.1 $564.8 $2,546.8
 
                                       Individuals only
Personal Tax               _________________________________________
Expenditures               1995   1996   1997   1998   1999  1995-99
_____________________________________________________________________
TOTAL, ALL INDIVIDUAL
TAX EXPENDITURES          $390.5 $417.3 $442.0 $467.1 $494.6 $2,211.4
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS:      $ 82.1 $ 86.9 $ 92.0 $ 97.3 $103.0  $ 461.3
Mortgage interest           52.4   55.5   58.7   62.2   65.9  $ 294.6
State & local taxes
  (w/o home property)       26.0   27.5   29.1   30.7   32.5  $ 145.8
Property taxes (homes)      14.3   15.1   15.9   16.9   17.8   $ 80.0
Charitable contributions    17.2   18.2   19.2   20.2   21.3   $ 96.1
Medical expenses             3.9    4.2    4.6    5.1    5.5   $ 23.3
Casualty losses              0.4    0.3    0.2    0.2    0.2    $ 1.3
Std. ded. offset           -32.0  -33.9  -35.8  -37.9  -40.1  $-179.7
EMPLOYER-PAID HEALTH
INSURANCE                 $ 53.4 $ 58.5 $ 63.3 $ 68.6 $ 74.5  $ 318.4
EARNED-INCOME TAX CREDIT  $ 22.0 $ 25.2 $ 27.5 $ 28.6 $ 29.8  $ 133.1
SOCIAL SECURITY ETC.      $ 23.0 $ 23.9 $ 24.9 $ 26.1 $ 27.2  $ 125.1
CAPITAL GAINS ON HOMES    $ 20.9 $ 21.7 $ 22.3 $ 23.0 $ 23.7  $ 111.7
Deferral of capital
  gains on home sales       16.0   16.6   17.0   17.6   18.1   $ 85.3
Exclusion of capital
  gains on home sales
  for persons >age 55        4.9    5.1    5.3    5.5    5.6   $ 26.4
MEDICARE                  $ 13.1 $ 15.3 $ 18.1 $ 21.3 $ 25.2   $ 92.9
OTHER FRINGE BENEFITS     $ 15.4 $ 16.4 $ 17.7 $ 19.0 $ 20.6   $ 89.1
WORKMEN'S COMP., ETC.      $ 4.8  $ 5.1  $ 5.3  $ 5.6  $ 5.9   $ 26.7
SOLDIERS & VETERANS        $ 4.1  $ 4.1  $ 4.2  $ 4.3  $ 4.5   $ 21.2
CREDIT FOR CHILD AND
DEPENDENT CARE EXPENSES    $ 2.8  $ 2.9  $ 2.9  $ 3.0  $ 3.1   $ 14.7
ELDERLY & BLIND STD.
DEDUCTION, ETC.            $ 1.8  $ 1.8  $ 1.9  $ 1.9  $ 2.0    $ 9.4
OTHER PERSONAL             $ 1.7  $ 1.7  $ 1.8  $ 1.9  $ 2.0    $ 9.1
TOTAL, PERSONAL:          $245.1 $263.6 $282.0 $300.6 $321.5 $1,412.7
___________________________________________________________
Sources:  Citizens for Tax Justice (1995).    Except where an item is listed in only one source, figures are averages from
the Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1995-1999, Nov. 9, 1984,
and Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United State Government, Fiscal Year 1996, Analytical
Perspectives,  Tax Expenditures   (Feb. 1995).
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Table 9.b.  Tax Expenditures, 1995-1999 Summary Cost Table (fiscal years, $ -billions)
                                                                         
                                          1995
                                    Corp. Individ. Total
    TOTAL ALL ITEMS               $ 65.0 $ 390.5 $ 455.4
Total as a % of Income Taxes       45%     65%     61%
________________________________________________________
Business & Investment
Capital gains (except homes)       $ 0.4  $ 29.2  $ 29.6
Accelerated depreciation            23.3     9.8    33.1
Tax free bonds, public & private     6.6    13.6    20.1
Insurance cos. & products            4.7    10.2    14.9
Multinational                        8.9     1.9    10.8
Business meals & entertainment       3.3     2.0     5.2
Oil, gas, energy                     2.6     0.7     3.3
Low-income housing credit            0.6     1.6     2.2
R&D tax breaks                       2.8     0.1     2.9
Timber, agriculture, minerals        0.7     0.5     1.2
Special ESOP rules                   1.4      --     1.4
Financial institutions (non-insur.)  0.9      --     0.9
Installment sales                    0.3     0.5     0.8
Empowerment zones                    0.1     0.2     0.3
Other business & investment          8.5     1.7    10.2
     Subtotal, business &
        investment:               $ 65.2  $ 71.8 $ 137.0
Pensions, Keoghs, IRAs               --   $ 73.6  $ 73.6
     Total, business,
   investment & savings:          $ 65.0 $ 145.4 $ 210.6
 
    TOTAL ALL ITEMS               $ 335.4 $ 2,211.4 $ 2,546.8
Total as a % of Income Taxes        44%       66%       62%
Business & Investment
Capital gains (except homes)        $ 2.5   $ 164.6   $ 165.2
Accelerated depreciation            114.5      47.6     162.1
Tax free bonds, public & private     34.0      71.7     105.6
Insurance cos. & products            27.6      60.2      87.8
Multinational                        46.6      10.4      57.1
Business meals & entertainment       18.0      10.8      28.7
Oil, gas, energy                     14.7       3.9      18.6
Low-income housing credit             4.1      10.6      14.7
R&D tax breaks                       10.0       0.3      10.3
Timber, agriculture, minerals         4.0       2.8       6.7
Special ESOP rules                    6.6        --       6.6
Financial institutions (non-insur.)   4.9        --       4.9
Installment sales                     1.7       2.7       4.4
Empowerment zones                     1.0       1.5       2.5
Other business & investment          45.3       9.1      54.4
     Subtotal, business &
        investment:               $ 336.4   $ 396.0   $ 732.5
Pensions, Keoghs, IRAs               --     $ 402.7   $ 402.7
     Total, business,
   investment & savings:          $ 335.4   $ 798.7 $ 1,134.1
                                          Individuals only
                                          1995    1995-1999
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                                          ____    _________
Personal (non-investment)
Itemized deductions (net)                $ 82.1    $ 461.3
Employer-paid health insurance             53.4      318.4
Earned-income tax credit                   22.0      133.1
Social Security, etc.                      23.0      125.1
Capital gains on homes                     20.9      111.7
Medicare                                   13.1       92.9
Other fringe benefits                      15.4       89.1
Workmen's compensation, etc.                4.8       26.7
Soldiers & veterans                         4.1       21.2
Child-care credit                           2.8       14.7
Elderly & blind std. deduction, etc.        1.8        9.4
Other personal                              1.7        9.1
       Total, personal                  $ 245.1  $ 1,412.7
Addendum: Itemized deductions
Mortgage interest                        $ 52.4    $ 294.6
S&L taxes (w/o home property)              26.0      145.8
Property taxes (homes)                     14.3       80.0
Charitable contributions                   17.2       96.1
Medical expenses                            3.9       23.3
Casualty losses                             0.4        1.3
Total before standard deduction offset  $ 114.1    $ 641.1
    Net Itemized Deductions              $ 82.1    $ 461.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sources: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 1996, Analytical Perspectives, Tax Expenditures
(Feb. 1995). Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax
Expenditures far Fiscal Years 1995-1999, Nov. 9, 1994.  Also used in
Citizens for Tax justice (March 1995).
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Table 11.  Tax Return Statistical (CTJ) Variables




The average reduction in federal income tax from the
deduction for home mortgage interest for all individual
filers
HMIB Dependent
The average state income tax deduction taken for all
individual filers with the deduction
ASIT_W Independent
(State Tax)
The approximate average local income tax deduction
available for all individual filers with the deduction











































Table 13.  204 Cell CTJ & PUMS Matching
Matching Criteria Levels Level Descriptions
Filing Status 3 Single
Married
Head of Household
Dependent Status 2 No Dependents
Dependents
Age 2 Non-Elderly (Age<65)
Elderly



















Table 14.  Univariate Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables
Variable Mean SD Min. Maximum Cases Skew. Kurt.
Dependent:
HMIB 263.140 708.30 0.00 7737.11 16000 4.345 27.783
Personal Characteristics:
Vital Characteristics
AGE 49.250 17.75 16.00 90.00 16000 0.359 2.085
AGE2 2740.631 1887.00 256.00 8100.00 16000 0.840 2.745
DRACEO 0.071 0.26 0.00 1.00 16000 3.354 12.247
DRACEW 0.867 0.34 0.00 1.00 16000 -2.166 5.693
SEX 0.388 0.49 0.00 1.00 16000 0.459 1.211
Other Individual Characteristics
CLASSINC 31810.514 30953.88 -9999.00 468539.00 16000 3.058 20.860
DEPEXEM 0.853 1.20 0.00 11.00 16000 1.640 6.669
MARSTAT 0.607 0.49 0.00 1.00 16000 -0.438 1.192
Educational Attainment
HSCH 0.283 0.45 0.00 1.00 16000 0.965 1.931
SOMECOLL 0.205 0.40 0.00 1.00 16000 1.461 3.134
COLL 0.181 0.39 0.00 1.00 16000 1.657 3.744
ADVCOLL 0.077 0.27 0.00 1.00 16000 3.165 11.018
Occupation
FARMFISH 0.031 0.17 0.00 1.00 16000 5.394 30.094
MILITARY 0.002 0.05 0.00 1.00 16000 20.180 408.233
OPERLABR 0.130 0.34 0.00 1.00 16000 2.196 5.823
PRECTRAD 0.114 0.32 0.00 1.00 16000 2.423 6.872
PROFEXEC 0.214 0.41 0.00 1.00 16000 1.397 2.950
SERVICE 0.095 0.29 0.00 1.00 16000 2.761 8.624
TECHSALE 0.218 0.41 0.00 1.00 16000 1.368 2.871
State Characteristic Factor Scores:
FAC1st 2.935e-13 1.00 -2.20 1.67 16000 -0.126 2.111
FAC2st 1.310e-12 1.00 -1.45 2.25 16000 0.091 1.461
FAC3st -8.384e-13 1.00 -1.54 2.31 16000 0.529 2.331
FAC4st 1.602e-12 1.00 -1.72 1.25 16000 -0.300 1.458
FAC5st 1.215e-12 1.00 -2.56 1.06 16000 -1.099 2.989
State Dummies
STCA 0.125 0.33 0.00 1.00 16000 2.268 6.143
STCO 0.125 0.33 0.00 1.00 16000 2.268 6.143
STFL 0.125 0.33 0.00 1.00 16000 2.268 6.143
STIA 0.125 0.33 0.00 1.00 16000 2.268 6.143
STIL 0.125 0.33 0.00 1.00 16000 2.268 6.143
STKY 0.125 0.33 0.00 1.00 16000 2.268 6.143
STNY 0.125 0.33 0.00 1.00 16000 2.268 6.143
STTX 0.125 0.33 0.00 1.00 16000 2.268 6.143
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Table 15.  Descriptive Statistics for HMIB by State
Statistic CA CO FL IA IL KY NY TX
Mean 624.40 366.29 199.77 83.97 269.47 124.55 248.01 188.67
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Variance 1710535 550848 260087 54763 435723 128604 399020 273254
Std. Deviation 1307.87 742.19 509.99 234.01 660.09 358.61 631.68 522.74
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 7737.11 6353.54 4583.25 2263.29 4170.16 3942.78 5089.71 4397.57
Range 7737.11 6353.54 4583.25 2263.29 4170.16 3942.78 5089.71 4397.57
Skewness 2.699 2.753 3.989 4.434 3.532 4.339 3.728 4.210
Kurtosis 7.899 8.873 20.120 25.382 14.107 25.302 17.400 21.926
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Table 16.  Regression Variable Correlations
HMIB MARSTAT DEPEXE
M




DEPEXEM 0.145 0.213 1.000
CLASSINC 0.733 0.443 0.109 1.000
AGE -0.121 -0.124 -0.393 -0.099 1.000
SEX -0.150 -0.478 -0.103 -0.243 0.122 1.000
AGE2 -0.151 -0.163 -0.408 -0.140 0.987 0.138 1.000
DRACEW 0.047 0.091 -0.177 0.108 0.110 -0.062 0.113 1.000
DRACEO -0.056 -0.134 0.081 -0.101 -0.05
0
0.103 -0.053 -0.705 1.000
HSCH -0.113 0.017 -0.015 -0.094 -0.02
0
0.008 -0.024 0.050 -0.022 1.000
SOMECOLL 0.010 -0.005 0.010 0.019 -0.10
5
0.003 -0.101 0.027 0.007 -0.319 1.000
COLL 0.155 0.049 0.023 0.196 -0.16
7
-0.023 -0.170 0.032 -0.031 -0.295 -0.239 1.000
ADVCOLL 0.243 0.089 0.013 0.293 -0.02
0
-0.060 -0.036 0.032 -0.042 -0.182 -0.147 -0.136 1.000
PROFEXEC 0.272 0.138 0.045 0.338 -0.14
8
-0.024 -0.169 0.045 -0.045 -0.193 -0.017 0.270 0.374 1.000
TECHSALE 0.042 -0.009 -0.007 0.064 -0.15
0
0.147 -0.158 0.030 -0.009 0.028 0.140 0.083 -0.076 -0.275 1.000
SERVICE -0.072 -0.084 0.020 -0.124 -0.05
4
0.107 -0.057 -0.091 0.082 0.043 -0.006 -0.067 -0.075 -0.169 -0.171
FARMFISH -0.050 0.048 -0.002 -0.037 0.016 -0.114 0.013 0.016 -0.028 0.021 -0.030 -0.040 -0.034 -0.094 -0.095
PRECTRAD -0.017 0.135 0.089 0.013 -0.14
1
-0.245 -0.147 0.018 -0.034 0.091 0.007 -0.061 -0.088 -0.187 -0.190
OPERLABR -0.066 0.091 0.109 -0.054 -0.14
3
-0.158 -0.149 -0.042 0.012 0.104 -0.031 -0.121 -0.099 -0.202 -0.204
MILITARY -0.010 0.029 0.027 -0.004 -0.04
3
-0.039 -0.039 -0.018 0.026 0.008 0.006 0.013 -0.005 -0.026 -0.026
STCA 0.193 -0.003 0.024 0.074 -0.03
5
-0.018 -0.036 -0.134 -0.012 -0.071 0.043 0.042 0.024 0.034 0.027
STFL -0.034 -0.029 -0.057 -0.013 0.041 0.021 0.043 0.006 0.049 -0.006 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.021
STIL 0.003 -0.007 0.005 0.032 0.013 -0.008 0.011 0.001 0.030 0.021 0.001 -0.007 0.001 -0.003 -0.014
STIA -0.096 0.034 -0.011 -0.052 0.045 -0.007 0.049 0.131 -0.093 0.088 -0.029 -0.015 -0.039 -0.050 -0.019
STKY -0.074 0.017 -0.002 -0.072 0.006 0.001 0.010 0.079 -0.024 0.005 -0.045 -0.058 -0.027 -0.046 -0.041
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STNY -0.008 -0.024 0.018 0.032 0.018 0.032 0.015 -0.053 0.057 0.000 -0.032 0.007 0.020 0.024 -0.001
STTX -0.040 0.007 0.030 -0.021 -0.04
0
-0.013 -0.039 -0.076 0.049 -0.021 0.019 -0.009 -0.012 0.004 -0.006
STCO 0.055 0.004 -0.008 0.019 -0.04
9
-0.010 -0.051 0.046 -0.057 -0.016 0.039 0.036 0.033 0.039 0.034
FAC1st 0.118 -0.060 0.029 0.039 -0.04
6
0.016 -0.048 -0.216 0.090 -0.081 0.046 0.037 0.026 0.047 0.030
FAC2st -0.020 -0.004 -0.022 0.036 -0.01
4
-0.004 -0.017 -0.005 0.059 -0.015 0.026 0.014 0.021 0.032 0.022
FAC3st 0.114 0.026 0.014 0.040 -0.07
6
-0.033 -0.077 0.011 -0.064 -0.047 0.042 0.020 0.027 0.029 0.018
FAC4st 0.064 -0.006 -0.030 0.028 0.002 -0.000 0.003 0.009 -0.054 0.003 0.035 0.051 0.015 0.021 0.045
FAC5st -0.010
9
-0.0482 -0.036 -0.0108 0.024 0.032 0.024 0.0237 0.0282 0.0029 -0.014 -0.004 0.008 -0.0037 0.0075
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PRECTRAD -0.116 -0.064 1.000
OPERLABR -0.125 -0.069 -0.139 1.000
MILITARY -0.016 -0.009 -0.018 -0.019 1.000
STCA -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 -0.026 0.012 1.000
STFL 0.008 -0.022 -0.009 -0.046 -0.003 -0.143 1.000
STIL -0.007 -0.018 -0.000 0.033 -0.007 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
STIA 0.006 0.085 0.003 0.037 -0.019 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
STKY -0.015 0.012 0.020 0.046 0.000 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
STNY 0.015 -0.045 -0.019 -0.025 -0.015 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
STTX 0.010 0.001 0.023 0.002 0.004 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
STCO -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.022 0.027 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 -0.143 1.000
FAC1st 0.011 -0.067 -0.015 -0.046 0.012 0.599 -0.109 0.077 -0.622 -0.444 0.364 0.188 -0.053 1.000
FAC2st 0.004 -0.033 0.005 -0.032 0.009 -0.520 0.534 0.138 -0.383 -0.297 -0.203 0.457 0.274 0.000 1.000
FAC3st -0.022 0.004 0.010 0.007 0.032 0.229 -0.360 -0.072 -0.300 0.293 -0.491 -0.027 0.729 0.000 0.000 1.000
FAC4st 0.007 0.026 -0.021 -0.048 0.007 0.289 0.357 -0.425 0.410 -0.600 -0.115 -0.278 0.363 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
FAC5st 0.001 -0.045 -0.0193 -0.0113 0.0005 -0.111 0.3555 0.3156 -0.337 0.1465 0.2568 -0.814 0.187 0 0 0 0
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Wages YES YES YES
Taxable Interest YES YES YES
Tax-exempt Interest NO NO YES
Dividends YES YES YES
State Tax Refunds YES YES NO
Alimony Received YES YES YES
Schedule C (Self-employed) Income or Loss YES* YES* YES**
Cap. Gain Realizations & Allowed Cap. Loss YES YES NO
Other Gains & Losses YES YES NO
Ira Distributions (Taxable) YES YES NO
Pensions & Annuities (Taxable) YES YES YES
Rents, Partnerships, S Corps, Trusts YES* YES* YES**
Farm Income or Loss YES* YES* YES**
Unemployment Benefits YES YES YES
Social Security Benefits, Total Taxable only Taxable only YES**
Other Income or Loss in AGI YES YES YES**
Less: Alimony Paid YES NO NO
Less: Other Adjustments YES NO NO
Non-tax-return Items:
Public Assistance NO NO YES
Supplemental Security Income NO NO YES
Workers' Compensation NO NO YES
Va Benefits NO NO YES
Child Support (Private) NO NO YES
Other Private Financial Assistance NO NO YES
* as reported on tax return
 ** as define in the Citizens for Tax Justice standard classifier income measure (CTJ4)
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Table 18.  Educational Attainment Categories
  
Variable
    Value  
 
Category with respect to educational attainment  
       00      N/A (less than 3 years old) 
       01      No school completed
       02      Nursery school
       03      Kindergarten
       04      1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade
       05      5th, 6th, 7th, or 8th grade
       06      9th grade
       07      10th grade
       08      11th grade
       09      12th grade, no diploma
       10      High school graduate, diploma or GED
       11      Some college, but no degree
       12      Associate degree in college, occupational program
       13      Associate degree in college, academic program
       14      Bachelor's degree
       15      Master's degree
       16      Professional degree
       17      Doctorate degree
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Table 19.  RELAT1 Variable Detail
Relationship to Householder
RELAT1
  Value   
Related:                                                         
Householder                                            00     
Husband/wife                                          01     
Son/daughter                                           02     
Stepson/stepdaughter                              03     
Brother/sister                                          04     
Father/mother                                         05     
Grandchild                                              06     
Other relative                                          07     
 Not related:                                                               
     
     
     
Roomer/boarder/foster child                    08     
Housemate/roommate                             09     
Unmarried partner                                   10     
Other nonrelative                                    11     
Group quarters:                                                           
     
     
Institutionalized person                           12     
Other persons in group quarters              13     
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Table 20.  State Variables
Variable Description/Calculation Name Source
Personal Characteristics:
Resident Population, 65 Years and Older 1990 (April 1) AGE64 SA
(Male Persons/All Persons)*100 MALE SS
(White Persons/All Persons)*100 WHPOP SS
(White Householders/All Householders)*100 WHHH SS
(Black Householders/All Householders)*100 BLKHH SS
Housing Demographics & Economic Characteristics:
Bankruptcy Filings/All Persons (_BNKRP_/POP) BNKPOP SA
Median Value of Owner-occupied Housing Units MEDVAL SS
Median Contract Rent for Renter-occupied Housing Units MEDRNT SS
Resident Population in Metro Areas 1990 (%) METRO SA
Personal Income Per Capita in Current Dollars, in 1990 PERINC SA
Persons per Square Mile of Land Area in 1990 PPSQMI SA
(Vacant Housing Units/all Housing Units)*100 VACAN SS
Home ownership Rates in 1990 OWNHM SA
Home Value PROPVAL PUMS
Mortgage Market Characteristics:     
Percent of Loans with Installments past Due PASDUA MBA
Percent of Loans in Foreclosure (Ending Inventory)  FORCLOA MBA
VA Loans as a Percent of All Loans VALOAN MBA
FHA Loans as a Percent of All Loans FHALOAN MBA        
Adjustable Rate Loans (%) ARLNS FHFB 
Conventional Mortgage Rates & Terms:  
Contract Interest Rate (%) KINRT FHFB
Initial Fees and Charges (%) INITFEE FHFB 
Effective Interest Rate (%) EFINTRT FHFB 
Term to Maturity (Years) MATYRS FHFB 
Purchase Price ($000) PURPRK FHFB 
Loan-to-Price Ratio (%) LNPR FHFB 
Second mortgage payment (proxy Texas Homestead Law) MORTG2 PUMS
Tax Characteristics:
Local Income Tax LOCIT NY,ACIR
Property Tax Payments on Home PTAX PUMS
State Income Tax ASITW CTJ
(SIT w/ HMI Ded dummy)*(Highest State Marginal Rate) SITWHMI NY,ACIR
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Table 20 State Variables (Continued)
Table 20 Data Source Abbreviations
Acronym Description (Source)
ACIR State marginal tax rates were obtained from the Advisory Council on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR 1990, 1991).
CTJ Citizens for Tax Justice (Tax Analysts 1995b)
FHFB Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB 1995)
MBA Mortgage Bankers of America (MBA 1989)
NY Data on local income tax was obtained primarily from New York Form
IT-201 and Instructions (New York State Department of Taxation and
Finance 1989).
PUMS Public Use Microsample (U.S. Census Bureau 1990)
SS  State Statistics (U.S. Census Bureau 1999a)
SA State Averages  (U.S. Census Bureau 1999b)
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Los Angeles-Long Beach CA 57 38.0
Sacramento CA 33
San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario CA 33
Stockton CA 23
Vallejo-Napa CA 44
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood FL 64 49.0
Tampa-St. Petersburg FL 34
Peoria IL 53 53.0
Cincinnati KY 57 43.3
Lexington KY 31
Louisville KY 42
Albany-Schenectady-Troy NY 3 13.0
New York NY 23
Dallas TX 63 43.0
Fort Worth TX 23
National Average 43 43.0
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Table 22.  Factor Analyzed State Characteristics
Variable Mean SD Minimu
m
Maximum Cases Skew. Kurt.
Personal Characteristics:
AGE64 12.775 2.65 10.00 18.20 16000 0.83 2.66
MALE 48.827 0.66 47.95 50.06 16000 0.59 2.12
BLKHH 8.587 4.23 1.48 14.27 16000 -0.28 1.80
WHHH 85.251 7.22 75.83 97.41 16000 0.28 1.73
WHPOP 82.105 8.95 68.97 96.63 16000 0.20 1.78
Housing Market Characteristics & Economic Characteristics:
PERINC 19113.500 2441.78 15106.00 23147.00 16000 0.00 2.07
BNKPOP 0.003 0.00 0.00 0.01 16000 0.72 2.76
MEDRNT 370.125 92.86 250.00 561.00 16000 0.64 2.85
MEDVAL 90475.000 46893.28 45900.00 195500.00 16000 1.26 3.41
METRO 78.075 19.24 43.20 96.80 16000 -0.98 2.26
OWNHM 61.300 5.64 53.30 70.70 16000 0.02 1.95
PPSQMI 167.238 114.79 37.50 384.10 16000 0.55 2.09
PROPVAL 64825.156 87462.06 0.00 450000.00 16000 2.28 9.02
VACAN 9.977 3.34 6.75 15.83 16000 0.60 1.68
Housing Discrimination:
DISCRIM 40.625 11.27 13.00 53.00 16000 -1.62 4.74
Mortgage Market Characteristics:
ARLNS 37.875 9.45 15.00 46.00 16000 -1.57 4.45
EFINTRT 10.094 0.21 9.86 10.45 16000 0.42 1.74
FHALOAN 31.845 9.62 13.73 44.56 16000 -0.27 2.36
FORCLOA 1.094 0.53 0.34 2.04 16000 0.43 2.06
INITFEE 1.651 0.35 1.16 2.33 16000 0.53 2.50
KINRT 9.815 0.19 9.62 10.22 16000 1.01 3.08
LNPR 75.263 2.16 72.00 79.30 16000 0.37 2.38
MATYRS 27.050 1.62 24.60 29.80 16000 0.02 1.98
MORTG2 0.066 0.25 0.00 1.00 16000 3.48 13.12
PASDUA 4.353 0.88 2.91 6.11 16000 0.40 3.01
PURPRK 121.500 38.94 72.00 199.60 16000 0.61 2.67
VALOAN 17.556 6.58 4.53 24.70 16000 -0.78 2.36
Tax Characteristics:
ASITW 1278.559 2517.02 0.00 58896.91 16000 10.63 175.88
LOCIT 131.756 871.05 0.00 29448.46 16000 21.30 599.28
PTAX 563.655 902.92 0.00 5000.00 16000 2.41 10.05
SITWHMI 5.000 4.27 0.00 11.00 16000 -0.01 1.46
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Table 23.  Factor Analyzed State Characteristic Correlations
PTAX PROPVAL ASITW MALE WHPOP VACAN WHHH BLKHH MEDVAL MEDRNT METRO AGE64 PERINC OWNHM PPSQMI
PTAX 1.000
PROPVAL 0.698 1.000
ASITW 0.317 0.353 1.000
MALE -0.047 0.145 -0.022 1.000
WHPOP -0.138 -0.239 -0.043 -0.362 1.000
VACAN -0.069 -0.081 -0.081 0.109 0.024 1.000
WHHH -0.143 -0.228 -0.042 -0.317 0.995 0.027 1.000
BLKHH 0.135 0.083 0.006 -0.329 -0.694 0.088 -0.732 1.000
MEDVAL 0.122 0.301 0.130 0.467 -0.760 -0.280 -0.724 0.230 1.000
MEDRNT 0.126 0.292 0.099 0.482 -0.820 -0.042 -0.775 0.338 0.949 1.000
METRO 0.140 0.214 0.039 0.344 -0.841 0.351 -0.826 0.613 0.666 0.835 1.000
AGE64 -0.023 -0.092 0.009 -0.660 0.375 0.186 0.404 0.038 -0.303 -0.187 -0.185 1.000
PERINC 0.224 0.237 0.117 0.051 -0.711 -0.162 -0.704 0.530 0.768 0.808 0.785 -0.095 1.000
OWNHM -0.147 -0.244 -0.096 -0.401 0.832 0.028 0.845 -0.462 -0.811 -0.778 -0.771 0.579 -0.754 1.000
PPSQMI 0.165 0.165 0.111 -0.420 -0.582 -0.106 -0.586 0.757 0.535 0.578 0.584 0.346 0.763 -0.485 1.000
PASDUA -0.083 -0.203 -0.160 -0.121 0.116 0.476 0.064 0.257 -0.701 -0.586 -0.140 -0.146 -0.532 0.281 -0.380
FORCLOA -0.040 -0.153 -0.118 0.178 0.256 0.746 0.238 -0.152 -0.526 -0.344 0.092 -0.144 -0.260 0.163 -0.505
VALOAN -0.210 -0.176 -0.118 0.373 0.582 0.467 0.595 -0.684 -0.567 -0.533 -0.459 -0.115 -0.826 0.510 -0.893
FHALOAN -0.206 -0.167 -0.116 0.349 0.535 0.387 0.530 -0.540 -0.555 -0.545 -0.416 -0.277 -0.786 0.411 -0.842
KINRT -0.092 -0.120 -0.044 -0.392 0.140 -0.215 0.079 0.280 -0.396 -0.520 -0.437 -0.113 -0.482 0.193 -0.050
INITFEE 0.052 0.014 -0.100 0.130 -0.624 0.454 -0.644 0.715 -0.011 0.196 0.587 -0.188 0.177 -0.295 0.192
EFINTRT -0.070 -0.111 -0.073 -0.334 -0.041 -0.080 -0.104 0.463 -0.386 -0.441 -0.250 -0.158 -0.403 0.110 -0.001
MATYRS 0.093 0.234 0.079 0.502 -0.709 0.286 -0.668 0.199 0.786 0.867 0.785 -0.138 0.637 -0.727 0.415
PURPRK 0.138 0.290 0.100 0.563 -0.854 -0.114 -0.829 0.318 0.953 0.948 0.802 -0.461 0.799 -0.913 0.468
LNPR -0.155 -0.119 -0.114 0.361 0.193 0.186 0.205 -0.414 -0.373 -0.378 -0.409 -0.179 -0.708 0.359 -0.706
ARLNS 0.003 0.118 0.131 -0.179 0.114 -0.255 0.155 -0.127 0.406 0.339 0.027 0.437 0.279 -0.019 0.449
DISCRIM -0.147 -0.120 -0.144 0.254 0.328 0.240 0.367 -0.277 -0.458 -0.300 -0.207 0.144 -0.535 0.625 -0.542
LOCIT 0.241 0.194 0.631 -0.201 -0.130 -0.084 -0.150 0.203 0.133 0.094 0.108 0.013 0.250 -0.215 0.286
MORTG2 0.216 0.230 0.119 0.045 -0.039 -0.011 -0.033 -0.005 0.082 0.079 0.051 -0.011 0.054 -0.054 0.037
BNKPOP -0.093 0.018 -0.027 0.606 0.167 0.173 0.178 -0.417 0.038 0.031 0.052 -0.516 -0.167 -0.101 -0.506
SITWHMI 0.024 0.122 0.139 0.163 0.095 -0.606 0.119 -0.522 0.474 0.224 -0.274 -0.143 0.148 -0.192 -0.013
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Table 23.  Factor Analyzed State Characteristics (Continued)
PASDUA FORCLOA VALOAN FHALOAN KINRT INITFEE EFINTRT MATYRS PURPRK LNPR ARLNS DISCRIM LOCIT MORTG2 BNKPOP
PASDUA 1.000
FORCLOA 0.618 1.000
VALOAN 0.444 0.594 1.000
FHALOAN 0.513 0.564 0.917 1.000
KINRT 0.510 -0.240 0.039 0.266 1.000
INITFEE 0.647 0.365 -0.104 -0.076 0.093 1.000
EFINTRT 0.669 -0.113 0.007 0.225 0.957 0.377 1.000
MATYRS -0.423 -0.071 -0.266 -0.418 -0.628 0.250 -0.530 1.000
PURPRK -0.505 -0.284 -0.504 -0.478 -0.433 0.209 -0.356 0.838 1.000
LNPR 0.473 0.256 0.714 0.507 0.130 0.176 0.176 -0.087 -0.319 1.000
ARLNS -0.781 -0.581 -0.334 -0.271 -0.144 -0.647 -0.334 0.116 0.169 -0.627 1.000
DISCRIM 0.381 0.363 0.583 0.598 0.004 0.169 0.066 -0.387 -0.433 0.364 -0.158 1.000
LOCIT -0.109 -0.126 -0.300 -0.285 0.020 -0.014 0.012 0.098 0.129 -0.228 0.066 -0.371 1.000
MORTG2 -0.077 -0.041 -0.029 -0.021 -0.040 -0.030 -0.048 0.059 0.072 -0.050 0.074 -0.017 0.051 1.000
BNKPOP 0.007 0.372 0.494 0.703 -0.071 -0.188 -0.126 -0.071 0.110 -0.061 0.113 0.390 -0.197 0.041 1.000
SITWHMI -0.784 -0.579 -0.149 -0.254 -0.221 -0.772 -0.435 0.212 0.294 -0.041 0.452 -0.519 0.106 0.043 -0.029
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Table 24.  Factor Analysis Total Variance Explained
 Initial Eigenvalues  Rotation Sums of Squared











1 10.775 34.757 34.757 9.325 30.081 30.081 
2 5.103 16.461 51.218 4.246 13.696 43.776 
3 4.502 14.523 65.741 3.831 12.357 56.133 
4 2.525 8.144 73.885 3.631 11.712 67.845 
5 2.079 6.706 80.591 2.914 9.401 77.246 
6 1.545 4.984 85.575 1.957 6.314 83.560 
7 1.285 4.145 89.720 1.910 6.160 89.720 
8 .994 3.205 92.925     
9 .887 2.862 95.787     
10 .756 2.439 98.226     
11 .299 .964 99.190     
12 .251 .810 100.000     
13 1.684E-14 5.432E-14 100.000     
14 1.503E-14 4.849E-14 100.000     
15 9.436E-15 3.044E-14 100.000     
16 8.475E-15 2.734E-14 100.000     
17 7.555E-15 2.437E-14 100.000     
18 7.256E-15 2.341E-14 100.000     
19 3.939E-15 1.271E-14 100.000     
20 2.524E-15 8.141E-15 100.000     
21 7.872E-16 2.539E-15 100.000     
22 -1.338E-16 -4.316E-16 100.000     
23 -9.379E-16 -3.025E-15 100.000     
24 -2.736E-15 -8.827E-15 100.000     
25 -3.047E-15 -9.829E-15 100.000     
26 -4.428E-15 -1.428E-14 100.000     
27 -6.101E-15 -1.968E-14 100.000     
28 -7.225E-15 -2.331E-14 100.000     
29 -8.750E-15 -2.823E-14 100.000     
30 -1.144E-14 -3.690E-14 100.000     
31 -1.188E-14 -3.834E-14 100.000     
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Table 25.  Factor Analysis Rotated Component Matrix
 Component       
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
WHPOP -0.966 -0.059 0.143 0.117 0.073 0.025 -0.103 
WHHH -0.960 -0.074 0.148 0.183 0.077 -0.018 -0.080 
PURPRK 0.938 -0.194 0.125 0.228 0.064 0.061 0.083 
OWNHM -0.923 0.087 -0.142 0.009 -0.057 -0.263 0.027 
MEDRNT 0.875 -0.136 -0.012 0.343 0.201 -0.074 0.147 
METRO 0.870 0.387 -0.034 0.190 0.219 0.004 0.079 
MEDVAL 0.838 -0.414 0.043 0.256 0.169 0.011 0.116 
PERINC 0.777 -0.069 -0.257 0.230 0.395 0.191 0.045 
MATYRS 0.773 0.040 -0.057 0.547 -0.090 0.041 0.045 
BLKHH 0.577 0.355 -0.482 -0.503 0.223 0.055 0.033 
SITWHMI 0.028 -0.897 0.076 0.353 -0.056 0.195 -0.035 
VACAN -0.019 0.847 0.109 0.273 -0.047 -0.019 -0.072 
FORCLOA -0.206 0.801 0.344 0.200 -0.208 0.092 -0.129 
INITFEE 0.495 0.705 -0.183 -0.321 -0.300 -0.119 0.044 
PASDUA -0.234 0.687 0.059 -0.541 -0.405 -0.033 -0.089 
BNKPOP -0.015 0.096 0.961 0.051 0.230 -0.088 0.023 
FHALOAN -0.495 0.282 0.748 -0.122 -0.211 -0.148 -0.047 
MALE 0.452 -0.038 0.693 0.307 -0.367 -0.208 0.103 
AGE64 -0.468 0.137 -0.666 0.281 0.367 -0.161 0.055 
PPSQMI 0.539 -0.045 -0.622 -0.068 0.529 0.114 0.052 
VALOAN -0.554 0.271 0.569 0.161 -0.429 -0.168 -0.051 
EFINTRT -0.104 0.117 -0.058 -0.957 -0.120 -0.026 -0.034 
KINRT -0.253 -0.094 0.001 -0.925 -0.029 0.013 -0.051 
LNPR -0.276 0.063 0.133 0.009 -0.896 -0.201 -0.014 
ARLNS -0.038 -0.461 -0.032 0.265 0.773 -0.073 0.103 
LOCIT 0.086 -0.009 -0.145 -0.033 0.085 0.837 0.114 
ASITW -0.012 -0.046 0.032 0.062 0.055 0.696 0.380 
DISCRIM -0.405 0.390 0.315 -0.003 -0.055 -0.545 0.182 
PROPVAL 0.199 -0.083 0.019 0.055 -0.004 0.171 0.832 
PTAX 0.080 0.024 -0.114 0.012 -0.009 0.273 0.787 
MORTG2 0.016 -0.029 0.042 0.014 0.054 -0.047 0.517 
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Table 26.  Descriptive Statistics for Factor Scores by State
Score Statistic CA CO FL IA IL KY NY TX
1 Mean 1.5856 -0.1394 -0.2885 -1.6461 0.2039 -1.1755 0.9639 0.4962
Median 1.6217 -0.1240 -0.2629 -1.6299 0.2249 -1.1562 1.0208 0.5163
Std. Dev. 0.1093 0.0631 0.0648 0.0620 0.0736 0.0517 0.1996 0.0509
Minimum 0.6396 -0.5661 -0.7962 -2.1969 -0.3111 -1.6352 -1.2170 0.2042
Maximum 1.6728 -0.0781 -0.2336 -1.5935 0.2675 -1.1349 1.0984 0.5354
Range 1.0332 0.4880 0.5626 0.6034 0.5786 0.5003 2.3155 0.3312
Skewness -3.3550 -1.8770 -2.1540 -3.2530 -2.3420 -2.7090 -5.6550 -1.9620
Kurtosis 19.5950 5.7370 6.7470 17.6080 8.4220 12.4020 47.9980 4.5580
2 Mean -1.3755 0.7242 1.4116 -1.0136 0.3651 -0.7845 -0.5376 1.2102
Median -1.3908 0.7154 1.4019 -1.0211 0.3556 -0.7913 -0.5832 1.2026
Std. Dev. 0.0617 0.0299 0.0350 0.0399 0.0348 0.0275 0.2251 0.0226
Minimum -1.4499 0.6665 1.3570 -1.0756 0.2922 -0.8247 -0.7082 1.1536
Maximum -0.7166 1.0242 1.7463 -0.5944 0.6426 -0.4836 2.2520 1.3419
Range 0.7334 0.3577 0.3893 0.4812 0.3504 0.3412 2.9602 0.1883
Skewness 7.0590 3.5980 3.2740 5.7410 3.2210 3.8920 7.9510 1.8420
Kurtosis 65.7330 25.4900 15.2760 49.4640 16.3720 29.8860 80.4800 4.5900
3 Mean 0.6054 1.9290 -0.9529 -0.7932 -0.1905 0.7739 -1.3002 -0.0715
Median 0.5926 1.9266 -0.9597 -0.7996 -0.1861 0.7669 -1.3300 -0.0666
Std. Dev. 0.0762 0.0345 0.0495 0.0533 0.0410 0.0355 0.1662 0.0276
Minimum 0.3935 1.8173 -1.1590 -0.9602 -0.3609 0.6772 -1.5412 -0.2546
Maximum 1.5250 2.3087 -0.5156 -0.2108 0.0987 1.1633 0.7426 0.0783
Range 1.1315 0.4914 0.6434 0.7495 0.4595 0.4861 2.2838 0.3329
Skewness 6.9950 3.7320 2.6130 6.8650 1.5620 3.1230 8.5030 -1.6840
Kurtosis 67.8980 33.2020 15.2790 68.8080 11.0770 20.7790 89.8220 6.8570
4 Mean 0.7634 0.9606 0.9445 1.0838 -1.1237 -1.5881 -0.3054 -0.7352
Median 0.7785 0.9687 0.9516 1.0877 -1.1165 -1.5826 -0.3044 -0.7296
Std. Dev. 0.0453 0.0290 0.0313 0.0230 0.0282 0.0240 0.0518 0.0196
Minimum 0.5996 0.8110 0.7780 0.9693 -1.2888 -1.7234 -0.4771 -0.8715
Maximum 1.0086 1.0839 1.0767 1.2509 -1.0290 -1.4812 0.2876 -0.7003
Range 0.4090 0.2729 0.2988 0.2815 0.2599 0.2422 0.7648 0.1713
Skewness -0.7580 -2.1870 -1.7900 -0.4190 -2.3230 -2.6780 5.3600 -3.2580
Kurtosis 2.5410 5.0540 5.0060 18.2980 7.1140 8.2600 54.2260 12.1320
5 Mean -0.2947 0.4957 0.9405 -0.8905 0.8351 0.3877 0.6794 -2.1531
Median -0.2524 0.5100 0.9642 -0.8757 0.8556 0.3973 0.7200 -2.1255
Std. Dev. 0.0977 0.0600 0.0678 0.0477 0.0789 0.0386 0.1128 0.0646
Minimum -0.6865 0.0895 0.5295 -1.3057 0.4400 -0.0028 0.1084 -2.5632
Maximum -0.1460 0.6130 1.0623 -0.7806 0.9735 0.4848 0.8438 -2.0337
Range 0.5405 0.5235 0.5328 0.5250 0.5335 0.4876 0.7354 0.5294
Skewness -1.4480 -1.7130 -2.5060 -2.0390 -1.8060 -2.7670 -1.5690 -2.2850
Kurtosis 1.8170 4.8570 9.1060 8.5300 4.1890 16.5000 2.4260 7.0890
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Table 27.  Detailed Hierarchical Model Specification
Personal Characteristics:
Age of householder or spouse
Sex of householder






Factored State Characteristics (see Table 20 for full detail):
Personal Characteristics 
Housing Demographics & Economic Characteristics 





Table 28.  Census Based Regression Results
Table 28.a. Ridge Regression Results
Table 28.a.1. Ridge Regression Results - Model 1 (Constant only)
Table 28.a.2. Ridge Regression Results - Model 2
Dependent variable:  HMIB    
Mult R =.7309054, R
2
 =.5342228, Adj R
2
=.5336690, SE     =
483.68461
                df        SS        MS
Regress     19.000 4.288E+09 225679359
Residual 15980.000 3.739E+09 233950.80
F-value =964.6445202,   Sig F =.0000000
  
Variable             B         SE(B)          Beta       
B/SE(B)  
AGE          -.3813913      .1386856     -.0095589    -
2.7500431*
AGE2         -.0134080      .0012339     -.0357208   -
10.8660195*
SEX        -12.3937896     7.1257088     -.0085277    -
1.7393062
DRACEW     -11.3888329    10.5690325     -.0054537    -
1.0775663
DRACEO     -14.6429466    13.9228775     -.0052945    -
1.0517184
MARSTAT     -7.8556946     7.2174391     -.0054173    -
1.0884324
DEPEXEM     33.8654537     2.8447584      .0572308   
11.9045096*
CLASSINC      .0133612      .0001132      .5839091  
118.0024661*
HSCH       -49.3899108     7.5474136     -.0314032    -
6.5439518*
SOMECOLL    -9.8967134     8.3572539     -.0056416    -
1.1842064
COLL        22.1742690     8.9240179      .0120556    
2.4847853
ADVCOLL    110.5125433    12.7736065      .0416737    
8.6516320*




OPERLABR   -78.0163321     9.8837796     -.0370816    -
7.8933703*
FARMFISH   -99.7491004    18.6424109     -.0244803    -
5.3506545*
PRECTRAD   -67.3983083    10.4564889     -.0302857    -
6.4455965*
MILITARY  -153.3219813    65.2538861     -.0106744    -
2.3496222
TECHSALE   -11.7579620     8.0894430     -.0068514    -
1.4534946
PROFEXEC    31.3558470     8.4478975      .0181489    
3.7116746*
Constant   -93.1491299    16.5822958      .0000000    -
5.6173844*
* indicates significance at the .01 level
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Table 28.a.3. Ridge Regression Results - Model 3
Dependent variable:  HMIB    
Mult R =.7424749, R
2
 =.5512690, Adj R
2
 =.5505949, SE    
=474.82557
                df        SS        MS
Regress     24.000 4.425E+09 184363701
Residual 15975.000 3.602E+09 225459.33
F-value =817.7248676,       Sig F =.0000000
Variable             B         SE(B)          Beta      
B/SE(B)
AGE          -.2806264      .1362666     -.0070334    -
2.0593929
AGE2         -.0123418      .0012121     -.0328804   -
10.1818497*
SEX         -9.2713666     6.9956325     -.0063793    -
1.3253078
DRACEW      32.2747554    10.4255703      .0154553    
3.0957305*
DRACEO      25.6503052    13.6694516      .0092744    
1.8764692
MARSTAT      -.3614093     7.0914864     -.0002492     -
.0509638
DEPEXEM     34.5623173     2.7938030      .0584084   
12.3710644*
CLASSINC      .0132623      .0001112      .5795854  
119.2395883*
HSCH       -44.3058537     7.4145511     -.0281706    -
5.9755275*
SOMECOLL   -19.6028798     8.2095168     -.0111745    -
2.3878238
COLL        15.9741280     8.7630499      .0086847    
1.8228959
ADVCOLL    104.6383882    12.5405036      .0394586    
8.3440340*
SERVICE     -8.7935075    10.9698200     -.0036415     -
.8016091
OPERLABR   -72.9054963     9.7092039     -.0346524    -
7.5089057*
FARMFISH   -94.5416046    18.3279111     -.0232023    -
5.1583404*
PRECTRAD   -65.3634890    10.2654435     -.0293714    -
6.3673322*




TECHSALE   -15.9944126     7.9448360     -.0093201    -
2.0131835
PROFEXEC    29.0811113     8.2951640      .0168323    
3.5057910*
FAC1ST      51.7848803     3.1995869      .0731119   
16.1848646*
FAC2ST     -25.8919892     3.1613287     -.0365553    -
8.1902237*
FAC3ST      51.2101429     3.1664885      .0723004   
16.1725339*
FAC4ST      28.2550811     3.1633134      .0398916    
8.9321156*
FAC5ST      -2.4823302     3.1598326     -.0035046     -
.7855892
Constant  -142.5091023    16.3228143      .0000000    -
8.7306698*
* indicates significance at the .01 level
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Table 28.a.4. Ridge Regression Results - Model 4
Table 28.a.4.A. Ridge Regression Results - Model 4 (Five Factor Scores)
Dependent variable:  HMIB    
Mult R =.7463732, R
2
 =.5570729, Adj R
2
 =.5562130, SE    
=471.84828
                df        SS        MS
Regress     31.000 4.471E+09 144235913
Residual 15968.000 3.555E+09 222640.80
F-value =647.8413265,   Sig F =.0000000
Variable             B         SE(B)          Beta      
B/SE(B)
AGE          -.3084407      .1353885     -.0077305    -
2.2781897
AGE2         -.0124553      .0012047     -.0331826   -
10.3392966*
SEX         -7.6962995     6.9525920     -.0052955    -
1.1069684
DRACEW      43.0785353    10.3888130      .0206289    
4.1466273*
DRACEO      32.8363857    13.5944345      .0118727    
2.4154286
MARSTAT       .5543396     7.0476792      .0003823     
.0786556
DEPEXEM     34.9331046     2.7767906      .0590350   
12.5803884*
CLASSINC      .0130875      .0001103      .5719468  
118.6040094*
HSCH       -41.9888127     7.3729595     -.0266974    -
5.6949740*
SOMECOLL   -21.9044544     8.1602509     -.0124865    -
2.6842869*
COLL        14.5282462     8.7092049      .0078986    
1.6681484
ADVCOLL    103.3918052    12.4621427      .0389885    
8.2964710*
SERVICE     -7.1534828    10.9015373     -.0029623     -
.6561903
OPERLABR   -71.0783152     9.6516810     -.0337839    -
7.3643457*
FARMFISH   -92.3213739    18.2223047     -.0226574    -
5.0663939*




MILITARY  -193.1491018    63.6763796     -.0134473    -
3.0332928*
TECHSALE   -17.0790261     7.8960097     -.0099521    -
2.1629946
PROFEXEC    29.0376077     8.2442758      .0168071    
3.5221538*
FAC1ST      -2.4433973     1.7928626     -.0034497    -
1.3628470
FAC2ST      -1.3116976     1.8664273     -.0018519     -
.7027853
FAC3ST      34.3106065     2.5372229      .0484410   
13.5228982*
FAC4ST       8.2662677     1.8948492      .0116706    
4.3624937*
FAC5ST     -22.5322490     1.7888627     -.0318119   -
12.5958518*
STIA      -103.2453867     5.5035396     -.0482090   -
18.7598152*
STKY       -60.2479291     6.3957252     -.0281319    -
9.4200310*
STTX       -83.4772637     5.2403197     -.0389786   -
15.9298036*
STFL        -3.0187935     7.0316825     -.0014096     -
.4293131
STNY         1.9282922     7.2199719      .0009004     
.2670775
STIL         3.2050330     7.6901112      .0014965     
.4167733
STCA       202.9255418     6.9589935      .0947533   
29.1601857*
Constant  -141.5081935    16.2855390      .0000000    -
8.6891931*
* indicates significance at the .01 level
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Table 28.a.4.B. Ridge Regression Results - Model 4 (Seven Factor Scores)
Dependent variable:  HMIB    
Mult R =.7772424, R
2
 =.6041058, Adj R
2
 =.6032875, SE    
=446.12139
                df        SS        MS
Regress     33.000 4.849E+09 146933931
Residual 15966.000 3.178E+09 199024.30
F-value =738.2713245,   Sig F =.0000000
Variable             B         SE(B)          Beta      
B/SE(B)
AGE         -1.4223082      .1275694     -.0356475   -
11.1492894*
AGE2         -.0141356      .0011409     -.0376592   -
12.3894718*
SEX          -.5444363     6.5759518     -.0003746     -
.0827920
DRACEW      17.0379022     9.8286157      .0081589    
1.7334997
DRACEO      38.9809054    12.8541581      .0140944    
3.0325522*
MARSTAT    -30.4079002     6.6926978     -.0209695    -
4.5434444*
DEPEXEM     27.5932185     2.6263577      .0466310   
10.5062682*
CLASSINC      .0104777      .0001103      .4578955   
94.9707414*
HSCH       -49.5499248     6.9691853     -.0315049    -
7.1098590*
SOMECOLL   -40.1681365     7.7149803     -.0228976    -
5.2065119*
COLL       -19.4806589     8.2443291     -.0105911    -
2.3629162
ADVCOLL     51.7723781    11.8126008      .0195231    
4.3828094*
SERVICE     -5.6371620    10.3075073     -.0023344     -
.5468987
OPERLABR   -60.2391613     9.1290794     -.0286320    -
6.5986019*
FARMFISH   -91.9004526    17.2289094     -.0225541    -
5.3340842*
PRECTRAD   -60.6664695     9.6453990     -.0272607    -
6.2896796*




TECHSALE   -35.7014783     7.4693035     -.0208035    -
4.7797600*
PROFEXEC     2.2301138     7.8089631      .0012908     
.2855839
FAC1ST      19.3994012     1.5686817      .0273888   
12.3666904*
FAC2ST      -6.2988842     1.6630681     -.0088930    -
3.7875084*
FAC3ST      43.2779842     2.3836878      .0611015   
18.1558944*
FAC4ST      20.6081685     1.7784523      .0290954   
11.5876981*
FAC5ST      -3.4947681     1.6375254     -.0049340    -
2.1341764
FAC6ST      27.5079010     3.2617108      .0388367    
8.4335807*
FAC7ST     188.7348741     3.2837943      .2664631   
57.4746333*
STIA       -66.9855375     5.1302039     -.0312780   -
13.0570906*
STKY       -42.2417159     6.0469552     -.0197242    -
6.9856175*
STTX       -25.9581289     4.8235156     -.0121208    -
5.3815787*
STFL       -40.8980783     6.7844570     -.0190968    -
6.0282022*
STNY        20.2063938     6.8393701      .0094351    
2.9544232*
STIL       -55.7260366     7.5290861     -.0260205    -
7.4014344*
STCA       100.4336503     6.8869917      .0468961   
14.5830944*
Constant    77.7520344    15.6310411      .0000000    
4.9742070*
* indicates significance at the .01 level
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Table 28.b. OLS Regression Results
Table 28.b.1. OLS Regression Results - Model 1
  
  Dependent variable:  HMIB          
  Model size: N = 16000, Parameters =  1, Df=  15999  
  Residuals:  SS= 8990377092. , SD= 749.62236  
  Fit:        R
2
= -.120095, Adjusted R
2
 = -.12009  
 Variable   Coefficient            SE       B/SE    
P[|Z|>z] 
 Constant  508.5908068      5.9262851       85.819   .0000
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Table 28.b.2.  OLS Regression Results - Model 2
  
  Dependent variable:  HMIB    
  Model size: N = 16000, Parameters = 20, Df=  15980  
  Residuals:  SS= 3578150391.  , SD=  473.19583  
  Fit:        R
2
=  .554205, Adjusted R
2
 =  .55367  
  Model test: F[ 19,  15980] = 1045.58,    P-value = 
.00000  
 Variable   Coefficient           SE        B/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant -112.0847650      36.716156       -3.053   .0023
 AGE       4.635489705      1.3807437        3.357   .0008 
 AGE2     -.7488905671E-01  .13573977E-01   -5.517   .0000 
 SEX      -5.614456451      9.2752973        -.605   .5450 
 DRACEW   -26.51798367      15.973282       -1.660   .0969 
 DRACEO   -31.36706998      20.778295       -1.510   .1311 
 MARSTAT  -96.85200286      9.8232467       -9.859   .0000 
 DEPEXEM   34.80468861      3.5605451        9.775   .0000 
 CLASSINC  .1723031175E-01  .15234265E-03  113.102   .0000 
 HSCH     -75.55252223      10.745431       -7.031   .0000 
 SOMECOLL -47.06932042      12.100839       -3.890   .0001 
 COLL     -42.24593259      13.521303       -3.124   .0018 
 ADVCOLL   9.936684927      18.164282         .547   .5843 
 SERVICE  -77.47757509      16.721775       -4.633   .0000 
 OPERLABR -170.8649826      16.365558      -10.441   .0000 
 FARMFISH -174.0984646      24.117344       -7.219   .0000 
 PRECTRAD -168.2760424      17.148126       -9.813   .0000 
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 MILITARY -235.4824584      77.173082       -3.051   .0023 
 TECHSALE -117.7064186      14.956763       -7.870   .0000 
 PROFEXEC -98.43583536      16.150519       -6.095   .0000 
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Table 28.b.3. OLS Regression Results - Model 3
  Dependent variable:  HMIB
  Model size: N = 16000, Parameters =  25, Df=  15975  
  Residuals:  SS= 3440882480.  , SD= 464.10312  
  Fit:        R
2
=  .571307, Adjusted R
2
 =   .57066  
  Model test: F[ 24,  15975] =  887.06,    P-value =  
.00000  
 Variable   Coefficient           SE        B/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant -193.2546275      36.204160       -5.338   .0000
 AGE       4.610331083      1.3545824        3.404   .0007 
 AGE2     -.7243053056E-01  .13319960E-01   -5.438   .0000 
 SEX      -.7032201968      9.1026387        -.077   .9384 
 DRACEW    52.77259634      16.146737        3.268   .0011 
 DRACEO    53.26259376      20.690816        2.574   .0100 
 MARSTAT  -85.08488727      9.6688076       -8.800   .0000 
 DEPEXEM   36.33504753      3.4954347       10.395   .0000 
 CLASSINC  .1708800067E-01  .14972670E-03  114.128   .0000 
 HSCH     -72.67988395      10.565893       -6.879   .0000 
 SOMECOLL -63.27014233      11.912819       -5.311   .0000 
 COLL     -53.41353949      13.301620       -4.016   .0001 
 ADVCOLL  -.9896987671E-01  17.834959        -.006   .9956 
 SERVICE  -75.16784069      16.412181       -4.580   .0000 
 OPERLABR -163.9621119      16.066108      -10.205   .0000 
 FARMFISH -169.0077880      23.745785       -7.117   .0000 
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 PRECTRAD -164.8926211      16.826168       -9.800   .0000 
 MILITARY -286.6615067      75.738231       -3.785   .0002 
 TECHSALE -122.0857541      14.680502       -8.316   .0000 
 PROFEXEC -99.28246776      15.846124       -6.265   .0000 
 FAC1st    56.58589582      3.8203869       14.812   .0000 
 FAC2st   -33.55406207      3.6912744       -9.090   .0000 
 FAC3st    59.61636837      3.7021266       16.103   .0000 
 FAC4st    34.42809928      3.7065112        9.289   .0000 




Table 28.b.4. OLS Regression Results - Model 4
  Dependent variable:  HMIB
  Model size: N = 16000, Parameters =  32, Df=  15968  
  Residuals:  SS= 2997922954.  , SD= 433.29629  




 =  .62577  
  Model test: F[ 31,  15968] =  863.99,  P-value =  .00000 
 Variable   Coefficient           SE       B/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant  252.5937601      188.02980        1.343   .1792
 AGE      -4.028485589      1.2797560       -3.148   .0016 
 AGE2     -.5793040886E-02  .12530613E-01    -.462   .6439 
 SEX       5.633586799      8.5012139         .663   .5075 
 DRACEW    26.61333565      15.124251        1.760   .0785 
 DRACEO    54.51364702      19.342617        2.818   .0048 
 MARSTAT  -104.0196457      9.0640736      -11.476   .0000 
 DEPEXEM   28.32434069      3.2737734        8.652   .0000 
 CLASSINC  .1315407995E-01  .18545179E-03   70.930   .0000 
 HSCH     -88.01697323      9.9024929       -8.888   .0000 
 SOMECOLL -95.63629213      11.174148       -8.559   .0000 
 COLL     -101.4537119      12.502234       -8.115   .0000 
 ADVCOLL  -58.42169666      16.744488       -3.489   .0005 
 SERVICE  -60.45299057      15.335894       -3.942   .0001 
 OPERLABR -137.7111964      15.030328       -9.162   .0000 
 FARMFISH -163.1961499      22.187687       -7.355   .0000 
 PRECTRAD -146.5543422      15.726777       -9.319   .0000 
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 MILITARY -227.3678881      70.727388       -3.215   .0013 
 TECHSALE -125.5496962      13.722160       -9.149   .0000 
 PROFEXEC -102.9890866      14.822347       -6.948   .0000 
 FAC1st   -4300.727780      294.17769      -14.619   .0000 
 FAC2st   -4408.004200      245.14184      -17.981   .0000 
 FAC3st    927.7114948      154.39840        6.009   .0000 
 FAC4st    1302.328372      354.86715        3.670   .0002 
 FAC5st   -768.8241893      144.47945       -5.321   .0000 
 STIA     -13030.01332      983.41225      -13.250   .0000 
 STKY     -6958.488496      316.91508      -21.957   .0000 
 STTX      6755.434561      979.51546        6.897   .0000 
 STFL      5290.759380      503.55811       10.507   .0000 
 STNY      3822.375511      351.31089       10.880   .0000 
 STIL      4720.750630      605.16073        7.801   .0000 
 STCA     -768.2339668      195.10769       -3.937   .0001 
 
Table 28.c. Tobit Regression Results
Table 28.c.1. Tobit Regression Results - Model 1
  Dependent variable:        HMIB     
  N            16000      
  LL       -54696.83      
 Variable   Coefficient           SE       B/SE    
P[|Z|>z] 
 Constant -659.4126958      17.466514      -37.753   .0000
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Table 28.c.2. Tobit Regression Results - Model 2
 Dependent variable:        HMIB    
 N            16000      
 LL       -49442.49      
 Variable   Coefficient           SE       B/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant -3319.593917      104.69804      -31.706   .0000
 AGE       93.03977521      4.2049537       22.126   .0000 
 AGE2     -1.050775836      .44337517E-01  -23.699   .0000 
 SEX      -48.33514110      20.717725       -2.333   .0196 
 DRACEW    100.9921344      36.233979        2.787   .0053 
 DRACEO   -13.58395263      49.321907        -.275   .7830 
 MARSTAT   195.8568377      22.936792        8.539   .0000 
 DEPEXEM   64.24080253      7.4550604        8.617   .0000 
 CLASSINC  .2217452740E-01  .28472657E-03   77.880   .0000 
 HSCH      82.73642697      27.062789        3.057   .0022 
 SOMECOLL  211.9177683      28.902428        7.332   .0000 
 COLL      225.8752450      30.812232        7.331   .0000 
 ADVCOLL   230.6083638      38.552342        5.982   .0000 
 SERVICE  -4.607270419      46.937958        -.098   .9218 
 OPERLABR -15.94574337      43.979932        -.363   .7169 
 FARMFISH -332.9382797      66.484161       -5.008   .0000 
 PRECTRAD  31.93778044      44.374462         .720   .4717 
 MILITARY -307.7000972      174.47635       -1.764   .0778 
 TECHSALE  75.58792518      41.248127        1.833   .0669 
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 PROFEXEC  86.18040674      42.499809        2.028   .0426 
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Table 28.c.3. Tobit Regression Results - Model 3
                
 Dependent variable:        HMIB      
 N            16000      
 LL       -49214.57      
 Variable   Coefficient           SE       B/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant -3425.394211      102.03803      -33.570   .0000
 AGE       91.84150878      4.0810848       22.504   .0000 
 AGE2     -1.037788243      .43111455E-01  -24.072   .0000 
 SEX      -41.65359678      20.002264       -2.082   .0373 
 DRACEW    248.1941514      35.978549        6.898   .0000 
 DRACEO    126.3184127      48.289048        2.616   .0089 
 MARSTAT   225.2738887      22.280871       10.111   .0000 
 DEPEXEM   68.07914185      7.1877876        9.472   .0000 
 CLASSINC  .2173329958E-01  .27477825E-03   79.094   .0000 
 HSCH      96.32243206      26.254375        3.669   .0002 
 SOMECOLL  182.3363940      28.015286        6.508   .0000 
 COLL      209.4443002      29.822798        7.023   .0000 
 ADVCOLL   217.8791420      37.232501        5.852   .0000 
 SERVICE  -2.942553999      45.650338        -.064   .9486 
 OPERLABR  5.708557287      42.795789         .133   .8939 
 FARMFISH -312.7341275      64.789700       -4.827   .0000 
 PRECTRAD  37.48095348      43.133186         .869   .3849 
 MILITARY -407.0136904      168.24527       -2.419   .0156 
 TECHSALE  62.59076689      40.125497        1.560   .1188 
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 PROFEXEC  76.82311452      41.308302        1.860   .0629 
 FAC1st    126.8890324      8.4938137       14.939   .0000 
 FAC2st   -16.23960397      8.0048258       -2.029   .0425 
 FAC3st    91.54838961      7.8601544       11.647   .0000 
 FAC4st    73.78376440      8.2313792        8.964   .0000 




Table 28.c.4. Tobit Regression Results - Model 4
 Dependent variable:        HMIB      
 N            16000      
 LL       -47955.10      
 Variable   Coefficient           SE       B/SE    
P[|Z|>z]
 Constant  434.4899320      348.63716        1.246   .2127
 AGE       64.74414160      3.7070601       17.465   .0000 
 AGE2     -.8168371409      .39205311E-01  -20.835   .0000 
 SEX      -19.83453744      18.090762       -1.096   .2729 
 DRACEW    194.4746275      33.093341        5.877   .0000 
 DRACEO    157.8347607      44.205665        3.570   .0004 
 MARSTAT   168.0613139      20.328719        8.267   .0000 
 DEPEXEM   47.80033562      6.4894993        7.366   .0000 
 CLASSINC  .1529186746E-01  .33565547E-03   45.558   .0000 
 HSCH      45.09037270      23.784989        1.896   .0580 
 SOMECOLL  78.66799547      25.378347        3.100   .0019 
 COLL      60.13670923      27.118394        2.218   .0266 
 ADVCOLL   54.65939401      33.785035        1.618   .1057 
 SERVICE   36.97244285      41.973969         .881   .3784 
 OPERLABR  62.50422460      39.347493        1.589   .1122 
 FARMFISH -242.3132123      58.388445       -4.150   .0000 
 PRECTRAD  66.99971949      39.565070        1.693   .0904 
 MILITARY -289.3229496      151.32781       -1.912   .0559 
 TECHSALE  31.88611775      36.937224         .863   .3880 
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 PROFEXEC  52.61036221      37.938632        1.387   .1655 
 FAC1st   -4888.983404      526.61263       -9.284   .0000 
 FAC2st   -4950.048061      438.76278      -11.282   .0000 
 FAC3st    1408.642503      278.66081        5.055   .0000
-
 FAC4st   -1226.739355      637.06969       -1.926   .0542 
 FAC5st   -2417.956253      258.80956       -9.343   .0000 
 STIA     -15791.65560      1751.3947       -9.017   .0000 
 STKY     -14617.44671      542.93397      -26.923   .0000 
 STTX     -418.9551939      1773.4644        -.236   .8132 
 STFL      7702.864760      915.43256        8.414   .0000 
 STNY      2244.567822      642.20664        3.495   .0005 
 STIL      935.9088970      1089.4762         .859   .3903 
 STCA     -1979.890884      343.95517       -5.756   .0000 
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Table 29.  H4-H6 Results 
Table 29.a. Census Hypothesis Test Results (Ridge)
Table 29.a.1.  H4 Results (Ridge)
Model Model Description R2
1 HMIBENE = F(Constant) 0
2 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Personal Characteristics)   .534222
FH4= [(.534222-0)/(1-.534222)]*[(16,000-0-8-1)/(8)]=2,293
Table 29.a.2.  H5 Results (Ridge)
Model Model Description R2
2 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Personal Characteristics) .534222




Table 29.a.3.  H6 Results (Ridge)
Model Model Description R2
3 HMIBENE =F(Constant + Personal Characteristics + State Factor
Scores)
.551269
4 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Personal Characteristics + State
Factor Scores + State of Residence)
.557073
FH6= [(.557073-.551269)/(1-.557073)]*[(16,000-13-7-1)/(7)]=30





Table 29.b. Census Hypothesis Test Results (OLS)
 
7The actual value reported by Limdep is -.120095, yielding an  F of 2,949.  Either
value indicates the same test result - highly significant.
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Table 29.b.1.  H4 Results (OLS)
Model Model Description R2
1 HMIBENE = F(Constant) 07
2 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Personal Characteristics)   .554205
 FH4= [(.554205-0)/(1-.554205)]*[(16,000-0-8-1)/(8)]=2,485
Table 29.b.2.  H5 Results (OLS)
Model Model Description R2
2 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Personal Characteristics) .554205




Table 29.b.3.  H6 Results (OLS)
Model Model Description R2
3 HMIBENE =F(Constant + Personal Characteristics + State
Factor Scores)
.571307
4 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Personal Characteristics + State
Factor Scores + State of Residence)
.626494
 FH6= [(.626494-.571307)/(1-.626494)]*[(16,000-13-7-1)/(7)]=337.280
Table 29.b.4. Summary of Hypothesis Test Results (OLS)







Table 29.c. Census Hypothesis Test Results (Tobit)
Table 29.c.1.  H4 Results (Tobit)
Model Model Description LL
1 HMIBENE = F(Constant8) -54,697
2 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Personal Characteristics) -49,442
Ç 2H4 = 2*[LL(2) - LL(1)] = 2*[-49,442 - (-54,697)] = 10,840
Table 29.c.2.  H5 Results (Tobit)
Model Model Description LL
2 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Personal Characteristics) -49,442
3 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Personal Characteristics + State
Factor Scores)
-49,215
Ç 2H5 = 2*[LL(3) - LL(2)] = 2*[-49,215 - (-49,442)] = 454
Table 29.c.3.  H6 Results (Tobit)
Model Model Description LL
3 HMIBENE =F(Constant + Personal Characteristics + State
Factor Scores)
-49,215
4 HMIBENE = F(Constant + Personal Characteristics + State
Factor Scores + State of Residence)
-47,955
Ç 2H6 = 2*[LL(4) - LL(3)] = 2*[-47,955 - (-49,215)] = 2,520
Table 29.c.4. Summary of Hypothesis Test Results (Tobit)






Table 30.   State Dummy Coefficients and P-values (Ridge v. Tobit v. OLS)
Ridge Tobit OLS
Coefficient P[|Z|>z] Coefficient P[|Z|>z] Coefficient P[|Z|>z]
STIA -103.25 0.0000 -15791.66 0.0000 -13030.01 0.0000
STKY -60.25 0.0000 -14617.45 0.0000 -6958.49 0.0000
STTX -83.48 0.0000 -418.96 0.8132 6755.43 0.0000
STFL -3.02 0.6677 7702.86 0.0000 5290.76 0.0000
STNY 1.93 0.7894 2244.57 0.0005 3822.38 0.0000
STIL 3.21 0.6768 935.91 0.3903 4720.75 0.0000
STCA 202.92 0.0000 -1979.89 0.0000 -768.23 0.0001
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Table 31.  Differences in Mean State Effects (Ridge, Corrected & Uncorrected)
State
Uncorrected Effects Corrected Effects Corrected v.
Uncorrected
Means
Mean Difference Mean Difference
IA 83.97 - 165.14 - 81.17
KY 124.55 40.58 184.91 19.77 -3.76
TX 188.67 64.12 208.13 23.22 83.58
FL 199.77 11.10 265.36 57.23 65.59
NY 248.01 48.24 268.38 3.02 -97.91
IL 269.47 21.46 270.31 1.93 22.3
CO 366.29 96.82 271.59 1.28 2.12






























































































Figure 2.  Scree Plot for State Characteristic Factor Analysis
